

VOL. XVIII. No. 4.

OCTOBER, 1908.

THE MONIST

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Philosophy of Science

Editor: DR. PAUL CARUS.

Associates: { E. C. HEGLER.
MARY CARUS.

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CHICAGO

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

Price, 60 cents; Yearly, \$2.00

LONDON: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd.

In England and U. P. U., half a crown; Yearly, 9s 6d.

Entered as Second-Class Matter Oct. 10, 1890, at the Post Office at Chicago, Ill., under Act of March 3, 1879.
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THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY

1908

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THE MONIST

A BRIEF HISTORY OF EARLY CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.¹

III. RELIGION.

I WISH, under this heading, to discuss the conception of God or Shang Ti in the Five Canonical Books (*Wu King*), especially in the Shu and the Shih, both of which can be considered to embody the gist of popular philosophy in early China. The reason why I confine myself to these classical documents is because every religious attitude manifested by the Chinese towards God is to be found in them, and I might almost say—only in them. The philosophers, on the other hand, including the Confucians, the Taoists and others, seem to have had nothing especially to do with the worship of God. In fact, there is a very definite line of demarcation between these two representative groups of writings, the classic and the philosophical treatises. The first are religious in the proper sense of the word, while the latter are practical, moral and rationalistic, or sometimes highly speculative as is the case with the Taoist books.

The earliest Chinese notion of God was more or less personal; the relation that obtained between Heaven (*T'ien*) and mankind on earth was to a certain degree intimate and mutually responsive; whenever misfortune vis-

¹ Former instalments of Mr. Suzuki's "Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy" have appeared in *The Monist*: (1) Philosophy, in July, 1907, and (2) Ethics, in April, 1908.

ited the people they were sure to cry to Heaven as the source of mercy and repented of their wickedness. But when the philosophical mind began to make inquiries, Heaven lost its emotional, religious relations to the creatures below; for it became more and more impersonal until it finally came to represent no more than natural laws which required no special humoring, as it were. The *t'ien* came to be used in the sense of rationality and almost entirely replaced *Ti* (Lord) or *Shang Ti* (Lord on high), a term fully suggesting a personal agent.²

That in ancient times the Chinese had in their minds a being, or power, or even a person that governed mortals below, is gathered from the terms (Lord, August Heaven, Pitying Heaven, etc.) so liberally and religiously used in the Shu King, Shih King, Yih King, and Li Ki—especially in the first two canonical books. In what follows an attempt will be made to illustrate the attitude of the early

² It may not be altogether proper to consider *Shang Ti* as a person residing in heaven (*t'ien*). Though it is certain that he was not merely a moral power nor the personification of Heaven as some Christian missionary scholars of Chinese religion are inclined to believe, he was not a person in the fullest sense of the word. But he had something of personality in him and could properly be called "he" instead of "it." There is no doubt, however, that the early Chinese did not conceive their *Shang Ti* as did the Jews their Yahweh. When the Chinese spoke of *Shang Ti*, they had in their minds something of an august supreme being in Heaven above, who was the arbiter of human destiny, though not their creator. He did not, exactly speaking, reside in Heaven, but Heaven was his material or objective expression. Figuratively speaking, Heaven was *Shang Ti*, and *Shang Ti* was Heaven. A famous commentator to the Wu King, Lü Shih, says: "It is called Heaven (*t'ien*) when viewed from the point of its overshadowing the entire world; it is called Lord (*ti*) when viewed from the point of its rulership." Again, the author of the Lu Shih, a history of prehistoric China, says in one of his supplementary essays attached to the History: "Ti is *T'ien*, and *T'ien* is *Ti*. Why, are they not identical? *T'ien* is a general name given to primordial essence [*yüan ch'i*], while *Ti* is a name given to its virtue as manifested in its activities. It is *T'ien* when viewed from the point of its objectivity; it is *Ti* when viewed from the point of its rulership. When the immensity of depth, height, and expansion of the essence is considered, it is called the 'lord on high in great heaven.' When reference is made to the fact that the lords of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth abiding in different localities assume alternately the rank of leadership, we consider the Lord differentiating himself into five lordships, and he is accordingly known under five different names, which may however be comprised in the one name of Great Heaven. When sacrifices are offered to the five lords who severally assuming their celestial ranks are to be designated under one common appellation, then they are collectively known as the *Shang Ti* (Lord on high)."

Chinese towards this *Ti* as well as the attributes under which he was conceived.

1. In the first place, Heaven (*T'ien*) was compassionate, as is known from one of its common attributes, *min*, "pitying." Whenever the early Chinese suffered, they called upon Heaven for protection and commiseration; they found consolation in their distress by addressing Heaven as their parents. When the early Chinese settlement was still struggling hard with wild and barbarous neighbors, the San Miao tribes who rebelled repeatedly against Chinese rule, they thought it expedient to appeal to the religious sentiment of the wild Miao and to call God to their help. So we read in the "Counsels of the Great Yü," in the Shu King (Part II, Book II): "At the end of three decades, the people of Miao rebelled against the commands, when Yi came to the help of Yü, saying, 'It is virtue only that moves Heaven; there is no distance to which it does not extend. Fulness invites loss, humility receives increase,—this is the way of Heaven. In the early time of Ti³ when he was living by Mount Li, he went into the fields, cried daily to Pitying Heaven, and to his parents, taking upon himself all guilt and charging himself with their wickedness. At the same time with respectful humility he appeared before Kû Sâu, looking grave and awestruck, till Kû Sâu also became transformed by his example. Entire sincerity moves the spirits, how much more will it move the rulers of Miao!'"⁴

Under King Li (B. C. 878-828) of the Chou dynasty, a courtier was slandered and disgraced. He did not know where to appeal for vindication but to Heaven who looked upon human affairs with parental sympathy. He composed

³That is, Shun, who became the ruler of this early settlement in the year B. C. 2255.

⁴The quotations from the Shu and the Shih King are generally taken, with occasional modifications, from Legge's translations in the *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. III.

a poem and thus addressed Heaven: "O Great and Distant Heaven, who art called our parent,⁵ why should I without crime or offence suffer from disorders so great! The terrors of Great Heaven are excessive, but indeed I have committed no crime. The terrors of Great Heaven are very excessive, but indeed I have committed no offence." (Shih King, II, V, 4. Legge, p. 361.)

Mang Tze, chief of eunuchs, became a victim of slander whereat he cried to Heaven, bitterly denouncing his enemies: "The proud are delighted and the troubled are in sorrow. O Azure Heaven! Look on these proud men; pity those who are troubled." (Shih, II, V, 4.)

2. Since Heaven is compassionate, it is Heaven that showers blessings upon humankind. The early Chinese were quite simple-hearted. Whenever their hearts overflowed either in grief or in joy, they, like every other primitive people, made Heaven their last refuge. When the Chou dynasty came to full sovereignty through the successful achievements of its earlier rulers, T'ai Wang, T'ai Pe, Wang Chi, and through the subjugation of Mi and Ts'ung by King Wên, they ascribed this to the special grace of Heaven shown to the House of Chou, and for which the poet was made to sing the virtues of the kings and to thank Heaven in the following lines: "Great is the Lord on high, beholding this lower world in majesty. He surveyed the four quarters, seeking for some one to give establishment to the people. Those two earlier dynasties had failed to satisfy him with their government; so throughout the various states, he sought one on whom he might confer the rule. Hating all the great states, he turned his attention to the West, and gave a settlement [to King T'ai]." (Shih III, I, 7. Legge, p. 389.)

This idea of heavenly bliss is also expressed in a much

⁵Cf. Shu King, Part V, Book I, "The Great Declaration"; "Heaven and Earth are the parents of all creatures."

earlier ode of the Shang dynasty (B. C. 1766-1123). The piece is a sort of hymn sung to the spirit of the founder of the dynasty, T'ang the Perfect. First, it alludes to his virtuous life, offerings are made, he is asked to partake of them and to bless his descendants. Then it describes the feudal princes coming to celebrate the festival (Shih, IV, V, 2): "With the hubs of their wheels bound with leather, and their ornamented yokes, with the eight bells at their horses' bits all tinkling, [the princes] come to assist at the offerings. We have received the appointment in all its greatness, and from Heaven is our prosperity sent down, fruitful years of great abundance. [Our ancestors] will come and enjoy [our offerings] and confer on us happiness without limit."

In another ode belonging to the same period, the virtue of T'ang the Perfect is described and praised as a special blessing bestowed upon him by Heaven: "He received the tribute of the states, small and large, and supported them as a strong steed [does its burden]:—so did he receive the blessings of Heaven. He displayed everywhere his valor, unshaken, unmoved, unterrified, unsared,—all dignities were united in him." (Shih, IV, V, 4. Legge, p. 310.)

This idea of heavenly bliss is also expressed by Chou Kung in his advice to his colleague, Shao Kung, who wanted to retire from royal service. Alluding to the prosperous state which the Chou dynasty was then enjoying, the Duke of Chou says: "And the favor of Heaven has come to us so largely; it should be ours to feel as if we could not sufficiently respond to it." (Shu, Part V, Book XVI, "The Prince Shih.")

3. Not only bliss but curses come also from Heaven, when the creatures below pay no regard to the moral laws as established by it. There are numerous passages in the Shu as well as the Shih in which sufferers most pitifully appeal to Heaven for rescue, sometimes even blaming

Heaven for the misery which they endure. This is quite natural; for were it not for the existence of evils man would never become conscious of a power above him. To quote only a few of the many lamentations addressed to Heaven by the early Chinese: "Great Heaven is not just to send down these dire calamities; Great Heaven is not merciful to send down these miseries... O Unpitying Great Heaven, there is no end to disorder! With every month it continues to grow so that the people have no rest." (Shih, II, IV, 7.)⁶ "Great and Far-reaching Heaven, how is it thou hast not extended thy benevolence, but sendest down ruin and famine, and bringest about desolation throughout the empire? Pitying Heaven, quickened with wrath, hast thou no discrimination, no design? Leave unpunished those who sinned, for they have already suffered for their offences. But those who are without sin are also drawn into the general misfortune." (Shih, II, IV, 10.)⁷ "Shou, King of Shang, does not reverence Heaven above, and inflicts calamities on the people below.... Great Heaven was moved with indignation." (Shu, Part V, Book I.)⁸

4. Heaven was thus considered to be in possession of full power over mankind. It showed mercy to those who were virtuous and obedient to the heavenly will; but woe unto those who deviated from its prescribed course; no one could resist or ignore heavenly displeasure. "The overpowering wrath of unfathomable Heaven is felt throughout the world below." (Shih, II, V, 1.)⁹ "Right

⁶ Legge, p. 352 ff. The poem is said to have been composed by Chih Fu, a grand officer of the Chou dynasty under King Yu (B.C. 781-771), who listened to the evil advice of his favorite mistress Yin.

⁷ Legge, p. 357. The author of the poem is Chih Yu of the Chou dynasty, who wrote this, lamenting the unjustifiable action of the King and expressing his surprise at its progress unchecked by heavenly wrath.

⁸ Legge, p. 125 f. From the first section of the "Great Declaration," which is divided into three. The Declaration was issued by King Wu of the Chou dynasty when he assembled his army at Mang Ching to attack Chou Hsin, the tyrant of the Shang. Some consider this spurious.

⁹ Legge, p. 358. A poem written during the reign of King Yu who was notorious for his misconduct. It continues: "[The King's] counsels and plans

from the spring comes the water bubbling, revealing its depths,—sorrow of my heart! Did it start only to-day? Why not in the days before me? Why not in the days after me? Incomprehensible Heaven, far and distant, is able to strengthen anything. Do not disgrace your ancestors, but save your posterity." (Shih, III, III, 10.)¹⁰ "If you reverently obey, Heaven will favor and compassionate you. But if you do not reverently obey, you shall not only be deprived of your lands, but I will also carry to the utmost Heaven's inflictions upon your persons." (Shu, V, XIV. Legge, p. 200.) In this passage, which is taken from Chou Kung's address to the "Numerous Officers" of the Yin dynasty which he had just overthrown, we notice his most threatening attitude toward the survivors of the preceding dynasty. This is due to the conviction that he represents in his person the authorities above, according to which he was ordered to overturn the tyrannical government of Shang. This theocratic conception is traceable throughout in the history of China, to which further reference will be made later on.

5. Owing to the fact that sinners are liable at any time to be visited with heavenly judgments, the power above had to be revered and its decrees complied with. The poet Fang Peh, of the Chou dynasty, who mourns the prevailing misery of the people suffering from the reckless policy of King Yu, strongly urges the King and his counsellors to heed the wrath exhibited by Heaven: "Revere the wrath of Heaven, and dare not to make sport or be lax. Revere the ways of Heaven, and dare not to be wild and unruly. Great Heaven is bright and is with you wherever you go. Great Heaven is clear-sighted, and is

are crooked and bad. When will an end be put to them? Good counsels are not followed; evil counsels are listened to. When I look at the counsels and schemes, I am greatly grieved."

¹⁰ Legge, p. 429. Composed in the time of King Yu. The author evidently believes in the almighty power of Heaven who can turn misery into happiness, if the people below behaved according to his behest.

with you wherever you wander." (Shih, III, II, 10. Legge, p. 410.) In the same spirit, King Wu addresses K'ang Shu who was about to be appointed Marquis of Wei which was formerly a stronghold of the Shang dynasty: "Let us be reverent, let us be reverent. The way of Heaven is evident, and its decree is not easy to follow. Say not that it is high, high above us. It ascends and descends around these people; daily overseeing us, it is wherever we are....Oh! Fang, my little child, be reverent as if thy person were suffering from a disease; awesome though Heaven be, it yet helps the sincere." (Shu, V, IX. Legge, p. 165 ff.)

6. Heaven is not only the symbol of power and energy, but that of wisdom, bright and illuminating. "High Heaven, so bright, the earth below lies in thy illuminating survey." (Shih, II, VI, 3.)¹¹ "Great Heaven is exceedingly bright." (Shih, III, III, 2.)¹² "The bright and illuminating Lord on high giveth us promise of a prosperous year." (Shih, IV, II, 1.)¹³ "Great Heaven is bright and is with you in all your journeys. Great Heaven is clear-sighted and is with you in all your wanderings." (Shih, III, II, 10.)

7. Being intelligent and all-seeing, what is decreed by Heaven must be carried out by man who is no more than a mere instrument. The will of Heaven once declared is irrevocable, for it is the source of the moral laws and the

¹¹This is from a poem composed by a court officer engaged in a frontier war. Speaking of the hardships which he endures, he calls to Heaven that knows everything which transpires on earth, and continues: "I marched on this expedition to the West as far as this wilderness of Ch'iu. From the first to the second moon, I have passed through the heat and the cold. My heart is sad, the poison [of my lot] is too bitter. I think of those officers at court, and my tears fall down like rain. Do I not wish for home? but I dread the net of guilt."

¹²Legge, p. 416. From a didactic poem by Duke Wu of Wei in his ninth year.

¹³Legge, p. 321. By Chou Kung who admonishes his minister of agriculture.

standard of conduct. So, a poet¹⁴ of the Chou dynasty again declares: "Look into the midst of the forest; there we find large faggots and small twigs. The people now in their sad condition look towards Heaven, vague and indefinite. Yet when its determination is fixed, there is no one whom it will not conquer. There is the great Lord on high, and does he hate any one?" Duke Wu of Wei makes a rejoinder to this conviction when he says, "Great Heaven never errs." (*Shih, III, III, 2.*)¹⁵ And this unerring decree of Heaven was ever kept in view by a wise ruler, who would never think of doing violence to his moral conscience as an expression of the heavenly will. The Chinese government in those earlier days, and perhaps even now to a certain extent, was a theocracy. So we read in the "Instructions" given to T'ai Chia by his aged teacher minister, Yi Yin, (*Shu, IV, V.* Legge, p. 95 ff.): "The former king kept his eye constantly on the manifest decrees of Heaven, and so maintained the worship of the spirits of heaven and earth, of those presiding over the land and the grain, and of those of the ancestral temple;—all with sincere reverence. Heaven took notice of his virtue, and caused its great appointment to light on him that he should soothe and tranquillize the myriad regions." Again, in the "Great Announcement," which was issued by King Ch'eng of the Chou dynasty when he was at the point of undertaking a punitive expedition against some of his rebellious lords, the young king declares (*Shu, V, VII*): "I am the servant of Heaven, which has assigned me this great task and laid the hard duty on my person.... I the little child dare not disregard the appointment of the Lord

¹⁴ Chia Fu lamenting the misrule of his king. (*Shih, II, IV, 8.* Legge, p. 354.)

¹⁵ Legge, p. 417. The whole stanza runs thus: "Oh, my son, I have told you the old ways. Hear and follow my counsels, then shall you have no cause for great regret. Heaven is now inflicting great calamities and destroying the state. My illustrations are not taken from things remote; great Heaven never errs. If you go on to deteriorate in your virtues, you will bring the people to great distress."

on high....Oh! the clearly-intended will of Heaven is to be feared, it is to help my great inheritance." (Legge, p. 159.)¹⁶

8. The moral relations that exist between men are so determined eternally by the ordinances of Heaven. Heaven is the source of moral authority. Those who are immoral commit sin against Heaven and cannot escape its retribution. It is always impartial and shows no favor in administering justice. So declares the poet Yin Chi Fu of the Chou dynasty in the reign of King Hsüan: "Heaven gave birth to the multitudes of the people; and wherever there are things they are governed by fixed laws. To delight in what is held by the people eternally normal, that is the highest virtue." (Shih, III, III, 6.) This notion of the heavenly origin of the moral laws is much more clearly and definitely stated in the Shu King (II, III.) by Kao Yao, minister to Shun. Kao Yao says: "It is the heavenly arrangement that we have a universal order here; and we are charged with [the enforcement of] the five orders; let us be sincere in these five. It is the heavenly ordinance that we have a regular proceeding here; and ours is to observe the five ceremonies; let us be punctual. Through universal respect and united reverence, let there be a happy concordance. Heaven favors the virtuous; and there are five habiliments; let the five be clearly distinguished. Heaven punishes the guilty, and there are five punishments; let the five be in effect. In the affairs of administration—let us be earnest, let us be earnest." (Cf. Legge, p. 55.)

9. The moral laws were thus made by Heaven, and

¹⁶ Compare the following: "The ordinances of Heaven, how uninterrupted they are! and how unfathomable!" (Shih, IV, I, 2.) "The doings of High Heaven have neither sound nor odor. Follow the example of King Wen, and the myriad regions will repose their confidence in you." (Shih, III, I, 1.) "How vast the Lord on high! He is the ruler of men below. When in his fearful wrath, the decrees of the Lord on high are full of woes. Heaven creates the multitudes of the people, whose destinies are not uniformly determined. There are none who have not their [hopeful] start, but few are they that have a [blissful] finish." (Shih, III, III, 1.)

eternally fixed; and it was the same authority that rewarded the just and punished the unjust. For Heaven was not only the author of the laws but their executor, stern and inflexible. Therefore, whether or not the creatures here below were made happy, prosperous, and satisfied, depended upon their own conduct. If they obeyed the rules initiated by Heaven and practiced goodness (*Tê*), the Lord on high favored them; but if they did not they were sure to suffer the consequence. There was no escape from this absolute law. Therefore, we read in the Shu King (Part IV, Book IV, "The Instructions of Yi") : "Only the Lord on high is not constant: on the good-doer he sends down all blessings, and on the evil-doer he sends down all miseries. Do you but be virtuous, be it in small things [or large], and the myriad regions will have cause for rejoicing. If you be not virtuous, be it in large things [or small], it will bring the ruin of your ancestral temple." (Legge, p. 95.) Yi Yin, the sage-minister, expresses the identical idea in his discourse on "Absolute Virtue," (Shu, IV, VI), which is also addressed to his charge T'ai Chia: "It was not that Heaven felt any partiality for the Lord of Shang; but Heaven comes to [him who practises] absolute virtue. It was not that Shang courted the favor of the lower people, but the people turned towards [him who practised] absolute virtue. Where there is absolute virtue, there is no undertaking that is not favorable. Where virtue contradicts itself, there is no undertaking that is not unfavorable. Favor or disfavor does not wrongfully fall upon men; for Heaven sends down misfortune or prosperity according to their virtue." (Cf. Legge, p. 101.) In one word, "The heavenly way is to bless the good and to curse the dissolute." (Shu, IV, III, "The Announcement of T'ang.")

10. It thus goes without saying that Heaven knows no partiality whatever in conferring bliss or sending down

calamity. The venerable Yi Yin again instructs his young king (Shu, Part IV, Book V, section C): "Oh! Heaven knows no favoritism. Only those who are reverent are favored by it. The people have no special person whom they constantly cherish, they only cherish those that are benevolent. The spiritual beings have no special offerings which they are constant in accepting, they only accept things that are offered with sincerity. The heavenly seat is indeed difficult to hold." Later, Chou Kung also utters the same sentiment when he is about to appoint his nephew Chung Hu to Lord of Tsai (Shu, V, XVII): "Great Heaven knows no favoritism. Only those who are virtuous are helped by it. The people's hearts know no constant attachment; only they cherish those that are benevolent."

11. As Heaven shows no partiality in its dealings with the creatures below, the latter must be always on their guard so that they may not fall from the heavenly grace and suffer misery and ignominy. Heaven can never be relied upon, it is not constant, it changes as a man changes in his virtuous conduct. And it is most difficult for him to be always upright and virtuous, and not to deviate even for a moment from the path prescribed by the Lord on high. Heaven's favors are the most difficult thing to be retained by us earthly creatures. The unreliability of the heavenly will, therefore, from the human point of view is ever and again emphasized by the early Chinese moralists. Yi Yin's (who died B. C. 1713) instruction to the young king T'ai Chia repeatedly refers to this idea, he seems never tired of reminding the inexperienced lest he let loose his youthful unbridled passions in his administration, thinking that the heavenly pleasure once shown to his father is constant and eternal regardless of his own conduct. "Oh!" says Yi Yin, "it is difficult to rely upon Heaven, for its decrees are not constant. But [let a ruler] be constant in his goodness, and he will preserve his throne. Let him be inconstant in

his goodness, and the nine provinces will be lost to him." (Shu, IV, VI. Legge, p. 101.) Later, Chou Kung (d. 1105 B. C.) is also anxious to impress this idea on his colleague, Shao Kung: "The decrees of Heaven are not easily preserved, Heaven is difficult to be depended upon." (Shu, V, XVI; Legge p. 206.) In the Book of Odes we find Chou Kung again referring to the utmost difficulty of securing the heavenly grace; for he sings in his commemoration of the father Wen (Shih, III, I, 2): "The bright illumination [of virtue] here below; the stern authority [of God] there above. Heaven is not readily to be relied upon; it is no easy task to be a king. Yin's rightful heir to the heavenly seat was not allowed to govern the four quarters.... The King Wen gloriously served the Lord on high with watchfulness and reverence, and thus won numerous blessings. Since his virtue was never reversed, he enjoyed the allegiance of the states from all quarters.... The troops of Yin Shang assembled like a forest and marshalled on the wilds of Mu. We rose thereupon and [Shang Fu cried to the King Wen], "The Lord on high is with thee, be not faint-hearted!"

* * *

From these statements, it is apparent that the Chinese conception of God in this Ante-Ch'in period was of a very high order; and at the same time the fact will strike an observant reader that the Chinese God is different in one essential point from the Hebrew God, in that it betrays no such personal intimacy as the latter in the Old Testament. The Chinese are not such an intensely religious and fanatical people as the Hebrews, and naturally their conception of the highest authority of moral laws was not so personal and intimate as that of the Jews, though Shang Ti was personal enough in certain respects. Even in their most religious documents in the Shu King, they seem never to

have given rein to their imagination so far as to depart from the bounds of common-sense morality. This will be shown in the following "Announcement of T'ang," who founded the Yin dynasty (B. C. 1766-1154). This imperial manifesto was issued by T'ang to justify himself before his subjects in the overthrow of the preceding dynasty and in the establishment of his own,—a procedure sanctioned by Heaven.¹⁷ In this we see the elevation of its moral tone, but not any particularly religious fervor. After T'ang had made an end of the Hsia dynasty and returned to Po, he issued this announcement, a solemn inauguration of the new dynasty: "Ah! Ye multitudes of the myriad regions, listen clearly to the announcement of me, the One Man. The Great God has conferred [even] on the inferior people a moral sense, compliance with which would show their nature to be invariably right. To make them tranquilly pursue the course which it would indicate, is the work of the sovereign.

"The king of Hsia extinguished his virtue, and played the tyrant, extending his oppression over you, the people of all the clans from myriad regions. Suffering from his cruel injuries, and unable to endure the bitterness and venomousness, you, the people of all the clans from myriad regions, with one accord protested your innocence to the spirits of Heaven and Earth. The way of Heaven is to bless the good and make wretched the dissolute. It sent down calamities on Hsia, to make manifest her guilt.

"Therefore I, the little child, charged with the decree of Heaven and its evident terrors, did not dare to pardon [the criminal]. I presumed to use the dark-colored victim-bull, and, making clear announcement to the spiritual sovereign in the high heavens, requested leave to deal with the ruler of Hsia as a criminal. Then I sought for the

¹⁷ This justification was later subscribed to by Confucius who says in one of his commentaries on the Yih King that "The revolution of T'ang and Wu was in accordance with Heaven and in harmony with men."

great sage, with whom I might unite my strength, to request the favor [of Heaven] for you, my multitudes.

"High Heaven truly showed its favor to the people below, and the criminal has been degraded and subjected. What Heaven appoints is without error;— brilliantly [now], like the blooming of plants and trees, the millions of the people show a true revival.

"It is given to me, the One Man, to secure the harmony and tranquility of your states and clans; and now I know not whether I may not offend against [powers] above and below. I am fearful and trembling, as if I were in danger of falling into a deep abyss.

"Throughout all the regions that enter on a new life under me see that ye follow not lawless ways; make no approach to insolence and dissoluteness; let every one be careful to keep his state; that so we may receive the favor of Heaven. The good in you, I will not dare to keep concealed; and for the evil in me I will not dare to forgive myself. I will examine these things in harmony with the mind of the Lord on high. When guilt is found anywhere in you who occupy the myriad regions, let it rest on me, the One Man. When guilt is found in me, the One Man, it shall not attach to you who occupy the myriad regions.

"Oh! let us attain to sincerity in these things, and so we shall likewise have a [happy] consummation." (Shu, Legge, p. 89 *et seq.*)

The Chinese God was not the God of the Psalms nor of Job; he was a quiet, deliberate, ethical power that discharged or exercised his function rather impassively. He never showed himself in the midst of fires, thunders, or lightnings to vent his personal ire upon the creatures below. The Chinese never caught a glimpse of their God. He was hidden far up in the azure skies, he could not be brought into an immediate personal touch with mortals. His presence could only be inferred through the manifestations of

his power; that is, through extraordinary natural phenomena. When he was indignant, he visited all kinds of calamity upon the misguided. So we read in the Shih King (III, III, 3): "Heaven is sending down death and desolation, and has put an end to our king. It is [now] sending down those devourers of the grain so that the husbandry is all in evil case. Alas for our Middle States! all is in peril and going to ruin. I have no strength [to do anything], I but think of the power in the azure vault." Again: "Bright was the Milky Way, shining and revolving in the sky. The King said, 'Oh! What crime is chargeable to us now, that Heaven sends down death and desolation? Famine comes again and again. There is no spirit I have not sacrificed to, there is no victim I have grudged. Our jade symbols, oblong and round, are exhausted;—how is it that I am not heard?.... The drought is excessive, and I may not try to excuse myself. I am full of terror and feel the peril, like the clap of thunder or the roll. Of the remnant of Chou, among the black-haired people, there will not be a half man left, nor will the Lord on high in great Heaven exempt me. One and all, shall we not dread this? Our ancestors will be without successors.'"¹⁸

These calamities came down from Heaven on account of human wickedness. The cry of the suffering is piteous enough, and if this were raised to Yahveh, it is highly probable that he would listen to it and make a personal communication with his creatures below. But the Chinese God in great Heaven which is far extending,¹⁹ veiled in obscurity,²⁰ and has no sound nor odor,²¹ is altogether irresponsible; he seems to be not immediately concerned with human affairs, at any rate not so personally as the Judaic

¹⁸ Shih, III, III, 4. The drought occurred in the sixth year of King Hsüan of the Chou dynasty. He reigned B. C. 827-781.

¹⁹ Shih, II, V, 4; II, IV, 10, etc.

²⁰ Shih, II, IV, 8; III, III, 10, etc.

²¹ Shih, III, I, 1.

God, who "thundereth marvelously with his voice," who "saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength," and again who "sealeth up the hand of every man; that all men may know his work" (Job, xxxvii. 5-7). Such a God as this was not in accord with the Chinese imagination.

Though lacking in religious fervor, the Chinese God, besides being a stern moral power, was a political director, whose foremost object of administration was to give his people happiness, peace, and justice. When Heaven found its earthly representative who is called the "son of Heaven" unworthy of his exalted position, it appointed some one else from among the people. This new representative, conscious of his holy mission, gathered about him all the available forces to rise against the prevailing house. He would recount all the outrageous, inhuman sins committed by the tyrant, and in them would seek the justification of his action as heaven-ordained. The "Great Declaration" (Shu, V, I) by King Wu of the Chou dynasty, though by some considered spurious, fairly illustrates the attitude of a new dynasty against its corrupt, degenerate predecessor. He declares: "Heaven-and-Earth is the parent of all creatures; and of all creatures man is the most highly endowed. The sincerely intelligent [among men] becomes the great sovereign; and the great sovereign is the parent of the people. But now Shou, the king of Shang, does not reverence Heaven above, and inflicts calamities on the people below. Abandoned to drunkenness and reckless in lust, he has dared to exercise cruel oppression. He has extended the punishments of offenders to their relatives. He has put men into offices on the hereditary principle. He has made it his pursuit to have palaces, towers, pavillions, embankments, ponds and other extravagances, to the most painful injury of you, the people of myriad regions. He has burned

and roasted the royal and good. He has ripped up pregnant women.

"Great Heaven was moved with indignation, and charged my deceased father Wen to display its terrors; but [he died] before the great work was completed. On this account, I, Fa, the little child, have by means of you, the hereditary rulers of my friendly states, contemplated the government of Shang; but Shou has no repentant heart. He sits squatting on his heels, not serving the Lord on high nor the spirits of heaven and earth, neglecting also the temple of his ancestors, and not sacrificing in it. The victims and the vessels of millet all become the prey of robbers, and still he says, 'The people are mine; the [heavenly] appointment is mine,' never trying to correct his contemptuous mind.

"Heaven, for the help of the people below, made for them rulers, and made for them instructors, that they might be able to be of service to the Lord on high, and secure the tranquillity of the four quarters [of the empire]. In regard to deciding who are criminals and who are not, how dare I give any allowance to my own wishes?

"When the strength is the same, measure the virtue [of the parties]; when the virtue is the same, measure their righteousness!" Shou has hundreds of thousands and myriads of officers, but they have hundreds of thousands and myriads of minds; I have [but] three thousand officers, but they have one mind. The iniquity of Shang is full. Heaven gives command to destroy it. If I did not obey Heaven, my iniquity would be as great.

"I, the little child, early and late am filled with apprehensions. I have received the command of my deceased father Wen; I have offered special sacrifice to the Lord on high; I have performed the due services to the great earth, and I lead the multitudes of you to execute the punishment appointed by Heaven.

"Heaven compassionates the people. To what the people desire, Heaven will be found to give effect. Give ye aid to me, the One Man, to cleanse forever all within the four seas. Now is the time. It should not be lost." (Legge, p. 125 *et seq.*)

The Shih records how Heaven appointed King Wen to take measures against the tyrant of Shang, whose atrocious deeds are enumerated in the above "Declaration." "The Lord on high said to King Wen, 'I am pleased with your intelligent virtue, not loudly proclaimed nor portrayed, without extravagance or changeableness, without consciousness of effort on your part, in accordance with the pattern of the Lord on high.' The Lord on high said to King Wen, 'Take measures against the country of your foes. Along with your brethren, get ready your scaling ladders, and your engines of onset and assault, to attack the wall of Ch'ung.'" (III, I, 7.)

The Chinese did not make any distinction between moral and political authority. Whoever is able to govern the people must be a man of moral perfection; and whoever is perfect in his goodness is entitled to a rulership; for the highest position in the state belongs to the one who is nearest to the Lord on high. In this, the Chinese conception of rulership may be considered somewhat akin to that of Plato who conceives the state as a sort of great ethical institution in which the morally perfect and philosophically great must lead the masses.

When any rebellious uprising was not necessary to enforce the heavenly order of things against a despot, it was the wont of a perfect, virtuous ruler to select the wisest and most virtuous of his subjects as his own successor. In this way, Yao raised Shun to the highest office in the state, and Shun in turn selected Yü to succeed him. The occupation of the throne thus effected was ascribed to the heavenly will as we read in "The Counsels of the Great

"Yu" (Shu, II, II), in which the minister Yi praises the virtue of Yao: "Oh! the virtue of the Divine Yao is vast and unceasing. It is holy, spirit-like, awe-inspiring, and refined. Great Heaven regarded you favorably and ordained you to hold all the four oceans and to become the ruler of the empire."

Therefore, it was natural that every dynastic change was considered by the Chinese a decree of Heaven that wanted to discontinue its favor once so generously bestowed upon the declining dynasty and to have it transferred to the rising one which has proved its virtue and ability to carry out the appointment by the Unknown. The declining house showed by its very decline that it was no longer able to maintain effectively the right entrusted to it by Great Heaven. The disintegration that had been going on was no more than the punishment from above, and so long as they could not be made to become conscious of the fact and continued to aggravate the wretched condition of affairs, their punishment was completed by the total overthrow of the reigning government by the one which was to succeed it.

It was in accordance with this spirit that the Duke of Chou made the following declaration to the officers of the Yin dynasty which he overthrew (B. C. 1122): "Ye numerous officers of the Yin dynasty, great ruin came down on Yin from the cessation of forbearance in pitying Heaven, and we, the lords of Chou, received its favoring appointment. We felt charged with the manifest wrath of Heaven, carried out the punishment which came from a superior, and rightfully disposed of the appointment of Yin, thus finishing [the will of] the Lord on high. Now, ye numerous officers, it was not our small state that dared to attack the appointment of Yin, but Heaven was not for Yin, for indeed it would not strengthen the disorderly [government of Yin]. But it helped us. Did we dare to seek the office of

ourselves? Only the Lord on high was not for Yin as was gleaned from the doings of our common people in whom is seen the manifest wrath of Heaven." (Shu, V, XIV; Legge, p. 196 ff.)

As I stated before, the Chinese Shang Ti never made any direct personal demonstration of his will before the people, though the latter felt intimate enough toward him as they generally appealed to him as the last resort. Whatever displeasure or wrath he felt was only indirectly communicated through such inanimate mediums as drought, famine, epidemics, or earthquake, and especially through the doings and feelings of the common people, which a wise ruler is always anxious to read correctly. Heaven utters no word, but through the people. Its ever-persistent will is to bring peace and good-will and righteousness here below; and when the ruler fails to execute this order to the satisfaction of the masses and instead endeavors to promote his personal selfish interests, the people grow uneasy, disorder begins to prevail, a clamor goes up from the suffering, extraordinary phenomena take place, and herein the wise read symptoms of heavenly displeasure. "Heaven sees as the people see, Heaven hears as the people hear." (Shu, V, I). "As Heaven has mercy upon the people, whatever is desired by them is always granted." (Shu, V, I, a.) Again, "Heavenly intelligence is shown in the intelligence of the people, and the manifestation of heavenly wrath is shown in the manifestation of the wrath of the people." (Shu, II, III.) The relation between the two, above and below, is so intimate that when one is affected the other is sure to feel it. Therefore, whenever there is a manifestation of unrest among the masses, the wise and virtuous know that the heavenly appointment of the prevailing dynasty is being revoked, and they bide their time to rise against it when all hopes for its regeneration or reformation are gone. *Vox populi, vox dei*, was the motto

of the Chinese. Much of the Chinese democracy that prevails in spite of an autocratic form of government, is certainly due to the conception of the divinity of the popular will.

The *vox populi* was not, however, the only means to ascertain the heavenly will. There was another indication of it—divination. When divination and the reading of the popular will agreed, the wise knew conclusively where lay the heavenly will, and did not hesitate to carry this out through every means within their power. When King Ch'ang of the Chou dynasty started on his punitive expedition against the tyrant of Shang, he divined by the great tortoise-shell bequeathed to him by his father, King Neng, whether the great undertaking he was about to execute were in accord with the heavenly pleasure and could be brought to a successful end. (Shu, V, VII; Legge, pp. 157-158.) Having obtained a favorable response, he issued "the Great Declaration" to his fellow-dukes and kings as well as to his own people.

When Shun wanted to select his royal successor, he had recourse to divination, though his mind was first made up as to who it should be. To the protestation of great Yü, that the Divine Shun should, before selecting his successor, "submit the meritorious ministers one by one to the trial of divination and let the favorable indication be followed," the Divine Shun replied, "According to the rules for the regulation of divination, a person should first make up his mind and then refer his decision to the great tortoise-shell. My mind therefore was first made up. I consulted and deliberated with every one of my people who all agreed with me. The spiritual beings indicated their approval, the tortoise-shell and divining stalks concurred. Divination, when lucky, should not be repeated....The manifest appointment of Heaven is on thy person, and thou art even-

tually to ascend the sovereign seat." (Shu, II, II; Legge, p. 50 f.)

In "The Great Plan" (Shu, V, IV, ch. 7), we read how divination by the tortoise-shell and the stalks of milfoil is to be resorted to in the settlement of doubts. The philosophy of divination is that of the Yih King, for which see Part I of this series of articles.

Thus it is evident that Shang Ti was the supreme power that guided and controlled the destiny of the people below. It was the moral authority of the universe, and its will, in whatever way manifested, either through public opinion or divination, was absolute. The only way to court its favor was to be morally upright and humane. It never showed any personal favoritism. In this can also be seen the peculiarly practical turn of the Chinese mind. Their Shang Ti was the God of monotheism as much as the Yahveh of the Jews; but as I have repeatedly remarked, Shang Ti never entered into such an intimate relationship with mortals as did Yahveh. The Ti was a somewhat impersonal moral principle, though not without some of the human passions as when he showed his wrath through famine and desolation. However this may be, the Chinese conception of Shang Ti was free from the elements of poetical or mystical imagination. He never revealed himself on a certain sacred spot on earth, nor in any material, objective form that could be perceived by the human senses. No Chinese sages ever heard his "still small voice." There was no Moses, no Abraham, no Aaron; but Shun, Yü, Yi Yin, T'ang the Perfect, Duke of Chou, and Confucius. Theophany was unknown in China. In short, Chinese imagination could not conceive the utility of the prophet or seer. It is true that the voice of Shang Ti is sometimes represented as having spoken to the mortal ear, but we are always kept in the dark as to his method of commun-

cation, if not through strange natural events,²² or *vox populi*, or divination. He never manifested himself even in dreams or visions.

The early Chinese, however, seem to have made a distinction between Ti and T'ien. Though of course this distinction was not clearly defined, Ti appears to have been understood more personally than T'ien. This would at once be felt when Ti is translated into English by "Lord" or "God," while T'ien is rendered "Heaven." About the time of Confucius, or even as early as when the first part of the Yih King Commentaries was written, the significance of Ti was almost lost sight of, while T'ien came to occupy the more important place in the religious system of China. In other words, Shang Ti came to be regarded purely as a moral principle or reason of the universe. The most efficient and practical and religious way of serving it was to put all its moral laws such as the five Eternal Codes into practice, and did not necessarily consist in offering prayers or singing hymns or sacrificing victims to an imaginary, invisible presence that at best had no immediate personal relationship to the world below. The heavenly way was the human way. It was thus that the early religious conception of Shang Ti became gradually metamorphosed into

²² Hsün Tze was a very practical and unimaginative thinker. Note what he says about strange phenomena of nature which the early Chinese people thought were expressions of Heavenly indignation: "The stars are falling, the trees are roaring, and the people of the kingdom tremble with fear. What would this signify? It does not signify anything. It is a natural disturbance caused by the Yin and Yang, and occurring at irregular intervals. It is rational to wonder at it, and irrational to fear it. Such things as the eclipses of the sun or moon, unseasonable storms, or the frequent appearance of strange stars,—such things occur in every generation. If the ruler is enlightened and his government is honest, however often such events may take place, he cannot be hurt. If the ruler is benighted and his government is disorderly, even if there may take place no such things, he is of little account. Therefore, the shooting of stars, or the roaring of trees, is no more than a mere natural disturbance, caused by the Yin and Yang, and occurring at irregular intervals. It is rational to wonder at it, but irrational to fear it." (Ch. XVII, "On Heaven.")

Compare this with the almost religious attitude of Confucius toward unusual natural happenings such as violent thundering or hurricanes, as recorded in the Analects.

the purely philosophical principle of T'ien and then finally into the ethical idea of Tao.²³

Another peculiar feature of the Chinese worship of Shang Ti, which must not escape our consideration here, was that there was no popular temple dedicated to him where Heaven-fearing souls might come and offer prayers and ask special grace from above. The worship of Shang Ti was solely a state affair entrusted to a ruler personally, who by virtue of heavenly appointment was the only authorized personage sacred enough to conduct the ceremony of worship. It was the ruler himself and nobody else who could offer the annual sacrifice to Shang Ti, could give him thanks for whatever he did for the reigning house or the people in general. This was one of the most important imperial functions, the neglect of which might incur a heavenly displeasure and result in a grievous catastrophe to the kingdom. Indeed, it was thought sacrilegious for the masses to worship Heaven,²⁴ who was too sacred, too

²³ The following passage from Hsün Tze (Chapter XVII, on "Heaven") will show what a prosaic and practical conception of Heaven the author had; and when we compare this with the attitude of the Five Canonical Books towards Heaven, which was highly religious and reverential, we can at once feel the gap that came to exist between the canonical writers and the philosophers. Says Hsün Tze: "The working of Heaven is constant; it does not exist for Yao, nor does it disappear for Hsueh. When a man responds to it with order, there is luck; when he responds to it with disorder, there is evil. When he strengthens the foundation and is economical in expenditure, Heaven cannot make him poor; when he takes the proper nourishment and exercises himself regularly, Heaven cannot make him ill; when he is single-hearted in practising what he ought to, Heaven cannot do him any harm. Therefore, such a one cannot be made by rain or drought to suffer hunger or thirst, cannot be made by cold or heat to suffer sickness, cannot be made by evil spirits to suffer misfortune.

"When a man, however, neglects the foundation and is extravagant in expenditure, Heaven cannot make him rich; when he does not take sufficient nourishment and does not exercise himself frequently enough, Heaven cannot make him healthy; when, deviating from the course which one ought to follow, he wanders about irregularly, Heaven cannot make him happy. Therefore, such a one will suffer hunger before a drought or rain comes; he will be sick before the cold or the heat is yet threatening; he will be miserable before evil spirits visit him.

"Peace is gained by opportuneness and not by evil procedure; there is no reason to blame Heaven, for it is as it ought to be. Therefore, one who has a clear understanding of the distinction between heavenliness and humaneness, is called the perfect man."

²⁴ The reason why the common people were not allowed to worship the Shang Ti individually and why the ruler himself did not worship him more

divine, too holy to be so familiarly approached by them who were in fact nobodies in the eyes of the Lord on high. Not only that the worshiping of God by the common people, even by feudal lords, was an act of usurpation upon the inviolable right or duty of the reigning sovereign, but he was the mediator between Heaven and the people. Though Heaven communicated its indignation through the feeling of the multitudes of the people, it was only one man who was permitted to reflect on it and take the proper course to appease the heavenly wrath. When this one man was successful in his reflection or interpretation as well as in his undertaking, he was said to have been truly appointed by Heaven. Ever after this, he would never think of neglecting either the annual celebration of Shang Ti, or offering sacrifices on all great state occasions. As we read in the Shu King and the Shih King, the omission of this sacred and exclusive duty on the part of the occupant of the heavenly seat was counted among the grave offences which merited his overthrow by some more popular and virtuous political leader. This peculiar relation of Shang Ti to the creatures below is due to the fact that the Chinese did not conceive their Ti in his individual relation to mankind generally. The supreme one commissioned the earthly ruler with the office of looking after the welfare, moral and physical, of the masses. The latter, therefore, had nothing to do individually with the highest authority himself. It was sufficient for them if they obeyed the state regulations and acted according to the moral laws conceived as eternal and unchangeable. Of course, they had their ancestors to remember, to revere, and to keep supplied with sacrifices, but this was practically all that the common people had to

frequently, is partially seen in the following passage from the Li Ki (Book XXI) : "Sacrifices should not be frequently repeated. Such frequency is indicative of importunateness, and importunateness is inconsistent with reverence. Nor should they be at distant intervals. Such infrequency is indicative of indifference, and indifference leads to forgetting them altogether." (S. B. E., Vol. XXVIII.)

do in the way of religion, all their other doings being strictly moral, practical, and secular.

From the earliest time in the history of Chinese civilization, Shang Ti seems to have been associated with the state as such and not with individuals. And as the state was no more than its ruler himself in those days, the latter always assumed the duty to worship Shang Ti and to offer him the proper sacrifice in the proper season. In the great Chinese encyclopædia, *Ku Chin T'u Shu Chi Chêng* (section "Natural Phenomena," chapter "Spiritual Beings and the Miraculous," vol. IX), we notice reference to the facts that Huang Ti Yu Hsiung Shih in ancient times worshiped Shang Ti in a specially built temple, that Chuan Hsü Kao Yang Shih composed a piece of music called Cheng Yün on the occasion of a sacrifice to Shang Ti, and that later Ti K'u Kao Hsin Shih built a sort of artificial hill in the southern field, where he worshiped Shang Ti, the sun, moon, constellations, and his ancestors. The Shu King, the Chou Li (records of the rituals of the Chou dynasty), and also the Li Ki contain various statements referring to the state worship of Shang Ti on certain occasions. These facts are confirmed by the Yih King where (Appendix II) we read: "Thunder issues from the earth; it reverberates, which indicates the trigram *Yü*. The ancient kings, in accordance with this, composed music, and honored virtue, and offered it magnificently to the Lord on high, while their ancestors and their father were made to share [at the service]." Further, under the trigram *Hwan*, we read: "Wind moves over water, which is *Hwan*. The ancient kings, in accordance with this, offered sacrifice to the Lord on high and builded the ancestral temple."

All this clearly shows that from ancient times the worship of Shang Ti was one of the great state affairs which did not concern the people below. In this connection it may

be interesting to note that music was offered to Shang Ti, but no hymns singing of his virtue, power, or mercy.

This peculiar relation of Shang Ti to the people in general is very significant when we consider that he was not the creator of the universe. The early Chinese world-conception was wavering between monotheism and polytheism. It sometimes looked as if it advocated one Shang Ti, and then it fell back upon polytheistic belief, allowing besides Shang Ti in Great Heaven the terrestrial god, the five gods of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth, the mountain gods, and the river gods. But these latter were more or less subordinate to Shang Ti who apparently occupied the foremost and highly important position in the hierarchy of the gods, though the exact relation among themselves was left undefined. At any rate, this phenomenal world was not the sole work of Shang Ti in heaven, but a combined undertaking to which the Earth contributed a great deal of its energy. Therefore, in the Chinese mind heaven and earth are very closely associated, so closely indeed that they sometimes form one idea as heaven-and-earth. We can say, however, that a dualistic conception of the world either in the popular mind or in philosophy was a most predominant note throughout the history of Chinese thought, not only in its earliest stage but even when the Chinese mind reached its maturity during the Sung dynasty.

However that may be, this creation, as it were, by heaven-and-earth did not have any particularly well-defined purpose; there was not visible in it any strong predominating will.²⁵ True, things were regulated according to rules,

²⁵ The Chinese poets and philosophers were not altogether unconscious of a predominating will in the universe, which is beyond human control; but this consciousness did not play a very important part in their emotional life. As a typical instance of the Chinese philosophical attitude towards the universal will, here is a passage quoted from Chwang Tze: "Tze Lai fell ill and lay gasping at the point of death, while his wife and children stood around him weeping. Li went to ask for him and said to them, 'Hush! Get out of the way! Do not disturb him in his process of transformation.' Then, leaning

the universe was surely law-abiding, well-regulated, and by no means chaotic; but these laws were not animated with the presence of a special soul or spirit, which was powerful and active enough to impress itself upon the Chinese imagination. Being singularly practical and positivistic, the latter did not go beyond the boundary of its prosaic observation. There was no need for it to find creatorship in Shang Ti, and as soon as its worship was taken up by the king as his most solemn duty, the people and the philosophers turned their attention to another direction where Shang Ti did not make himself obtrusive.

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LONDON, ENGLAND.

against the door, he spoke to him [the dying friend]: 'Great indeed is the author of transformation! What is he now going to make of you? Where is he going to take you? Is he going to make you the liver of a rat? or is he going to make you the arm of an insect?' Tze Lai said, 'A son's relation to his parents is such that whenever he is told to go, whether east, west, south, or north, he simply obeys the command. A man's relation to the Yin and Yang is more than that to his parents. If they are hastening my death, and I do not obey, I shall be considered unruly.

"Now, there is the Great Mass, that makes me carry this body, labor with this life, relax in old age, and rest in death. Therefore, that which has taken care of my birth is that which will take care of my death.

"Here is a great founder casting his metal. If the metal, dancing up and down, should say, "I must be made into a Mo Yeh [a famous old sword]," the great founder would surely consider this metal uncanny. So, if merely because one has once assumed the human form, one insists on being a man, and a man only, that author of transformation will be sure to consider this one uncanny. Let us now regard heaven-and-earth as a great melting-pot and the author of transformation as a great founder; and wherever we go, shall we not be at home? Quiet is our sleep, and calm is our awakening." (S. B. E., Vol. XXXIX, p. 249.)

MEDIÆVAL OCCULTISM.

RECENT students of psychology will be familiar with the extension of the Nancy suggestion theory to many branches of psychic life which previously were greatly misunderstood. It has become possible to replace the down-right scepticism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by a sympathetic but critical treatment of belief and cult.

Although it is an exceedingly difficult matter to deal with this subject by reason of the prejudices within and without the inquirer there seems to be little doubt that within a few years it will be generally recognized that all forms of cult are simply suggestive processes tending to produce assent to and realization of certain beliefs.¹

Closely associated with religious cult is the magical cult, differing only from the first in its objective. The priest or devotee aims at communing with unseen powers for the purpose of developing his own and other beings to a comparable stature. The magician aims at communing with unseen powers for the purpose of gratifying certain desires, generally relating to power or knowledge. Should those desires be of a high ethical character, his function becomes almost identical with that of the priest. There is no essential difference between a religious man who prays for the recovery of one sick and the white magi-

¹ Regnault, *Hypnotisme: Religion*, Paris, 1897.—Regnier, *Hypnotisme et croyances anciennes*, Paris, 1891.—Skepto, *L'hypnotisme et les religions*, Paris, 1888.—Liébault, *Thérapie suggestive*, Paris, 1891.

cian who invokes good spirits to produce the same result. In the Eastern religions this is generally recognized, but in the West the logical fallacy of differentiating between the priest and the magus is overlooked, except among a few sects, such as the Christian Scientist.

If attention be given to the history and doctrines of the oldest branch of the Christian Church it will be noticed that

1. Several of its functions are distinctly magical² in character,
2. It has always vigorously opposed itself to anything in the nature of non-ecclesiastical magic, this opposition being in the earlier times accounted for by the demoniacal theory of magic, and in more recent times by statements as to its unreality.³

The Sacraments especially come within the definition of magical functions. In each case by a ceremony employing recognized magical methods, i. e., suffumigations, incantations, exorcisms and conjurations, there is created a magical sympathy or association of ideas. Thus Baptism forms a mystic link between the Supreme and the infant soul. Confirmation revives and strengthens this link at years of discretion, Ordination supplies an even more intimate bond between the Supreme and the priest, Marriage unites two souls, Penance repairs the link severed by sin, the Eucharist is the great and mysterious communion of the Individual with the Supreme, and Extreme Unction is the final coupling of the soul to the Supreme *in articulo mortis*.

Throughout the processes are suggestive.

Firstly, there is, as far as may be, a general body of thought which suggests continuously assent to a realization of these beliefs.

²It will be understood that the word "magical" is used in the sense in which it is employed by Tylor, Fraser and other modern authorities.

³Compare the Encyclical of 1856 against Animal Magnetism.

Secondly, the devotee makes a solemn declaration of his belief (*Credo*), thus tending to crystallize the general concept.

Thirdly, by a series of hymns (incantations) and prayers (conjururations) the mind is concentrated and the attention is fatigued.

Fourthly, by fumigation and artistic and musical aids, a nervous exaltation ("inhibition" would be the preferable word) is produced.

Fifthly, an environment is formed directly suggestive of the beliefs, and

Sixthly, a consummating act (Consecration) or *Grande suggestion*, completes and centralizes the ceremony.

It should here be mentioned that the author expresses no opinion as to the inherent truth of the dogmas concerned. These can be but types of inexpressible and unknowable matters, and their truth is irrelevant to the subject of inquiry, which is simply as to the function of the cult. Moreover similar cults attach to utterly diverse dogmas.

All that the author attempts to establish is the proposition that "*Ritual is a suggestive series of acts, and as such is conformable to the laws of Suggestion.*"

Passing now to non-ecclesiastical forms of suggestion, which are more particularly describable as magic, we find three classes:

1. Ceremonial magic (Fr. *La haute magic*, Ger. *Zauberei*).
2. Witchcraft (Fr. *Sorcellerie*, Ger. *Hexerei*).
3. General magical practices of a minor character.

The first (theurgic or white magic) is that to which it is proposed to devote particular attention. Witchcraft or goëtic magic seems to have been a mere travesty of the preceding, practised by the half-educated and depending for its efficacy upon the nervous susceptibility of the ig-

norant. The third class includes all those lesser practices adopted by superstitious people, such as pointing for the *mal occhio* or the like.

The author ventures to think that theurgic magic has a claim to serious consideration for the following reasons:

1. It possesses an extensive and well-written literature.
2. It claimed the attention and respect of many men of acknowledged intelligence.
3. It bears when examined a very intimate relation to religious cult and "suggestion."

It is not proposed to give here details of the literature, as there are many bibliographies. Horst's *Zauberbibliothek*, Agrippa's *De Occulta Philosophia*, Solomon's (pseudonym) *Clavicula*, Peter D'Abano's *Heptameron*, Levi's *Dogme et rituel de la haute magie* and the *grimoires* will supply a fully sufficient source of information on the subject.

Before giving details of the analogies to religious cult and hypnotic practice, the following examples of exorcisms from a *grimoire* and a missal respectively may be appropriately quoted:

"I conjure thee, O Book, to be useful and profitable to all those who shall read thee, for the successful issue of their affairs. I conjure thee by virtue of the blood of Jesus Christ contained daily in the chalice, to be useful to all those who shall read thee. I exorcise thee in the name of the most holy Trinity."⁴

"I exorcise thee, O Water, created for our service, in the name of God the Father Almighty, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ His Son, and by virtue of the Holy Ghost;

⁴ "Je te conjure, Livre, d'être utile et profitable à tous ceux qui te liront pour la réussite de leurs affaires. Je te conjure de rechef (sic), par la vertu du sang de J. C. contenu tous les jours dans le calice, d'être utile à tous ceux qui te liront. Je t'exorcise au nom de la très-sainte Trinité." *Grimoire of Pope Honorius* (pseud.) 1760.

to the end that by this exorcism thou canst banish and drive away all the forces of the enemy and banish himself together with his apostate angels: by the power of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, who will come to judge the living and the dead, and the world by fire.”⁵

Similar examples abound, demonstrating either that the magical books were composed on the basis of the missals, or that the magicians realized the identity of their proceedings with those of the priests. In other words, the magical and religious cults are identical in character, differing only in purpose.

In the *Clavicula Salomonis* (10862 Addison MS) Book i, Cap. iv, will be found a confession which although far more ample is identical in style with the *Confiteor*.

A careful study of the methods employed for evoking spirits (good and bad) in the last mentioned book and others of a similar character shows the same analogies.

After minute instructions as to the periods of fasting and abstinence, vestments and so on, differing but little from the usual preparations of a religious ascetic we have a solemn confession, an invocation to the Supreme for absolution, and solemn prayers.

In nearly all cases a “circle” is formed, presumably to limit and define the magical environment and prevent the attention wandering to external objects. To further this end, it is generally advised to use a place which shall be as far as possible devoid of interfering or disturbing influences, thus:

“And thou shouldst inviolably observe, that wishing to invoke the Spirits, either by day or by night, it is necessary that it should be done in a place hidden, removed, secret,

⁵ “Je t'exorcise, Eau créée pour notre usage, au nom de Dieu le Père tout puissant, au nom de notre Seigneur J. C., Son Fils, et par la vertu du Saint Esprit; afin que par cet exorcisme, tu puisses servir à chasser et à dissiper toutes les forces de l'ennemi et l'exterminer lui-même avec ses anges apostats: Par la puissance du même N. S. J. C. qui viendra juger les vivans et les morts et le monde par feu.” *Paroissien à l'usage de Versailles*, 1835.

convenient, and proper for such art, where no man frequenteth or inhabiteth, as we shall relate more fully in its place."⁶

An environment is further built up by employing symbols associated definitely with the nature and object of the conjuration, and by an astrological scheme of chronology, the time and place are suited by a strong association of ideas with the operation to be performed.

The practice in the churches of adopting definite days for various ceremonies associated by tradition with the quasi-historical types of the ceremonies is strictly analogous.

There is thus built up in the mind of the magus a complete association of ideas with the purpose of the operation.

Thus in Eliphaz Levi we are told that in invoking the spirit of a departed friend, his portrait and personal relics should be arranged in his room in the manner most provocative of familiar associations.

Wearying and reiterated incantations and suffumigations follow, producing nervous excitement and presumably eventually a form of hypnosis. At the same time by repeating the names of the Deity and various angels, the idea of spiritual communion is continuously suggested. It is perhaps noteworthy that the magical books exhibit a far more advanced knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures than appears in the theological manuals. Probably this would suggest a connection with the fountainhead of the religion which would give independence and authority outside the Church, and would further account for the violent nature of the Church's opposition.

In the course of the magical operation, conjurations (prayers) of increasing length and intensity are employed, the more powerful ones being employed in the event of the first not succeeding. Furthermore in the event of failure

⁶ *Clavicula, Book ii. cap. i.*

or interruption the magus is told to recommence just as in modern hypnosigenesis repeated seances are employed until success comes.⁷

A vision seems eventually to have appeared to the hypnotized magus, or at any rate a conviction of the presence of unseen powers. Levi narrates an experience of this kind which seems credible. Possibly the usual hyperesthesia of comatose subjects and telepathy here assist to produce results which must have seemed supernatural.

Further points which indicate a quasi-hypnotic or hystero-epileptic state are as follows:

1. Repeated accounts of violent deaths of magicians (Cf. the legend of Faust) with epileptic symptoms.
2. The books generally say the process becomes easier by repetition and adepts need but little aid from ritual.

("So exact a preparation of days and hours is not necessary for those who are adepts in the art.")⁸

3. It is repeatedly affirmed that great danger accrues to those who neglect the precautions of fasting and due preparation. Personal purity, cleanliness and care in diet are strongly urged.⁹

4. Freedom from mental disturbance is essential.

[("He who wisheth to apply himself to so great and difficult a science should have his mind free from all business and from all extraneous ideas of whatever nature they may be.")¹⁰

Sufficient has, it would seem, been said, to indicate, if not the identity, at least the close analogy of religious cult, ceremonial magic, and auto-suggestion.

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HERBERT CHATLEY.

⁷ *Clavicula*, Book ii, cap. i, p. 74 in Mr. Mather's edition.

⁸ *Clavicula*, Book ii, cap. i.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Book ii, caps. iii, iv and v.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Book ii, cap. iii.

"ID QUO MAJUS COGITARI NEQUIT."¹

(A SCHOLASTIC ESSAY.)

THE main thesis of this essay may be stated as follows: The truth of the principle which absolute idealism² employs, in its polemic against Humism and Kantism, is not satisfied by the absolute idealist system—a system which judging it as I do from the standpoint of a scholastic I must characterize as pantheistic—but applied in a thoroughgoing manner it leads beyond idealism to a theistic metaphysic (which it shows to be the only possible metaphysic); with a scholastic logic, criteriology and epistemology.

There are two main lines along which the validity of the antithesis of thought and being may be defended, and it may seem that both defences fail in the end.

The first is the argument which starting from the ghostly and colorless nature of thought infers thought's inadequacy to the rich warmth of sensible reality. It has been stated as follows by Mr. F. H. Bradley in an often quoted passage (*Principles of Logic*, p. 533): "It may come from a failure in my metaphysics or from a weakness of the flesh which continues to blind me, but the notion that

¹ My title suggests St. Anselm's ontological proof. However, for me not God but Theistic Reality, which is indeed *reductively* identical with God, is "That than which a greater cannot be (or be conceived)."

² By which I mean Idealism of Hegelian descent such as is advocated by T. H. Green, Prof. B. Bosanquet, Mr. Haldane, Mr. J. B. Bailey, and Prof. J. M. E. McTaggart; with of course large individual variations. I should mention also Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison.

existence could be the same as understanding, strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of this world in the end is appearance, leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendor; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat if it hides some colorless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."

Dr. Bosanquet (*Knowledge and Reality*, p. 19) after quoting this passage comments as follows: "The dream of the intellectual world as a land of shadows, now below and now above, now more obscure, and now more brilliant than reality; a dream which the unwisdom of ages has ascribed to Plato, seems never to lose its malificent spell."

The objection on which any such view as the one we are refuting must come to grief, is that which Aristotle insistently argues against Plato, namely that if sensibles are not intelligible then the ideas cannot help us to understand the sensible world.³

But in effect, the thought determinations of which the thought-system is the proper totality are not *cogitationes* (states of mind) but *cogitata* (intelligibles) and, since we can form ideas of sensibles, they are intelligibles, and will as such, take their proper places as differentiations of a thought-system.

The second line of defence of the validity of the antithesis of thought and being starts, not from their unlike-ness, but from their unconnectedness.

To understand this we must place ourselves in the position of the idealist in controversy with his adversary the Humist. The philosophy of the latter⁴ he finds to be determined throughout by a certain conception of the

³ *Summa*, I, LXXXIV, Art. I, *sed contra*: "Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit corpora sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus et sic pirebit scientia naturalis."

⁴ Cf. Green's Introduction to Hume's Treatise.

antithesis now in question; this conception he finds to be the very *fundamentum*—the governing presupposition of Humism.

Common sense forces on us all in one form or another the belief that reality is as a fact just what it is, and goes on just as it does, whether we know its nature and doings, or whether we are ignorant of them. Humism generalizes inaccurately this common belief and from "reality" is as it is independently of and prior to *our* thinking" passes to "independently of and prior to *all* thought."

At this point absolute idealism steps in and has no difficulty in showing that in so far as Humism is *any thing*, it is a theory and its world therefore an ideal construction constructed by, in the sense of being "nothing apart from," the categories of thought.

It is essential to the success of the argument of this essay that the reader shall have a lively apprehension of what is meant by speaking of things as the "work of thought."

Consider what is suggested to the mind by such words as "the universe," "the earth," "my wife," or "that piece of sugar."

The first named is plainly made what it is by ideal construction, that is by inference—the stars seem to be points of light, they are for us in virtue of ideal construction immense globes—the earth seems flat and immovable, but again by means of construction it enters for us into the universe as round and mobile.

But consider again "the stars seem to be points of light," "the earth seems immovable,"—have we here pure fact? Not at all. In the first place the possible discrepancy between seeming and reality is guarded against. The stars-points-of-light are known in concepts. What is a point apart from its systematic place in the concept space? Some-

*In this connection reality equals finite reality—"our world."

times it happens that when one repeats a word often its connotation, i. e., its setting of ideal qualification, falls off leaving one with the mere *flatus vocis*, but even this would be nothing if it were not still ideally qualified as a "sound"; as such and such a sound of recognizable quiddity.

In the same way we could show that "my wife," "this piece of sugar" and, even the content of the ejaculations "red hot!" "horrible!" are each ideal constructions.

Prof. B. Bosanquet and Dr. Whewell bring this out excellently in their several ways.

"If a sensation or elementary perception is in consciousness (and if not we have nothing to do with it in logic) it already bears the form of thinking. I will not say that it is a rudimentary judgment; but it is certainly an act, for it is a charge within a percipient subject; it has identity in itself or it could be nothing for consciousness, and difference, or it could not have identity; and it stands out against the other elements of the momentary consciousness in a way that approaches to an attribution." (Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 33.)

"When we speak as if we saw impulse and attraction, things and classes, we really see only objects of various forms and colors, more or less numerous variously combined. But do we really perceive so much as this? When we see the form, the size, the number, the motion of objects, are these really mere impressions on our senses, unmodified by any contribution or operation of the mind itself? A very little attention will suffice to convince us that this is not the case. . . . A certain activity of the mind is involved not only in seeing objects erroneously but in seeing them at all. With regard to solid objects this is generally acknowledged. . . . But we may go further. Is plane figure really a mere sensation? . . . All objects are seen in space; all objects are seen as one or many: but is not the idea of space requisite in order that we may thus ap-

prehend what we see?....Thus the difficulty which we have been illustrating of distinguishing facts from inferences and from interpretations of facts, is not only great but amounts to an impossibility....We cannot obtain a sure basis of facts by reflecting all inferences and judgments of our own, for such inferences and judgments form an unavoidable element in all facts. We cannot exclude our ideas from our perceptions, for our perceptions involve our ideas. (Whewell, *Novum Organum Renovatum*, p. 52. Compare also p. 116.)

Once we learn to see in the instance of large and elaborate contents like "the universe," or by the study of a persevering and detailed criticism (such as Green's) of Humism, that in every fact there is embedded a theory and that the fact only is a fact because of its theory; we shall see also that it is idle to look anywhere within theory for minute data which are internally free from ideal construction, and which only enter into theory as units externally connected by it.

Each of such units is itself the content of a theory—the nature of mind is, as Professor Bosanquet says, present in it and makes it what it is.

As the repeated division and subdivision of matter brings us no nearer to getting rid of its extension, so the repeated extraction and re-extraction of factual elements from a theoretical network has no tendency to get us down to pure unmediated datum.

And as it is futile to attempt to escape from ideal construction by way of minification, so also is it equally futile to attempt to escape by way of magnification. As whatever is material is extended, and remains extended while it remains material, so also whatever in any sense is, is theoretical and remains theoretical so long as it in any sense is or is not.

All reality is of necessity primarily the content of a

theory: everything namable is what it is in virtue of its theoretically determined systematic place, in the ideal totality: *Thus if we can get to understand what the structure of the true theoretic whole "id quo majus cogitari nequit" is such of necessity is the structure of real reality.* It is mere failure to see to speculate about a real order of things possibly conformed to, and possibly discrepant from, the order of thought. In the reality of things is their ideal or theoretic nature. There is not one problem as to the nature of the ideal order and another as to the disposition of real existence; they are the same problem.

What we most commonly mean by the real is, that which is continuous with the world disclosed to us through sense experience and thus we are led to speak of this real world as extended by means of ideas as if *it* were the primary real and the ideal structure the secondary real supported by the given sensible. This is an illusion, for in the first place the supposed nucleus of given fact which is to support the ideal extension is a fiction: in the second place the flow of reality is the other way. It is not the ideas which are real *qua* continuous with sensible fact, but the sensible fact is real *because, it is ideal*, i. e., in virtue of its participation in the ideal totality.⁶

Take up *anything* merely as object of thought or ignorance or bewilderment or what you like. It is a something identical with its self. What is it? Here is a question of its nature answerable, and also of its nature answerable in one way only: that is, by exhibiting the content in question harmonized in its systematic place in the intelligible totality. The content as something is of necessity in ideal relation with every other something, as having with each something or nothing in common, being to each greater or less, prior or posterior, like or unlike, comparable or

⁶This point—one of great importance to my argument—is admirably argued in Mr. H. H. Joachim's essay *On the Nature of Truth*, pp. 80-82.

incomparable.⁷ By the nature of the case implication cannot be satisfied unless all intelligibles form a closed system and equally by the nature of the case implication cannot be denied satisfaction—for its law is the absolute prius; one might say of it in relation to philosophical agnostics who modestly doubt “whether our faculties are able to inform us as to the ultimate nature of the real,”—“When me they fly, I am the wings.” As easily escape from space by moving out of it as doubt, think, or in any way be, or not be, outside the ideal totality which is of its nature all inclusive.⁸

It is not necessary to have separately contemplated every possible individual triangle in order to be in a position to say that every one of them must be either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene; it is not necessary to have contemplated separately every individual possible being in order to know that it must have the systematic place and the properties which belong to it as being.

It is often said that so long as we are ignorant of anything we cannot possibly *perfectly* understand anything else; the converse of this is true, viz., that if to any degree we know anything we cannot be *perfectly* ignorant of anything else.

All reality is, to an extent, pledged and defined in every judgment. Blank ignorance as to the nature of things is in the strictest sense impossible in spite of the agnostic's affectation of it. Once true always true. If we know that A is A—if this is *true*, then our ignorance of all the rest of reality is limited; for we know that come what may

⁷ Mr. Bradley (*Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., p. 580 footnote) points out that something in the way of qualification must result from any comparison.

⁸ Ignorance falls within knowledge. We can only be ignorant of a basis of knowledge. It is only by possession of an outline map of a continent that we can know that there are points of the interior unexplored. Ferrier (*Institutes of Metaphysics*, sec. 2.) St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. II, cap. XCVII “Est enim proprium objectum intellectus ens intelligibile, quod quidem comprehendit omnes differentias et species entis possibilis, *quid enim esse potest intelligi potest.*”

it must at least be of-such-a-nature-as-to-consist-with-the-maintenance-by A-of-its-A-hood. God himself,—let us not fear emphasis in a good cause—God himself, I say, having made A to be A has no longer quite a free hand anywhere in the whole range of reality as to what He shall make anything else to be for those predicates at least which determine its relation to A are predetermined for Him or for it.

In logic once you admit anything you are already committed to all that is logically implied in your admission; this is a consequence of the all-inclusive nature of the intelligible as it appears in a process.

No view could be more false in logic, than that view which regards premises as detached truths, which in reasoning enter into a merely external relation with each other, and with the mind, so that the mind takes them up when it will, uses them as it will, and drops them to lie inert once more when its purpose is served.

On the contrary, having started a question the mind is powerless to do anything else than see it through to the end. Until the conclusion is produced the premises are endangered. Action and reaction are as between premises and conclusion equal and opposite. The premises constrain the conclusion; if the premises are true the conclusion follows, if the conclusion does not follow the premises are not true. Until the conclusion has followed the premises are on trial for their life and the reasoning mind which by accepting them has identified itself with them is on trial for its sanity; that is, for its existence as reasoning mind.

Instead of considering the premises as inert and the mind as employing them as instruments, let us rather consider them as like elemental forces which the mind may indeed evoke into activity but which having evoked it is

as powerless to control as it is to control the unending procession of summer and winter, seed time and harvest.⁹

The Hegelian dialectic is a very good example of this. It is in intention an attempt to interpret the stages of the automatic recovery of content from a state of abstraction. It is a perfectly impersonal instrument and the mind while submitted to it is as powerless to arrest the procession of the categories as a man falling through the void would be powerless to arrest his fall by wishing to do so.

If anything is it is, if it is it is A; if it is A it is AB; if it is AB it is ABC; and so on, so that unless ABC....Z were: nothing would be and if anything is ABC....Z is.

* * *

If, as we have just seen, the process from ignorance to knowledge is a process of recovery by content of the implication from which in the beginning it is taken as abstracted, it will follow at once that a content approximates to the supreme intelligible exactly in proportion to the richness of its realized implication. A being has more unity, is more to and for itself, in proportion as external relation enters less into its essence.

Now the root in a being of external relation is composition, because the constituents of a composite *in quantum hujus modi*, are not-each-other, and therefore the composite is a meeting place of differentia, and partially belongs to each of divers orders, so that as belonging to one it is in external relation to the other.

Now because whatever is, is (or has) being, and is therefore, in relation to all else that is or has being, (i. e., to every possible mode or manifestation of being) there is no possibility of escape from external relation by stripping the thing of qualities to such a degree that it escapes

⁹ A scholastic definition I remember seeing quoted in T. H. de Regnons's *Metaphysique des causes*, brings this out well: "Ratio est vis animae faciens currere causam in causatum."

from external relation for sheer lack of qualities to serve as points of attachment—rather by this process we tend to leave it no being but that of external relations. (Kleutgen, Vol. III, p. 123, No. 593—see the quotation from Maurus.)

The whole nature of reality qualifies every reality and the sole question is as to whether it qualifies it internally, that is by being possessed as an attribute, or by way of external relation.

Though its suggestion of numerical form is exceptionable we need not seriously quarrel with Spinoza's "Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquaeque res habet, eo plura attributa ipsi competitum." (*Ethics*, Prop. IX.) But the scholastic formula is preferable: "Quaecumque ens in quantum ens est unum et verum et bonum."¹⁰

Now an order implies a principle (*ubi est ordo ibi est principium*); an order of beings measured in degree of being according to degree of self-sufficiency implies a principle which absolutely is and is in all relations absolutely *a se*.

To doubt this, or to doubt the necessary subsistence of this principle is only possible under the domination of the common sense illusion as to the relation of ideal and real. *If the ideal order is exigent of such a principle where*

¹⁰ The doctrine of degrees is almost with the scholastics the master key of reality and they delight in running up and down the scale in various ingenious ways (see for example Dissertations VI and VII of Kleutgen's great work on the Scholastic Philosophy). Another modern scholastic of great acuteness puts the matter thus: "Now this light of knowability in things is more or less self-manifesting to the reason, in proportion as the things themselves are high in the order of self-sufficiency in their own nature. And this rule qualifying as it does the highest in rank of Being for the worthiest in the rank of object of science, yields as the due order of dignity for science the same as that which is assigned above. In which the *divine self-sufficient principle of principles* stands first in its luminous simplicity (*Lord Bacon's Philosophy Examined*, Rev. F. H. Laing D.D., p. 94). I may conclude by an example from St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. II, cap. XCVIII, "Quanto autem aliqua substantia separata (*pure spirit*) est superior, tanto ejus naturae est divinae naturae similius, et ideo minus contracta, ut pote propinquius accedens ad ens universale perfectum et bonum. (Compare App. and Reality, Chap. XXIV.) One might also venture to discern a poor relation of this law in Mr. Spencer's "Formula of Evolution."

is there a higher law to say it nay? And what can be more real than that which is most real in that ideal order whence reality flows to the sensible?

We must now proceed to apply this law of the intelligible order, viz., that the more self-sufficient, the more one, the more intelligible is the more real and the prior reality to the interpretation of the content of reality.

Prop. (1) God is the Ens universale.

Truth is predicated primarily of judgments, secondarily of their correlative concepts,¹¹ thirdly of the entities in which these concepts are realized.

According then as a being is the more nearly *a se*¹²—the more real—the judgment expressing its essence will express more reality¹³—will be a more universal truth. The "I am" of God expresses all reality and God is therefore called the Universal Being,

Prop. (2) God is self-conscious and omniscient.

The process of which God is the culmination is a process of unification. One aspect of this is the unification of subject and object;¹⁴ this union is perfect, therefore God knows Himself perfectly. To do this He must know in what He is, what He is not. What He is not is finitude, and as every determination of finitude is a different "not God" it follows that in God's perfect self-knowledge He knows as in a mirror every possible determination of finitude down to the uttermost detail.

¹¹ For relation between judgment and concept see Welton's *Manual of Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 13-16, and Harper's *Metaphysics of the School*, Vol. I, pp. 448-9, Note 3.

¹² i. e., here and always—the more near in the scale of being to the *Ens a se*.

¹³ Aveling's *God of Philosophy* (Sands & Co.), p. 113: "As we ascend the scale of being, we find more and more included in our judgment of the nature of the subject."

¹⁴ St. Thomas, *S.C.G.*, Lib. I, caps. XLIV-LXXI.

Two other proofs that God knows may be just mentioned.

(a) It is involved in the notion of truth that it is eternally true; but truth is in mind, therefore there is an eternal mind.¹⁵

(b) "If anything ever began to be, something at least must have existed and this eternally. Now this eternal being must be intelligent; otherwise its relations could only be to already existing things. It could have no relation to the purely possible. And therefore the non-existing would never have begun to be¹⁶ . . . since it is only by the translation of a pre-existent intellectual idea into actuality that non-being can be made to give place to being."

Prop. (3) God is not-the-world.

This formulation is clumsy I know. The proof is as follows: God is utterly one (*maxime unum*) but if He was in any way or in any relation whatever one with the world He would be subject of and subject to its distractions.

It is, we may say, in relation to our intellectual need of the very essence of God, that He shall be not-the-world. So far as He is in any way one with the world, so far He is distracted with its distraction, which it is *for us* His essay to heal. Leave any degree of oneness between God and the world and to that degree you have still not reached your goal. God could not be what He is to the world and do what He does for the world unless (a) He was everything to it and (b) it nothing to Him—nothing that is in the way of contrast or external relation.

Pantheism says that God must be in some way one with the world in order to be anything to it. Theism replies that God *cannot be* one with the world or else He could not be to it *that which He is*, i. e., its Absolute.

¹⁵ St. Thomas, *Summa*, I, XVI, Art. 7: "Si nullus intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna."

¹⁶ Aveling, *op. cit.*, p. 49, footnote.

Prop. (4) The Divine Life is simple, eternal, pure act and not subject to process.

The doctrine of the last proposition must be rigorously carried out. If God was in any way (*qua* substance) concerned in the processes of reality; if there was in Him any becoming; if creation was necessary to Him, or was an unfolding or enrichment of His life or consciousness; if there was in Him any progress in knowledge, any composition, any variableness, or shadow of turning; if anything can be affirmed univocally of Him and of creatures: then so far He would be not-God, not the Absolute, would have no systematic function, and would be "no use" to the speculative mind or to the religious soul.

* I repeat that God is not *in genere*; that He is in no real relation to creatures but is *a se* yesterday, to-day and forever, that nothing is the same in God and in creatures, these are all ways of expressing the same truth, and that truth one which if we would save our souls and our reasons *we* must hold without variableness or shadow of turning.

* * *

So far we have joined forces with the idealist and have, we hope, in his company finally demolished the Humist phenomenalist. So far, or at least up to the beginning of the second proposition, we have been able to make use of the idealist phraseology in all sincerity except that possibly we slipped into saying once or twice that reality is nothing but a system of thought determinations, when we should have stuck to the expression "nothing *apart from*."

Prop. (5) Reality as a system of thought-determinations is still charged with unsatisfied implication and is therefore logically exigent of further determination. In other words, a thought-system is a system of universals and a universal as such is undeter-

mined; that is, stripped of its final individuating determinations.

(a) A system of thought determination is at once a construction from, and a process of determination of, its datum. The construction rests on and depends on the datum, and at the same time it reacts on and modifies the datum. The datum antecedently to its determination in the process is an α which is *in potentia* to the further determination β , γ and δ . Therefore it is a universal α : therefore the β and γ which rest on and are determined by α are all universal β , γ and δ . In reality, as we have repeatedly urged, implication must be satisfied; in a system of universals implication cannot be satisfied; therefore reality cannot be a system of universals.¹⁷ As easily build up a circle out of straight lines as construct a system of satisfied implication out of universals.

(b) We may arrive at the same conclusion by a somewhat different path:

We have insisted (pp. 521-2) that determination as between premises and conclusion is reciprocal: therefore a thought is in a state of logical stress as necessarily containing undischarged implication. Its individuals, as the scholastics well knew and insisted, are individual *types*,¹⁸ still *in potentia* to final individuating determinations. Upon this is founded the well-known distinction between the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* or God's eternal knowledge of all possibilities considered as respects *ad extra* of His essence and the *scientia visionis* or divine eternal vision of things as actually existent.¹⁹

¹⁷ I may take this opportunity of giving a general reference to my paper in *Mind*, N. S., No. 61—"The Structure of Reality"—which covers very much the same ground as this present paper and in which the point we are now arguing is specially insisted on.

¹⁸ Ricaby, *God and His Creatures*, p. 36, footnote. Also Harper, Vol. I, p. 338 (Prop. LXIII)—particularly the quotation from St. Thomas on p. 340.

¹⁹ St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, III, 5 ad 2: "Scientia visionis addit supra simplicem notitiam aliquid quod est extra genus notitiae scilicet existentiam rerum."

(c) Finally we may lay Mr. Bradley²⁰ under contribution for an argument (which, being at the moment out of reach of his books, I paraphrase loosely from memory): "You can think of what you like for there is nothing of which you cannot make an idea. In this sense everything must be called intelligible. You can think of thisness, you can abstract the feature of presentation but each time your thought refers to a subject which it does not exhaust. The idea is to an extent necessarily loose from the existent; it can never succeed in being the idea of this existent only. Your thisness is still a *universal* thisness." Never can the idea of an object be that object. It is always and of necessity just not the object. It is as not the fact, that the idea unifies or colligates (in Dr. Whewell's word) the facts. In a sense one can accept T. H. Green's criticism that for the maintainers of the validity of the antithesis of thought and being the sole and simple determination of Being is that it is not thought. *Being is realized idea*, i. e., idea existing in an un-ideal state. There is between thought and being a point for point correspondence in a medium of "otherness."

If we consider now the system of thought-determinations, we may see that it is related on the one hand as a system of possible finite beings to the system of actual finite beings, and on the other hand it is related as a system of ideas to the divine intelligence which is both the knower of these ideas and the primary object in which, as a mirror, they are known. There is therefore—we are standing at the divine viewpoint and looking outwards to finitude—a being (the divine) which is prior to the divine thought and which is its support and foundation, and a being (finite being) which is posterior to the divine thought and is its term. The system of thought is a system of typical

²⁰ I find on referring that what I have done is to compound App., cap. XV, with *Principles of Logic* in a very bad imitation of the Bradleyan manner.

possibilities of imitation *ad extra* of the divine essence (which in this system is the logical *prius*) and is objected to the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae*.

But the universal implies the concrete and concrete essence is *ens actu* (existent being); as then the possible is referred to the divine essence *qua* intelligence the concrete is referred to it *qua ens actu*.

In the order of simple intelligence God *qua* first intelligible is the foundation and logical *prius*, therefore the relation of priority being preserved and transferred to the order of being we have to say that in the order of being God has absolute entitive priority—is first cause.²¹

The order is: (1) God; (2) the order of finite intelligibles which are respects *ad extra* of the divine essence actualized by the divine intelligence;²² the order of finite actuals which are imitations *ad extra* in the medium of finitude of the divine essence and which are actualized by the divine will.²³

As God is the total final efficient and formal cause of existent finitude, which as a whole and as referred to God has no material cause, we express this by saying that God created the world out of—nothing.²⁴

²¹i.e., first in order of nature and then consequentially first (if so be) in order of time. Just as when an assembly breaks up the person first in rank leaves the room first. Even Professor Bosanquet seems to think that the eventual priority claimed for the first cause is priority in temporal relation.

²²A very able scholastic, Canon Walker, whose masterly monograph on *First Principles* has only just become known to me, writes (p. 14 of that essay) as follows: Libertoire seems correct in saying that it is the intellect of God which takes them [the ideas] out of their fundamental state in His essence and gives them an actuality.... The essence of God is therefore the remote cause, His intellect the proximate cause of these ideas. Harper's *Metaphysics of the School* (Vol. I, Chap. II) gives the same teaching.

²³Spinoza (*Ethics*, Part II, Props. VIII and IX) clearly recognizes the necessity for a difference between the way in which mere possibilities are referred to God and the way in which existent finites are referred to Him.

Compare Kleutgen, Vol. III, p. 28 (Nos. 555 and 556).

²⁴Ricaby, *op. cit.*, p. 104; St. Thomas, S. C. G., Lib. II, cap. XXXVII.

Compare also Prop. 4 which shows that there can be no kind of emanation of the divine essence; also the paper in *Mind* previously referred to where I urge that the realization by an intelligence of its idea is will. This is Mr. Bradley's teaching but I think it is also St. Thomas's. The latter says (*Summa*,

We have next to show that God is genuinely free in respect to creating or abstaining from creating. I offer the following argument.

God as foundation of, is prior to the whole ideal order: therefore all possibilities absolutely presuppose His existence, therefore He cannot not exist — there can be *no* circumstances to which His prior existence is not necessary: Therefore His existence is an absolute necessity—that is to say He exists by His essence just as a trilateral figure is triangular by its essence.

Finites on the other hand though in the ideal order they are as referred to God necessary, eternal, and immutable, do not exist in this order but only as referred beyond it by the divine will. They are therefore essentially indifferent and passive in existence and non-existence. The ideal order known in the *scientia simplicis intelligentiae* which is the foundation of all necessity, is entirely blind to their determination in respect of existence which is objected to the *scientia visionis*. Existence is to them a purely extrinsic and conferred super-determination. They are brought into and maintained in existence by the power of God, which, being withdrawn, they would at once collapse into their native state of possibilities. As well expect a rope to stand upright on its end as make finites exist by their own essences.²⁵

From this it follows that creation and non-creation are genuine alternative possibilities: both (like everything else) founded in God; therefore both possible *for Him*. Now God exists *sub specie aeternitatis* and therefore for Him antecedent possibility is not limited by the "subsequent" fact of creation. It is therefore an illusion when we think of God as antecedently free in respect to creation

I, XXIII, Art. 1): "Ratio autem alicujus fiendi in mente actoris existens est quaedam p[re]tentia rei fiendae in eo."

* *God and His Creatures* (p. 236).

or non-creation to add the thought that nevertheless it must *in fact* be already fixed that He is going to do one thing or the other.²⁶

Consider what play²⁷ is to man. It is an activity pleasurable in itself and of which the essence is that it shall have no efficient cause (e. g., need of exercise) beyond its pleasurableness, and no final cause (e. g., to win a prize) beyond its pleasurableness. It is of the essence of play that it shall be a perfectly free activity.

I think we get the best idea of God's freedom in respect of creation by thinking of it as the Divine play.²⁸

We should therefore conceive God, the *ens universale, perfectum et bonum*, as resting eternally *a se*, perfectly complacent in His seamless simplicity, pure life, pure truth, pure act;—ineffable, immense, and yet “He compasses thee round and bears thee in His arms; He takes thee up and sets thee down.”²⁹

We have now reached a general view of the structure of reality: (1) God, the center or axis; (2) finite possibles, the inner ring; (3) the creation, the periphery.* But the scholastic philosophy teaches that after having ascended from consideration of creatures to such knowledge of God as is possible for us, it is useful to descend again to reconsider creatures and their activities in the light of that knowledge of the whole order of reality to which we have now attained.³⁰

Our first attempts shall be to throw light on some ob-

²⁶ St. Thomas, S. C. G., Lib. I, cap. LXVII, *Rursus*.

²⁷ Mr. Bradley, “On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary” in *Mind*, N. S., 60.

²⁸ There need be no irreverence in this conception. Play is not necessarily trivial. Macaulay, I think, speaks of Milton's sonnets as a sort of play of the poet's mind.

²⁹ Newman's *Parochial Sermons*, No. IX, p. 136.

* These spatial metaphors are of course merely metaphors.

³⁰ St. Thomas, *Summa*, I, LXXIX, Art. 9: “Nam secundam viam inventionis, per res temporales in cognitionem divinissimus aeternorum secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. i. 20, ‘Invisibilis Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.’ In via vero iudicii, per aeterna jam cognita de temporalibus judicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum temporalia disponimus.”

scure features of the scholastic teaching in logic and epistemology, viz., as regards self-evident principles, the distinction between the formal laws of thought and the matter subsumed under them, the correspondence theory of truth, perception by species and the maxim *nihil est in intellectu* etc.

Take a series of beings such as the following—a lump of clay, a piece of living rock, a single atom, an amoeba, a worm, a lion, an angel, God.

The first approximates to the formlessness of *materia prima*,³¹ the second has a unity of natural cohesion and an ordered crystalline structure, the next (the atom) has a true substantial form but since one atom is much like another it is relatively speaking abstract and un-individual, in the next (the amoeba) the form is sufficiently active to impose itself on strange matter (nutriment); the next (the worm) has a higher grade of life but still it can survive division and therefore its unity cannot be much to it; of the next (the lion) this is not true but its form (always the principle of unity) is immersed in matter to such an extent as to be inseparable from it. Here I may interpose that as radical extension is of the essence of matter the form of a material organism must have, relatively speaking, a low grade of unity.³²

We now come to man, and we notice that while on the one side, the remark made just above applies, on the other side the human soul has an immaterial operation so that it is midway between the soul of a brute and a pure spirit. It is like the latter in not being dependent for its being on union with the body but it approaches the former in being naturally exigent of such union.

As there is the grand scale of beings stretching upwards

³¹ "Materia Prima quae est omnium maxime divisibilis, ac minime una, cum facta quaecumque divisione conservetur, est imperfectissimum ens et minime unum." Quoted in Kleutgen, III, p. 355.

³² Kleutgen (III, pages 354-355 no. 704) works this out most beautifully. All my quotations from Kleutgen are perforce from the French translation.

from *materia prima (prope nihil)* at the nadir to God—pure act—at the zenith; so there are within this scale subordinate series, repeating its gradations on a smaller scale. Such a subordinate scale, that of immaterial forms, begins at the soul of man which occupies in it a position corresponding to that which *materia prima* occupies in the main scale.

The characteristic operation of immaterial forms is knowing³³ and as *operatio sequitur esse*—man's knowing within the series of “knowledges” has the lowest possible grade of *a seity*; consequently it is dependent on bodily organs (the organs of sense) its proper object is the intelligible in the *material*. It is actuated by species from *without*. The truth which it knows is as it were *divided*, and is different from the undivided truth of God; it begins as it were abruptly from a group of first principles,³⁴ and as a consequence its knowledge is always rather an *aggregate* than a true unity,³⁵ and because of the beginning it is dependent *ad extra* and subsumptive in form, that is, we know rather by *means of* than *in* first principles.

We are thus able to convert a difficulty into an instance and to understand *why* we are incapable of apprehending the truth in a perfectly satisfying form. The scholastics

³³ St. Thomas, S. C. G., Lib. I, cap. XLIV: “Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine materia.”

³⁴ The best account of the nature of the self-evident first principles known to me is to be found on p. 44 (Objection VI) of Dr. Laing's book already referred to. On the whole subject in its broadest sense Canon Walker's monograph (*First Principles*) is a most finished specimen of scholasticism at its best.

³⁵ M. Mahers, in his *Psychology*, p. 302, quotes Coconnier, *L'âme humaine*: “Examinez les idées que vous faites des différents êtres, et vous verrez, que vous les avez toutes constituées à l'aide des notions transcendantes et communes de l'ontologie. Notions d'être, de substance, de cause d'action, d'espace. D'après cela nos idées des choses matérielles sont commes autant de faiseux de concepts.” According to the scholastic view (which if not without difficulties is at least a beautiful bit of speculation) our knowledge stands to the divine (and in a less degree to the angelic) knowledge as does the broken image seen through the faceted eye of insects to the perfect image seen through the human eye. Each facet would represent a first principle or “fundamental idea.”

were familiar with the predication puzzle, so dear to Mr. Bradley.³⁶

Our second attempt is to be of a more ambitious nature—indeed it is one for the conception of which I make a modest claim to some degree of originality. So far as I know the attempt has not previously been made to formulate a theory of theory which will enable us to judge of the finality of any particular theory by a consideration of its theoretic form.

It will be plain that the principles we have laid down as to the gradation of entities in the order of *a seity* do not depend for their validity on the real existence of the entities subjected to gradation, any more than the principles of geometry depend for their truth on the real existence of triangles, squares, circles, etc.

Now Hume, Kant, Hegel,³⁷ and St. Thomas each offer us a certain conception of the universe, and for each of them his conception of the universe *is* his universe. I propose therefore to attempt to place their universes in systematic order according to the principle of *a seity*. In this order that which is supreme will be (as referred to God) "*id quo majus cogitari nequit*"—will be a true system of satisfied implication and will therefore be ultimate or real reality. The others will be; each in proportion to its distance from *a seity*; in a state of logical stress or undischarged implication and they will therefore be subordinate worlds just like those of fiction.³⁸

To begin with Hume: He conceives thought-processes (as does Locke) as the functional activities of a thinking thing under stimulation, and therefore as subjective pro-

³⁶ Kleutgen, Vol. III, pp. 17-18 (nos. 546 and 547).

³⁷ Hegel=short for absolute Idealism. My information is acquired from the authors referred to at the beginning of this paper and from stray papers in *Mind*, and translations into English and French. It may seem temarious to undertake this discussion under such conditions, but I hope this is just one of the cases where "the commonest facts are the most important."

³⁸ I believe it is Dr. Bosanquet's merit to have first made prominent the metaphysical significance of imaginary worlds.

cesses, connected indeed with the unknowable outer world as effects of changes in it and as indirectly causes of further changes but not in their structure concatenation and inner nature significant of its structure concatenation and inner nature which if accessible at all to our knowledge are so only when investigated by means of observation and experiment.

We said earlier in this paper that if phenomenism is not a theory neither it nor its world is anything.³⁹ A theory is a presentation of a multiplicity *per modum unius* and the unity, such as it is, in Humism is to be found in time and space. Now this is a unity of the lowest possible grade for (*a*) both time and space are extended and have parts outside parts (*b*) the unities in phenomenism like the light in Milton's Hell "serve only to make darkness visible"; that is to say, they do not explain the facts but barely render intellectual contemplation of them possible. These unities supply as it were a form to the matter (the momentary and isolated sensations) of experience, but it is a form accidental to the matter and to the least degree one with it. The matter lies on the form like stones on ice.

The low logical state of phenomenism may also be seen in another way. It is a kind of picture thinking. Now according as we progress in knowledge to that degree are we free from dependence on phantasm, figures, working models and in the same measure again to the truths we possess we approach to a genuine incorporation with the understanding and become invested with a true necessity and universality. The modality proper to phenomenism is that of opinion ("it may be"). The truths of phenomenism are immersed in accidental circumstances of time and space.

³⁹ Bradley, App. p. 122 (*Phenomenism*): "The theory seems a unity which if it were true would be impossible."

Kant's work was to show that the categories of thought are (as pre-requisite to the possibility of experience) logically prior to that experience in which observation and experiment are possible. So that whatever presupposes general experience (e. g., detailed scientific results) presupposes also what general experience presupposes, viz., the categories of thought.

In Kantism the matter and form of experience, which in Humist phenomenism are merely in external contact, begin to *blend*. The categories of thought are recognized as contributory constitutives of the known reality and in the modality a genuine though subjective necessity begins to emerge.

Nevertheless the unity is of low grade because the form is recognized as alien to and as *imposed* on the matter. We are forbidden to distract our attention, and our theory, by watching for the thing-in-itself, but nevertheless it is made impossible for us not to do so. The Kantian known reality is distracted on the one side by reference to the purely mental world of thought-forms and on the other side by reference to the extra-mental world of noumena.

Kant's matter of experience is itself what, to adapt a scholastic phrase, we may call "*materia signata*"—assigned matter, *in potentia* not to any order but only to that of thought; and further not assigned to this order as a whole but as exigent of a certain manner and order of imposition of the categories, so that, e. g., a certain portion must be conceived under the category of causality and a certain other portion under that of substantiality.

From this it follows that Kant's raw matter of experience—that one of the constituents of experience which should be free from ideality—is just as much "the work of thought" before as after its union with the forms. It results that the determination of form upon matter is a determination of thought-system by thought-system. The

distinction of matter and form is in fact a distinction within thought.

Kant's then is a system transitional between Humism and Hegelianism—the ghost of Locke's outer world still haunts it.

With regard to Hegelianism I have little more to say as I have already discharged at considerable length (Prop. 5) my main criticism.

And (if I were sufficiently vain to use language which Mr. Bradley may use without vanity) I should add that for those who understand, this objection makes an end of idealism.

In Kantism the thought-system is distracted by external relation inasmuch as it implies in a medium of universality and in that system is denied *all* the content of reality which content is in the order of being repeated in a medium of concreteness. In Hegelianism the thought system has all the content it desires *and more*, namely, it has all the content of the order of being as well as its own.

Now just as it is not a limitation of freedom of movement to be unable to move out of space, nor a derogation from God's omnipotence to be unable to do that which is intrinsically impossible and which therefore is no term of action, (any more than beyond space is a term of movement); nor a derogation from His infinitude that He is not finite; nor a derogation from the Absoluteness that He stand to the relative in relation of irrelativity; so also it is not a derogation from but rather a part of the completeness of the thought system that it is not-the-Being-system.

The Hegelian attempt therefore to surcharge the thought-system with content has actually the effect of impoverishing it. Perhaps I shall be appealing to the non-Hegelian side of Mr. Bradley's thought but still I cannot

forbear to enforce this criticism by remarking how obviously in "Appearance and Reality" the perception of the non-identity of thought and being combined with the Hegelian assumption that the absolute is the inclusive whole has led to a tendency to conceive the absolute as a Schellingian *neutrum*. An idea and its object are opposed precisely as A and not-A. Identify the finite object "not-A" with the absolute and you therefore identify it with that with which the absolute is identical, namely A, the divine idea. Then as referred to the same point, A and not-A cancel one another and we get the neutrum.⁴⁰ The following arguments may assist to show that Hegelian idealism is not the ultimate but only the pan-ultimate philosophical system.

(1) The determination of the whole system follows that of the absolute—but in Hegelianism the seat of absoluteness is undetermined and undeterminable.

For we cannot say that the system as a whole is the absolute, nor can we say it of the systematic center.

(a) Not of the system as a whole, for that contains the multiplicity which it is the function of the absolute to unify.

(b) Not of the systematic center, for as so conceived the multiplicity is as necessary to it as it to the multiplicity. Thus the systematic center is determined by relation to the multiplicity: it is nothing apart from the multiplicity, which therefore is equally with it necessary and eternal. Therefore it is not the absolute.

The process of knowledge is a process of unification. The absolute is the realization of knowledge, but if its unity is in contrast to a multiplicity it is not perfectly realized in itself but is in itself in a measure potential.

To put it briefly: just as we saw that the absolute must be self-conscious because it is eternally necessary and of

⁴⁰This point is enlarged upon in my paper in *Mind* already referred to.

itself intelligible in act and must therefore be the subject of its intelligibility, so also must it be in itself the completely adequate object of its knowledge; and this it would not be if its thought had to consider anything beside itself in order to understand itself.

(2) Pantheism bears all the marks of a penultimate system, one, as it were, still in the womb of reason, its features still undifferentiated. As its absolute is not *quite* the absolute so its finitude is not *quite* finite but in it finite and infinite are mixed together and still awaiting the final touch of purifying distinction. The best it can manage in the way of finite individuals are only make believe individuals, their minds play at being, but they cannot be really distinct from the absolute mind; in them it is God who pretends to be ignorant of His own thought, their truth is not really truth and their error lacks just the distinguishing peculiarity of error.⁴¹ *Theism alone can do justice both to the finite and to the infinite.*

(3) In the theistic reality being is the limit of thought just as a circle is the limit of the inscribed polygon—every enlargement of the thought-system carries it towards this unattainable limit. Truth is the correspondence of thought and being. Now a more enlarged thought-system is more near the being-system than a less enlarged, just as an inscribed figure of a million sides is nearer to the circle than an inscribed triangle. To consider a truth as cohering with other truths is to consider it in an enlarged system of relation—an enlarged thought-system; and a more enlarged thought-system stands to a less enlarged as proximately representative of the being-system. We have therefore an explanation of the relation of the cohe-

⁴¹ Mr. Joachim's essay on *The Nature of Truth* (chap. IV, Monism) which has been much before my mind while writing this. It was from Mr. Joachim's essay that I gained the conception of pantheism as the penultimate system. It, with its coherence theory of truth, "suffers shipwreck at the entrance of the harbor."

rence and correspondence theories of truth and error, which is at the same time a reconciliation of them. Coherence is a test, in a certain sense the *test* of truth. Correspondence of thought and being is the *definition* of truth.

To understand in what consist finite truth and error: We may conceive God as contemplating among creatables finite minds which He will further conceive as endowable with the capacity for becoming the centers of subordinate thought-systems and being-systems (my conception of the world—my world). These subordinate systems will fall into their places in final reality either as systematically homologous and as concentric with but minified from the final system and as reproducing it on a lower apperceptive level, (and in this case the systems are true and their truth though finite is impersonal, and their objects are identical each for each with the corresponding objects known to God). Or else these subordinate systems will be systematically unhomologous and eccentric and needing an epi-cyclic connection to bring them into their places in final reality. In this case the systems will be false and their worlds will be worlds of fiction.⁴²

The system of reality as conceived in theistic metaphysics alone as contrasted with any other, is capable of infinite enlargement without displacement of its systematic center. Every enlargement only changes it in the direction of making it more itself. Every system that can be set up against it falls obediently into its place as a subordinate system, and so illustrates the truth it pretends to deny. To conclude: Theistic reality is not merely as an empirical but as a necessary truth "*id quo majus cogitari nequit.*" Therefore it is the real and ultimate reality.

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⁴² Compare Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, Prop. XI. Coroll.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

Objective Illustrations: Their Sphere and Importance.

THREE is an old proverb which says: "Order is the first law of Heaven," and the consensus of men has long ago decided that the laws of Heaven should be the laws of earth. To labor without some law or system is to fore-ordain fruitless result, although to be always ordering, or to be tied to a system, is no whit better. The one is lawless disregard of just observances; the other is self-enforced slavery to imaginary needs and requirements or to principles held in exaggerated esteem. Somewhere between these lines lies a successful mean. System and classification are valuable, if they are used only as suggestion. They must never shape the facts, but the facts must shape them. Facts are many-sided and have many relations. No system or classification can do more than illustrate *some* of these. If it does this, it has an important value. If it cannot do this, it is valueless. If other phases and relations are to be suggested, another classification is necessary. Only shortsightedness will insist on the sufficiency of one arrangement. Different purposes must have their different methods. When system in the presentation of complex or abstract thought takes the form of classifications which may appeal to the eye, it has incalculable value. Nearly every topic can by the exercise of a little

ingenuity and energy be illustrated in an objective manner in which the interest may be heightened and the impression made more vivid and lasting. The justification and importance of such an attempt lie in the nature of our thought, so large a part of which is ordered in terms of space and time. When the eye can be brought to the aid of the imaging faculty a success may often be gained in the grasping of a thought which would otherwise be a failure. Again, when a map, a diagram, or analytic chart can be brought before the sight, not only are the above results accomplished, but that most important end of all education may be aided as in no other way, viz., the broadening of the mind, since in this way the scope of a subject and the internal and external relationships may be seen at a glance in their wholeness and fulness. Indeed, a good classification may do more in the way of suggestion and further stimulation for a susceptible mind than the most detailed explanation of the facts in a prosier way. For such reasons as these, the subjects we are here considering will be interspersed frequently with devices of various sorts helping to make less the tediousness of the recital of facts and aiding, it is hoped, towards an increase of interest and a broader understanding.

Some Recent Classifications of Religions.

The subject of Religion is exceptionally susceptible of classification. In recent times it has been often and in various ways attempted: sometimes from the point of view of the objects of worship, sometimes from historical sequences and characteristics, sometimes from certain philosophical standpoints or to illustrate certain underlying philosophical principles, and sometimes from an incongruous mixture of different principles. The various methods of classifications, so far as I have met them, fall severally under one of the four following headings:

- A. Classifications from certain preconceived assumptions or standards of authority based on philosophical or theological dogma;
- B. Classifications from external characteristics of the religions, i. e., from the character of their individual, objective features and beliefs, or their mere names and number of adherents;
- C. Classifications from the subjective side based on a psychology of the subject, i. e., on the internal characteristics;
- D. Classifications from racial relationships and from actually traceable mutual historical influences (including linguistic and other genealogical schemes).

All of these methods of grouping (even those under A) have their value, often a very great one. They only overstep their province when they claim to be the sole legitimate method or even the best method. They can at most do what it is possible for a classification to do, viz., illustrate a certain general phase, relationship, tendency, etc. Each must in the nature of the case omit the special advantages of the others; yet through all, the general character of the subject may be seen, just as one can see and recognize the same landscape from different points of view, while in each new standpoint we get new and otherwise impossible impressions. He will know it best who is at pains to view it from all the available points. So in the study of religions, the most varied views should be most welcome, so long as they are not partial, overdrawn, or fantastically colored. Only by various classifications and methods of study is it possible to bring out the manifoldness of the great idea.

A. CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON DOGMATIC ASSUMPTIONS.

Under this heading may in general be placed all classifications which have occurred in Christendom down to quite recent times. This holds true of both the most con-

servative and liberal writers. Religions were of two classes: *true* and *false*. Christianity was true, all others (including its parent Judaism) were false; and to bring out the opprobrium of the contrast most fully the term "Heathenism" was applied to the extra-Christian world. The Jews would have dubbed them "Gentiles"; the Greeks, "Barbarians." If there was any apparent truth among the "heathen" it would be found in the end to be untrue, or it was claimed that evil was so mixed with it as to render its effects wholly bad. Neither in doctrine or cultus had Christendom anything to learn from Heathendom. To wicked priest-craft and to the Devil was assigned the origin of all its institutions. They took advantage of the fallen sinful condition of man, buried him with erroneous doctrines, and bound him in slavery to false worship and debasing superstitious practices. (Of course the writers themselves were members of the true.)

A second theory on this basis having the same meaning but couched in different terms, was that which classed religions as *natural* and *revealed*.* Yet in Christendom this was an advance on the former in two ways: first it enlarged the sphere of exclusiveness so that now both Judaism and Christianity were included on the side of revealed religions, while all others were invented or natural. Then again the terms of description and contrast were milder, although it was yet implied that the former were from God and the others from man (the Devil not receiving quite so large a share of credit). The natural religions however were in no way sufficient for man's needs. He had sunken from an original state of bliss and innocence to so low a condition that supernatural Divine interposition

* It must be observed, that from the point of view of the adherents of each religion, all the others are "false" and "natural" while theirs is "true" and "revealed." Hence the religion that should stand on the one side over against the others in the contrast of the legitimate against the illegitimate, would depend entirely on the birth-place of the classifier.

was necessary to prevent his utter ruin. The fatal consequences of sin could in no other way be counteracted. Hence we observe, the classing of religions was the outline of the theological or rather doctrinal attitude toward them. Theologians resting their faith on Church dogma could of course have no other view. Hence even the most liberal of them must hold this general attitude. James Foster in a sermon on "The Advantages of a Revelation," speaking of the condition of the world at the birth of Christ, says: "Just notions of God were, in general, erased from the minds of men. His worship was debased and polluted, and scarce any traces could be discerned of the genuine and immutable religion of nature." Here is an unusually liberal view of the so-called natural religion for a man of the eighteenth century, yet it contains the denial of even the comforts which this might have afforded to the men of those times. From men of philosophical tendencies the attitude was substantially the same. This could not be otherwise from the belief which men universally held regarding the moral and religious state of primitive man. They one and all believed him to have been originally perfect, they observed him to be far from that now. He must have been degraded. They read of things in history repulsive to their feelings and unseen in their circle of experience. They generalized this into the universal condition of the times alluded to. Distance in time and racial dislike gave the imagination scope, and the consequence was a theory anything but philosophical. John Locke, (1632-1704) one of the greatest if not the greatest English mind of his day, referring to the times of the beginning of the Christian era, says in his "Reasonableness of Christianity": "Men had given themselves up into the hands of their priests, to fill their heads with false notions of the Deity, and their worship with foolish rites, as they pleased; and what dread or craft once began, devotion soon made sacred,

and religion immutable." "In this state of darkness and ignorance of the true God, vice and superstition held the world." Heathendom, all and entire, morally and religiously was eschewed. Some of the Greek and Roman classical authors were good to read as literature, and a few writers upheld the study of Greek philosophy, notably the "Cambridge Platonists," while the Logic of Aristotle was generally in good repute.

But I must mention an opinion or two from Church history, that we may better see the prevalent teaching of the investigators and observe a further basis for this sort of classification. Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1694-1755), one of the most widely read and influential writers during the latter half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th, and a man revered for his great learning and sincerity by the general use of his text-books during a hundred years, says concerning this period in the first chapter of his "Church History": "All nations of the world, except the Jews, were plunged in the grossest superstitions. Some nations, indeed, went beyond others in impiety and absurdity, but all stood charged with irrationality and gross stupidity in matters of religion." "The worship of these deities consisted in ceremonies, sacrifices, and prayers. The ceremonies were, for the most part, absurd and ridiculous, and throughout debasing, obscene, and cruel. The prayers were truly insipid and void of piety, both in their form and matter." "The whole pagan system had not the least efficacy to produce and cherish virtuous emotions in the soul; because the gods and goddesses were patterns of vice, the priests bad men, and the doctrines false." (Quoted by J. F. Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, 21st ed. B. 1884, pp. 5-6.)

A similar picture of the period spoken of may be found in Geikie's *Life and Words of Christ*. If space permitted, I should illustrate this attitude from writers who construct

their classification of present religions on this same basis. And yet it is so general an assumption that we need not ask to have it illustrated. The theory usually urged for sending and sustaining Christian missionaries in various parts of the world is an ever re-current witness of it. Moreover, if one is looking for the foundations of things, he may find this assumption at the bottom of a vast amount of the religious literature of our times. Without further comment upon it, I will add a few lines from Dr. J. F. Clarke (*Ten Great Religions*, p. 7) who in speaking of this attitude toward the "ethnic" religions says:

"Apply a similar theory to any other human institution, and how patent is its absurdity! Let a republican contend that all other forms of government—the patriarchal system, government by castes, the feudal system, absolute and limited monarchies, oligarchies, and aristocracies—are wholly useless and evil, and were the result of statecraft alone, with no root in human nature or the needs of man. Let one maintain that every system of *law* (except our own) was an invention of lawyers for private ends. Let one argue in the same way about medicine, and say that this is a pure system of quackery, devised by physicians in order to get a support out of the people for doing nothing. We should at once reply that, though error and ignorance may play a part in all these institutions, they cannot be based on error and ignorance only. Nothing which has not in it some elements of use can hold its position in the world during so long a time and over so wide a range. It is only reasonable to say the same of heathen or ethnic religions.... Unless they contained more of good than evil, they could not have kept their place. They partially satisfied a great hunger of the human heart. They exercised some restraint on human wilfulness and passion. They have directed, however imperfectly, the human conscience toward the right."

B. CLASSIFICATIONS FROM OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

I. According to the Nature of the Objects Worshiped.

This is the most general classification of those inclined to be scholarly and broad. It not only has numerous representatives in books, but is probably the only one that can

CLASSIFICATION OF RELIGIONS ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF THE OBJECTS WORSHIPED	
NON-RELIGIOUS PEOPLES, OR A-THEISM.	
FETICISM	{ Negroes of Central Africa Some S. Amer. Indians Australians, etc.
TOTEMISM	{ N. E. Asiatic Peoples N. Amer. Indians Some Polynesians Ancient Egyptians, etc.
SHAMANISM	{ Some N. Amer. Indians " N. Asiaticans " Papuans, Tamans, New Hebridians, etc. " Mohammedans, etc.
ANIMISM	{ An element intermixed in the religions of all peoples, but especially characteristic of Chinese, Ancient Greeks and Romans.
POLYTHEISM	{ Greeks, Romans, and Germans of Ancient Times All Ancient Semites Ancient Hindus Early Chinese and Japanese Aztec-Toltecs (Indeed, all religions, except Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Judaism, when contrasted with Monotheism.)
DUALISM	{ Persians (best representatives) Modern Hindus (in certain respects) Manichaeans of Middle Ages, Some Christian and Mohammedan theories
MONOTHEISM	{ Jews generally since prophetic times Higher religious conceptions in Ancient India, Modern Europe, and Mohammedan lands
MONISM	{ Upanishad and Vedanta Philosophers of India Lao-Tsze of China Eleatic School of Greece Many Modern Mystics: Bruno, Eckhardt, Böhme, etc. Idealists: Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc. Realists: Spinoza, etc.

be said to be popular among those classifications that deserve respect as aspiring to be scientific. Several of its divisions are in the most universal circulation, yet not all of them are so well understood, hence I shall give and explain them more fully than would otherwise be necessary. (See chart.)

1. *Non-religious Peoples*, if there be such, should be mentioned first. Many reputable authorities claim to have discovered tribes devoid of religious ideas. (See the works of Dr. Monnat, Sir Samuel Baker, David Livingstone, Sir Messenger Bradley, and Sir John Lubbock.) The testimony is disputed on the ground of its incompleteness and for other reasons, hence I will place no peoples under this topic. (Buddhism was at first an atheistic religion—i. e., in any of the usual senses.)

2. *Fetichism*, the worship of simple and casually selected objects which have come to be regarded as possessing in some way a superior power, such as stones, bones, shells, herbs, bits of wood, feathers, weapons, etc. In general, this is the religious condition of those peoples in the lowest stage of civilization, or the so-called "savage" state.

3. *Totemism* (or Nature Worship), the religious regard of objects of nature in a somewhat larger and less servile way, as of mountains, rocks, water, rivers, groves, trees, animals (serpents, cattle, etc.), and, in higher forms, the heavens, sun, moon, etc. This form of worship is found with peoples a stage higher than the last.

4. *Shamanism*, in which the deities are of the most diverse character, including the Fetichistic, Totemic, and polytheistic orders; but the method of approaching them is through magical formulas, incantations, etc., the performance or recital of which is believed to exercise an authority over them. If properly carried out, it is believed to extort from them the fulfilment of the applicant's wishes, whether these be temporal present needs or the disclosure of future

events. This form of religion is thought to be the dominant characteristic of most of the so-called "barbarous nations."

5. *Animism*, or the worship of ancestral spirits, is the belief that the soul after death has special opportunities for doing good or evil to the living, and hence is to be honored or propitiated. It is very wide spread and can scarcely be said to be the characteristic form of any stage of development.

6. *Polytheism*, the worship of many gods. This is a term capable of covering the whole range of religion below monotheism, but which is best used to designate a stage in which the gods are not longer natural objects, but entities or spirits in or independent of these. It is the characteristic of the religion of peoples on the border of or somewhat advanced in civilization, the so-called "civilized peoples," as distinguished from the "enlightened" above and "savage" below.

7. *Dualism*, the belief in two deities, one benevolent the other malevolent, the form of religion that accounts for the good and the evil of the world by referring each to a supreme cause having a nature in accord with the character of its creations.

8. *Monotheism*, the faith that one all-wise, all-good, and almighty being alone created, guides and governs the universe for ultimate good ends. This Being is regarded as a spirit transcendent to or over against the world of his creation. The type attained by the great majority of peoples in the most enlightened nations.

9. *Monism*, the view that the universe is a real unity in which the manifold diversity is only apparent; that the creating, guiding power and intelligence is immanent in it and not above or over against it; that the so-called material and spiritual are qualitatively the same (by one school all being regarded as material, by another as spiritual, and

by yet others the whole being spoken of as an unknown essence). This division has no representatives among nations or special peoples, but has been and is held by various individuals and schools of thought in various ages and various parts of the world. It embraces wide extremes, and must comprehend most of those included under the terms: idealists, phenomenlists, materialists, organicists, mystics, spiritists, etc.

* * *

It will be observed that these terms are none of them very definite, and that used combinedly in a classification they are loose. Their suggestiveness at best is somewhat vague, and without care is apt to be misleading, since it will be found that no people arranges itself exclusively under one of these headings, but that all of the varieties are found among the highest nations, while even the lowest peoples have some of the higher elements. Such religions as Confucianism and Buddhism, having the most numerous followings, really find no place in such a classification.

II. According to the Worshipers' Estimates of their Deities.

Sir John Lubbock, a careful student of ethnology and an investigator who has much to say worthy of hearing, objects to the usual classification of religions according to the nature of the objects worshiped. His method has somewhat of originality, though not more exact or by any means so different from the method he refuses, as he believed it to be. He proceeds to sort them over on the principle by which the deity is estimated by the worshipers. The result is a division of seven chief types. The first five are designated by terms in general use, the other two having no specific name. I will give the whole for what they may suggest. (See his *Origin of Civilization*, 4th ed., L., 1882, pp. 205-6.)

1. "*A-theism*; understanding by this term not a denial of the existence of a Deity, but an absence of any definite ideas on the subject."

2. "*Fetichism*; the stage in which man supposes he can force the deities to comply with his desires."

3. "*Nature-Worship* or *Totemism*; in which natural objects, trees, lakes, stones, animals, etc., are worshiped."

4. "*Shamanism*; in which the superior deities are far more powerful than man, and of a different nature. Their place of abode also is far away, and accessible only to Shamans."

5. "*Idolatry* or *Anthropomorphism*; in which the gods take still more completely the nature of men, being, however, more powerful. They are still amenable to persuasion; they are a part of nature, and not creators. They are represented by images or idols."

6. "In the next stage the deity is regarded as the author, not merely a part of nature. He becomes for the first time a really supernatural being."

7. "The last stage is that in which morality is associated with religion."


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This classification attempts to proceed strictly on the basis of progress in the development of religious ideas. When practically applied, it is not less confusing than the former, and is equally inadequate to define the character of the religion of any given people; although in the last two divisions it makes useful discriminations.

III. According to the Part Played by Man in their Development.—Historical Method.

1. Prof. W. D. Whitney, the celebrated Sanskrit scholar and Orientalist of Yale College, has instituted the classification of religions into *National* and *Individual*. I will let him explain himself. In an essay entitled, "On the

So-called Science of Religion," he says: "There is no more marked distinction among religions than the one we are called upon to make between a race religion—which, like a language, is the collective product of the wisdom of a community, the unconscious growth of generations—and a religion proceeding from an individual founder, who, as leading representative of the better insight and feeling of his time (for otherwise he would meet with no success), makes head against formality and superstition, and recalls his fellowmen to sincere and intelligent faith in a new body of doctrines, of especially moral aspect, to which he himself gives shape and coherence. Of this origin are Zoroastrianism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism; and, from the point of view of the general historian of religions, whatever difference of character and authority he may recognize in its founder, Christianity belongs in the same class with them, as being an individual and universal religion, growing out of one that was limited to a race."



2. DR. FAIRBAIRN of Scotland, a man who has written and lectured considerably on the comparative study of re-

ligions, makes his classification on the same basis as that of Professor Whitney, viz., from the part man's conscious and individual intentions have played in bringing them to the condition in which we find them in history. (*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*.) His terms are different, though meaning practically the same. He further subdivides the two main divisions, and, under these, religions are cited as examples. (See Chart.)

(1) *Spontaneous or Natural Religions*, those that have grown up out of a people collectively, e. g., the religion of ancient Greece. These he further subdivides into:

- (a) Primitive Naturalisms.
- (b) Transformed Naturalisms.

(2) *Instituted Religions*, or those which have their origin in some great personality, e. g., Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, etc. This again is of two kinds:

- (a) Reformed natural religions,
- (b) Reformed spiritual religions.

Each of these divisions, he claims, shades into the others. Nature's gradations are too fine for our subtlest distinctions. The naturalisms bring forth the historical; the instituted presupposes the spontaneous.

This classification too, like the others, calls attention to certain facts which deserve notice. When not too carefully scrutinized the divisions offer useful intimations. There is a sense in which certain religions are more spontaneous than others, or than the same are at later times. The consciousness of man was not so active in early as in later times. Moreover the simpler and less conscious growths must have come to take on crystallized forms before the reforming recreative spirits could be operative, and these efforts of the reformers and founders have again a freshness and spontaneity which the same religion in later times does not possess. Indeed, the latter is then to

the former as an "instituted" to a "spontaneous" religion. Hence we perceive that in the end the division is only a very relative one, i. e., that it has no intrinsic basis in the nature of religions themselves, but only applies to temporal changes coming about sooner or later in the process of all religious development. Nor have the remarks "growing up out of the people collectively" and "originating in some great personality," any more than an intimative significance. They are not divisions which correspond literally to the facts. As to the first, it is only the darkness which hovers over the history of nations in early times that enables us to speak of spontaneous developments unaided by great personalities, if humanity was governed by the same general laws then that it has been within historic times (and we have no ground to assume otherwise). We must believe that compared with the rest of their contemporary fellowmen, there have every now and then lived in the world those great personalities which set in motion certain influences relatively, though not entirely, new. And this leads me to say of the second remark, viz., that about certain religions "originating in great personalities," that these great personalities are only in a very qualified sense their originators. They are possessed of a broader, deeper consciousness which takes up into itself the facts or light of their age better and more thoroughly than others; they see more plainly and clearly the way the experiences of mankind point; they draw more faithfully and truly the higher inductions of their times: hence they become to others the apparent originators, in some perhaps supernatural way, of great ideas and religions. To themselves and to those who can appreciate with them this fuller consciousness and those more farreaching inductions, they are not more a mystery than the rest of life's experience. It is only to the mass of smaller minds that they appear origi-

nators in that absolute sense, or that they come indeed later to be deified.

The remarks which are here passed are applicable alike to the two presentations of this basis of classifying religions. The classification is suggestive and helpful, but it is a mistake to suppose it either deeply grounded or final.

After writing the above my attention was called to the fact that Prof. Max Müller (although adopting a classification equally untenable when exclusively insisted upon) had objected to this method of classification before Professor Whitney's essay was published, on similar ground to that which is here taken, viz., that though neither Brahman, Greek, nor Roman could point to the founder of his religion, yet "the student of antiquity can still discover the influence of individual minds or schools or climates. If on the other hand we ask the founders of so-called individual religions, whether their doctrine is a new one, whether they preach a new God, we almost always receive a negative answer. Confucius emphatically asserts that he was a transmitter, not a maker; Buddha delights in representing himself as a mere link in a long chain of enlightened teachers; Christ declares that he came to fulfil, not to destroy the Law or the Prophets; and even Muhammed insisted on tracing his faith back to Abrāhym, i. e., Abraham, the friend of God, whom he called a Moslim, and not a Jew or Chrstian, (Koran iii, 60) and who, he maintained, had founded the temple at Mekka. To determine how much is peculiar to the supposed founder of a religion, how much he received from his predecessors, and how much was added by his disciples, is almost impossible; nay, it is perfectly true that no religion has ever struck root and lived, unless it found a congenial soil from which to draw its strength and support." (See *Science of Religion*, 140.)

Professor Tiele, objecting to this same method, asks, "What is the wisdom of a community but the wisdom of its

more enlightened members, that is, of individuals?" Every myth, rite, or eternal truth, in any religion was the work of an individual mind, and I must re-affirm that it is only from the fact of their lying so much in the dark, that we speak of unconscious growths and spontaneous generation.

Moreover, these founders could have no success if they were so supremely and vastly ahead of their people as is hinted. What they spoke was only waiting in others' hearts for a mouth-piece. It is just because their better insight gathers up into itself merely in clearer manner what many less clearly feel, because they are able to lend shape to the more advanced ideas which the community has already come up to and which are already agreeable to the minds of many as soon as expressed. Individuals are ever at work, and the community is ever making some sort of growth. The one is conscious, the other not; but neither goes on without being in a true sense the product of the other. Sometimes in the course of events the individual's opportunities are greater and his efforts shine forth in more glaring light, but the underlying relationship and bond of mutual dependence is never broken.


It must further be observed that in most cases these founders never shaped new bodies of doctrines, etc., but by inspiration of their life infused new and pregnant principles into others who later developed them into doctrines and founded upon them ceremonies, which in time became a great body of faith and practice, or another religion.

3. PROFESSOR TIELE, starting from this same external historic characteristic, has developed a classification far more tenable than either that of Professor Whitney or of Dr. Fairbairn. (See *Outlines of the History of Religion to the Spread of the Universal Religions*. Tr. by J. E. Carpenter, L. 1877. [New ed. in Dutch and German.] Also especially, his later statement in *Encyc. Brit.*, 9th ed. art. "Religion.") This comes from the fact that he has

penetrated beneath this external shell to the deeper meaning. He has, in the process, gone away from the mere historic phenomena to a philosophical distinction which is to be made between them. Nevertheless his treatment must be placed with historical classifications, because he looks at this difference as one that has come about in the process of development; in other words, the difference between his two great classes, though one intrinsic in kind, is at bottom evolutionally considered a difference of degrees or stages. The higher was once on the same stage in which we find the lower; the lower in course of time would naturally reach the higher. He claims that the essence of such divisions as that made by Prof. Whitney is true. "The principle of the one category is *nature*, that of the other *ethics*." Hence he makes these the basis of his "morphological" classification of religions. (See *Encyc. Brit.* 9th ed. "Religion." See also accompanying chart.)

With great differences in their degrees of elevation, the *nature religions* agree fundamentally in the fact that the supreme gods are "the mighty powers of nature, be they demons, spirits, or men-like beings, and ever so highly exalted." They are subject to change and progress through the unconscious drift of public opinion, and by the conscious alterations and additions of foreign modes of worship. "Gods are more and more anthropomorphized; rites, humanized." Then too they are susceptible of a moral progress, which begins by ascribing ethical attributes to the highest gods. Farther on in the more advanced stages of nature worship, ethical abstractions are personified, deified, and worshiped, at first indiscriminately and indistinguishably intermixed with the nature gods. By and by the stronger and clearer minds (the philosophers, sages, prophets) begin to perceive the difference. To them the latest elements or deities are of overshadowing—indeed of sole—importance. They preach the predominance of

the moral. Persecution ensues. The defenders of the old faith abhor these independent spirits whose mission is to



them mere destruction. They speak in derision of the pure abstractions by which these innovators would dethrone

the old and trusted gods of the fathers, and if the ancient faith has not lost too greatly its hold on the masses (as it generally has not at these early stages), these high thinkers—Socrates, Jesus, etc.—may pay the penalty of their elevation by premature and violent deaths. These simpler and more sensuous faiths with true instincts perceive the danger to the old traditions if such doubt and preaching are allowed to go on unmolested. A little infiltration may be tolerated, may indeed give an agreeable vivacity to religious life; “but the reform must not exceed certain limits,” for if it does, the old forms would plainly become superfluous. Finally when the new ideas have become wide-spread enough, the old ones meet the doom which from the first awaited them. No help can do more than make the process gradual; no arguments, however specious, no claims of sacredness, no assertions about superiority or universality can make head against the on-coming intellectual tendency. “No political power, no mighty priesthood, no poetry, no mysticism like that of the Neo-Platonists, no romanticism like that of Julian, not even an attempt to imitate the organization and the rites of an ethical religion, can save it any longer from utter decay.”

The tide of religious conception is now turned. The old nature religion may now be considered as advanced to the stage of an ethical religion, in that the predominant characteristic has changed. The traditional naturistic elements are not wholly set aside or excluded, but they are subordinated and assume somewhat of ethical functions. The more important of the old nature gods survive, but no longer occupy first places and dominate. On the contrary they take menial positions, become serving spirits, ministers, angels (*ἄγγελοι*, *yazatas*, etc.) before the supreme moral Orderer of the universe. A great breadth of conception has entered in. Man views the world not so much in its former conflicting diversities. The natur-

istic religious standpoint has been reversed. The polydæmonistic and polytheistic character is tending to monotheism. The polytheism is at least becoming organized and monarchical. To this is added greater individualism among the adherents. Conscious speculation, imagination and reflection increase. Growth goes on more by these than by unconscious national accumulation or change. Some higher central notion of a more definite sort of salvation to be attained comes into prominence. Organization for the purpose of fostering and propagating this idea takes place. Men bind themselves more closely together to aid in practicing it, and the religion is finally "instituted or organized" by later hands; while we may merely say it was "founded" by or received its original impulse from an individual or body of priests or teachers. These later organizers always ascribe to the "founders" a high standing in relationship with the Divine. They stand as inspired prophets to whom the Deity has revealed his will, as messengers expressly sent to direct men, as sons of the gods instructed with various missions, or indeed, as incarnations of God himself. So much on the general divisions of the topic.

Subdivision of Nature Religions. (See chart). Professor Tiele calls the very earliest stage of religion the *Polyzoic*. This he does not place in the outline, since we have no information concerning it. He thinks "man, in that primitive stage, must have regarded the natural phenomena, on which his life and welfare depend, as living beings endowed with superhuman magical power; and his imagination, as yet uncontrolled by observation and reasoning, must frequently have given them the shape of frightful animals, monstrous portentous mythical beings, some of which still survive in the later mythologies."

The earliest stage with which we have an acquaintance, he names the *Polydaemonistic Magical*. Animism is the

predominating characteristic, though the religion is not mere animism. Animism is a sort of primitive philosophy. The primitive mind has come to believe in a spirit which is superior to the body. This he extends to the phenomena of nature by supposing them to be the work of spirits of departed men. This is extended till everything living, moving, startling, extraordinary, is finally attributed as the work of mighty spirits moving freely here and there and abiding either permanently or temporarily in this or that object or region. The most powerful among them come to attain in man's mind the rank of divine beings, and are worshiped either as invisible or embodied spirits (spiritism or fetichism). Three special characteristics of this stage are noticeable: (1) Its confused and indeterminate mythology, though some spirits are more powerful than others, especially the heavenly, and in general there is a supreme spirit of heaven who is mightiest of all; (2) The implicit confidence in magic through which sorcerers and fetich-priests come to be held in such veneration; and (3) The predominance of fear over all other feelings and the doing of religious acts generally for selfish ends.

Therianthropic Polytheism is the name given to the next higher stage. The name is intended to describe the character in which the gods usually appear, viz., in the forms of animals and men, yet predominantly the former. They are really spiritual conceptions embodying themselves in these ways. Animal worship is everywhere in such religions a prominent characteristic. The gods are represented as men with animal heads, or as animals with human heads. Such religions have yet an element of magic, but it is in the hands of an organized priesthood, hence they are characterized as purified or organized magical religions. These practices are forbidden to private sorcerers, and in the hands of the priesthood have a developed ritual.

Some are very highly organized, others little. Some approximate very closely to the next higher stage of pure anthropomorphism, others closely to the next lower, of animistic predominance. In the former there is a strong tendency to monotheism, accompanied by a sort of theocratic government in which the king is the living representative of the king of the gods.

Next in order are the *Anthropomorphic Polytheisms*, the highest stage in the naturistic religions. These, as well as all the higher forms, contain many survivals of the characteristics of the earlier stages, yet those features have been adapted to newer ones and no longer predominate, and consequently the religion deserves another name. The gods are now all superhuman and manlike, rulers of nature, effecting good and evil. They are more ethical than the former, yet the mythology is sensual in character. Wars, wooings, revelries, and the lowest passionate indulgences are exceedingly frequent. Such myths, of course, were shocking to graver thinkers, but they formed the staple for the masses till the time of naturistic religious decay. "Not one of the religions in the polytheistic stage was able to elevate itself to the purely ethical standpoint; but, as moral consciousness went on increasing, deeper and more ethical religious ideas gathered round the persons of the most humane gods, the beloved son or daughter of the supreme deity, and gave rise to purer modes of worship which seemed to be forebodings of a time to come."

Subdivision of Ethical Religions.—The question of subdividing this class into *Nomistic* and *Universalistic* religions has called forth considerable discussion. The essential difference consists in the features that the former are based on sacred law drawn from sacred books, while the latter start from principles and maxims. (On the soundness of this asserted difference more will be said later.) Professor Kuenen used the expression "National Religions and Uni-

versal Religions" as the title of his Hibbert Lectures, (1882). He excluded Islam from the latter. Several other terms have been proposed for this class. Among the rest "world religions" and "world churches." The latter title was given by Professor Rauwenhoff (*Theol. Tijdschrift*, 1885, No. 1), who, however, rejects this method of classification. Professor Tiele himself would not use the term "world religions," unless as a sort of practical designation "to distinguish the three religions which have found their way to different races and peoples and all of which profess the intention to conquer the world, from such communities as are generally limited to a single race or nation, and, where they have extended farther, have done so only in the train of, and in connection with, a superior civilization." He granted that strictly speaking there can be only one world or universal religion. No religion has any claim to such a title from its achievements, whatever it may have in it potentially. Hence he adopted the more modest title "universalistic," in place of "universal" or "world," religions. Buddhism and Christianity are distinguished from Confucianism, Brahmanism, Jainism, Mazdaism, and Judaism, by their missionary spirit. The latter, after each becoming the religion of a single race, have ceased to spread, and after centuries of stiffening into dogmatism and formalism are slowly fading away; while the former number their adherents by hundreds of millions, are spreading among different races, and are rapidly making inroads upon the territory of other faiths.

This, said Professor Tiele, "cannot be due to some fortuitous or external circumstances only, but must have its principal cause in the very nature of each sort of religion." By other terms he described the one class as "nationalistic" or "particularistic" in contrast with the "universalistic." The three religions belonging to the latter class aspire to represent religious ideas which were not limited to the

nation's horizon, but which would have an interest for humanity, which would bespeak the general aspirations of the human heart. For this reason, two of these religions were rejected by the peoples to which their founders belonged by birth, and the third one, Mohammedanism, though founded by an Arab, derived its fundamental ideas from Jews and Christians and was raised to its high position by Persians and other peoples. Its unnatural character is shown in the fact that its converts, whether made by force of arms or by missionary exertions, enjoy on embracing Islam the same rights and dignities as Arabs. So too Buddhism "looks for the man, the miseries of existence beset all alike, its law is a law of grace for all." That so broad is the Christian aim at its best, need not be here supported.

Though not on the same level, these religions are classed together because of their resemblance in origin and aim. Islam and Buddhism are only relatively universalistic, each showing the onesided religious development of its race at its highest. Islam emphasizes the absoluteness of the divine side at the expense of the human. Man is of no importance, hence he has but one duty, obedience. In such a system ethics cannot develop. Society must be conducted on a despotic basis. Buddhism puts the stress wholly on the human side. It knows no divine. Man must save himself by his own exertions. Self-renunciation, full and entire, is the way of escape from the miseries of life. The more truly religious has no place; or if it develops at all, it results in a childish fantastic mythology.

On Professor Pfleiderer's basis, that religion is the synthesis of dependence and liberty, Islam represents the former, Buddhism the latter. (Cf. this with Pfleiderer's classification farther on.) Christianity in its purest forms

fuses the two, dependence and liberty, the divine and the human, religion and ethics, into a real unity.

We have in this classification, on the whole, the most profound and profitable grouping thus far considered. In its development we receive many valuable suggestions. But good as we see it to be, satisfied or flattered as we may feel ourselves over the result, still we must as far as possible look at all the facts in these matters, and be governed as little as possible by our prejudices, desires, and the circumstances of where and under what influences we were born. In the spirit of such an outlook and such an attempt, several things must be said about this classification.

In the first place, to distinguish between *nomistic* and *universalistic* ethical religions on the ground given, is practically to make distinctions on the basis of features where there is no essential difference. Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism are each as truly sacred book religions as Confucianism, Judaism, etc. But they are in addition what he describes them—religions based on principles and maxims, on great central dominating ideas. This more definite characteristic, together with the facts that their bodies of doctrine cluster around distinct personalities, and that they have operated under more favorable opportunities as to civilization and coincidences in time, have largely occasioned their superior successes. He admits that other religions have extended farther than their race limits “in the train of or in connection with superior civilization.”

He distinguishes Buddhism and Christianity from the others by the fact that they are trying to make proselytes, while the others are doing so no more. But Islam cannot be excluded from this desire and activity. Again, the contrast shown between this feeling in their adherents and its absence in those of others, is due more to the superior moral development of those of their peoples who are so

engaged, than to an essentially restrictive national character of the religious side of those religions who are not so engaged. I say *religious side* of the religions, because we must not in our enthusiasm over and emphasis of the morality connected with a religion forget that this does not constitute the whole religion. Religion has its moral side, but morals are not religion. Religion should no doubt be helpful in the development of morals; but though it be of inestimable importance, this must not reach an eclipsing character. To make religion morality, and then to make morality our kind of morality, would be an easy way to decide that some peoples are devoid of both. But this is not science. When we say, this or that religion is not making proselytes, we must look for reasons before deciding that this is an intrinsic defect in the religion *per se*. It may be, as above indicated, from lack of moral development of the beneficent unselfish feeling of the people quite apart from any thing which the religious outlook alone would necessitate. It may be from other circumstances beyond the power of the votaries to hinder, e. g., we know that many religions are in a state of decay brought about by the destruction of their political support and by persecutions. Sometimes it may be from poverty of material resources to undertake. Sometimes, alas, by internal dogmatic development and formalistic decay. But from this last we must confess that the great missionary religions have not been free, and have in some countries hardened into as dead and disinterested a formalism as others. Witness Spain, Turkey, and Ceylon. Nor can we be at all certain that their fate would have been measurably different among those races, climates and environments where we find dormant and fading faiths. It may even be doubted whether the great religions accompanied by their best representative peoples would have maintained a living progressive faith under such political and climatic circum-

stances during thousands of years. It must be further observed, that below certain limits of intelligence, men will believe what they are taught. Men of faith would find no difficulty in being men of another faith, if the fates of life had put them in such an environment. It is only when a high degree of individuality of thought has made them think for themselves, that a religion becomes unbearable.

Along this same line of thought, his remark that the three universalistic religions were representatives of religious ideas which had in view not the special religious wants of the nation, but the more general aspirations of humanity, can scarcely be admitted as sound. Every devotee of every distinct faith or sect in the world believes that his religion represents *just such ideas* as would be of general interest to the race, if only he could get the race to see its interest and its duty of accepting his belief. He pities, deplores, complains, exhorts, or despairs and damns, according to the doctrines of his order, those who do not.

It is going too far to say that Buddhism and Christianity were rejected by the peoples to whom their founders belonged because they represented universalistic rather than national ideas. As stated above, the parent religions were full of the faith that their teachings were just such as the world as a whole needed, indeed must have, if it ever received salvation. Rather was it because the new faiths rejected and despised the old means, that they themselves were spurned and persecuted by the parent religions. It is true, they were a great advance in sympathy toward the world, and hence also a liberalized outlook. The new way of looking at religion filled the early adherents with new enthusiasm, new hope, and new confidence that the world could be brought to see and believe in this way (as new ways of looking at any cause, in or out of religion, always inspires to this); but that they any more seriously than

their predecessors in the old faith believed themselves to possess religious ideas of world-wide rather than national interest, is erroneous, and results in a denial to the old faiths of that which is essential to any and every faith. The faith of any individual or any people must necessarily in his or their mind be the faith for the world. If he or they do not preach it, it is either because external circumstances do not permit, because it lacks definiteness and clearness in the believer's own mind, or because they are so engrossed in its formalities as to be oblivious to what if conscious they would regard as others needs. If those founders of new religions had sought to generate a world-wide enthusiasm over the old lines and methods, history teaches us that they would never have been cast off. They cast themselves off before others cast them off. The founders and establishers opened the conflict by an absolute renunciation of the forms of the current religion. It might have been difficult, perhaps practically impossible, to have brought forward the new ideas with the continuance of all the old forms and methods. It is a historic fact that the idea which each of these three great faiths embodied was taken up by parties within the old religions, but only to a very limited extent were they successful. Why they were not more so, would be very difficult to ascertain. In Jainism we have the "national" form of the Buddhistic idea; in Ebionitism that of Christianity; and possibly in the Wahhabites that of Islam. Perhaps at certain junctures of conditions a complete break with the old is the very best that can be done, although in general growth up, out of, and above is healthier, more enduring, and apt to be more wide-spread than reform by reaction and opposition. However, this is not here our present concern, but merely to see, in the truest light we can, why these faiths were not more lastingly successful among their own peoples. There might be many other reasons given. I will mention only

one, regarding the attitude of Judaism to Christianity, viz., that the position or too close relationship to God which both Jesus himself claimed and his followers who wrought out the doctrines more fully demanded for his personality, was revolting to the highly developed Jewish monotheistic sense of that time. The development of the conception as to the person of Christ had come about with the aid of ideas then prevalent which had their origin in Greek semi-mythological philosophy. The Jewish Semites had had for centuries no taste for mythology. The Prophets had drilled them into loyalty to Jehovah alone. He had no progeny nor co-rulers. Pauline theology set Christ up as his deity son, made him in many respects equal with God, and assigned to him a conspicuous part in the moral government and management of the world. Indeed, the primitive Christian idea added a new feature to the character of the Deity, but instead of putting it into the character of Jehovah, it embodied it in a new god or personage which it set up beside him. In this difference and claim alone we have nearly a sufficient explanation of the Jewish rejection of the new faith. To our day, this has remained the great and all hindering objection to Christianity by the Children of Israel. From their standpoint, it had its basis in mythology and idolatry; and since the days when the Decalogue was written, nothing has been more repugnant to a faithful son of Abraham than these.

Ethically the new faiths have, speaking in a general way, an intrinsic advantage, and this advantage was a natural outgrowth of the circumstance of an improving social development in the time of their origins. (See Prof. J. R. Seeley's *Ecce Homo* for an excellent exposition of the social and moral causes at work in the Roman Empire at the beginning of the Christian era.) Moreover, this ethical advantage of these faiths would have availed nothing, had it not been for the indispensable aid afforded to their

success by the improving social and ethical relations. But we must again remind ourselves, that however important ethics may be for the practical every-day purposes of life, ethics is not all of religion. A classification might be made on the basis of the metaphysical characteristics of the objects of faith, in which case it would be impossible by the best results of our highest philosophy and science to sustain the assertion that these three great religions are more "universalistic" or more true to the facts than Brahmanism, Confucianism, or Mazdaism. Philosophy and Science have scarcely settled the question as to whether the truth lies with monistic idealism, monistic realism, or dualism. Nor have they been able to decide positively which is the more inspiring as a philosophy of life. Until something more definite is agreed upon regarding this more religious side of religion, it will not do for us to be too dogmatic in our assertions of superiority here or there merely on ethical grounds. Down to the present, ethics have been the feature of apparently greatest importance, yet we are not in the least sure but that when society shall have reached a relatively high moral development in which the crying demands of "live and let live" are heeded without great exertion, the ethical feature of religion will sink to be a matter of minor significance.

And now a final remark as to the confusion regarding the meaning of such terms as Christianity, Buddhism, etc. If, e. g., we mean by Christianity the teachings of its founder and establishers, we are constantly in danger of confounding (if we do not actually do so) the objective metaphysical and physical sides of that early (and to us the genuine) Christianity with nineteenth century ideas of theism and the universe. On a second thought, after turning to history, we perceive that increasing knowledge of facts and laws is gradually supplanting the early Christian ideas of the universe and with this changing the conception

of God. Again, if we mean by Christianity the standards of thought and duty of to-day prevalent among enlightened nations, the body of belief regarding the universe and man's relation to it and to his fellows, we perceive that we have undermined the ground of our frequent appeal to the original type as authority. For except in the spirit of sympathy, love or universal brotherhood, which is the common ideal of the two, they are as different as 1800 years of varying fortune could make them. Hence our appeal must take the character of a resource for inspiration and a refreshment of courage. Whichever or whatever our position may be, we should endeavor to avoid the fallacy of such an incoherent mixing of facts and principles and periods as that so often met with.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE JONAH LEGEND IN INDIA.

STUDENTS of the Old Testament may be interested in learning about a migration of the Jonah Legend eastward into India.

Two versions of it occur in the Tibetan work *bKa-babs bdun-ldan*, a History of Buddhism in India from the eleventh century A. D. to the reign of Akbar, written by the Lama Tāranātha in 1600.¹ This author is well known to students of Buddhism by another work on the history of Buddhism in India compiled in 1608, which has become easily accessible by the Russian translation of W. Wassiljef and a German version of Anton Schiefner. The former book represents the continuation of the latter.

The legends refer to the late period of Buddhism characterized by a group of eighty-four saints or rather sorcerers known under the designation Mahāsiddha. Their activity seems to embrace the time roughly from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. They play an important rôle in the mythology of Lamaism.² One version of the legend is connected with the name of Naropa who, in all likelihood, died in A. D. 1035.³ The story is very brief. Naropa, says our text (p. 37, 7), had consecrated a Man-

¹ The Tibetan text has been edited by the Pandit Sarat Chandra Das at Darjeeling (printed at the Bengal Secretariat Press), 1895, 76 pp. The book has not yet been translated.

² A. Grünwedel, *Mythologie des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei*, p. 40.

³ This date has been computed by E. Schlagintweit, *Abhandlungen der Bayer. Akademie*, 1896, p. 602.

dala of the God Hevajra⁴ and studied certain methods of meditation, and while he once was in a state of contemplation, he was carried away by a stream and swallowed by a fish; but as he perceived in the belly of the fish the Mandala of Heruka,⁵ he did not suffer any harm and was cast out again.

The other story (p. 58, 1) is somewhat more detailed. "Minapa (i. e., the fisher), a pupil of the Saint Kakkutipa, was a fisherman in Kāmarūpa in the east of India. While he used to meditate a little after the 'wind' method,⁶ as practised by the fishermen, he once threw his fishing-hook at a fish, and pulling the line, he was snatched and swallowed by the fish. By virtue of his deeds and meditations, however, he did not die, but drifted on the river Rohita towards Kāmarūpa. There, on the little hill Umagiri, Maheçvara⁷ preached to the goddess Umā⁸ instructions on the 'wind' Yoga. As the fish came into that river, the fisherman in the belly of the fish listened to the sermon, meditated, and obtained many accomplishments (*guna*). It once happened that this fish was caught by fishermen and killed, when a man turned out. The former king had then already died, and meanwhile, since the birth of his (Minapa's) son, thirteen years had elapsed: thus it was found that he had spent twelve years in the belly of the fish. Thereupon, father and son betook themselves to the master Carpatipa, requested a sermon from him, meditated, and obtained both the siddhi. The father is known as the Siddha Minapa, the son is called the Siddha Ma-ts'in-dra-

⁴ Grünwedel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 104, 105.

⁵ Identical with Hevajra. See Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, p. 233.

⁶ A term of mysticism denoting the drawing in and holding one's breath to prepare for meditation and finally the power of holding back one's breath for a great length of time, by which faculty miracles and many extraordinary things may be performed, not only those of religious significance, but also of good practical purposes, as in the above case the method of the fishermen is doubtless suggestive of a good catch of fish. See also R. Garbe, *Sāmkhya und Yoga*, pp. 44 et seq.

⁷ Shiva.

⁸ Shiva's consort.

pa." The latter word is apparently identical with the Sanskrit *matsyendra*, "the lord of the fish."

As traditions of men being swallowed by a fish seem not to be found in ancient India, and as the above two stories relate to a period when Mohammedan power was established, we shall probably not err in supposing that it may have been the Arabs who spread the story in India. Indeed, the legend of Jonah is narrated in the Koran (*Sūrah*, XXXVII, 139-148) and quoted in four other passages of it.⁹

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⁹ See Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 249.

CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

A LETTER FROM DR. PAUL TOPINARD.

The last numbers of *The Monist* and *Open Court* gave me such satisfaction that I cannot resist the temptation to express it to you. Please accept my congratulations on the evolution which I perceive in these magazines since their foundation. They answer perfectly the purpose of the founders to help in furthering the evolution of thought throughout the world, in the search for truth and its best application to the welfare of humanity.

Some years ago you invited me to publish my attitude toward the religious problem. I did not answer then because I thought I was not ready for it, I believed that the difference between us was too great. I was puzzled with your use of the word "form" in distinction from the meaning of it to which I was accustomed, that is, as a synonym for the physical shape of a body. But in the meantime I have read all your editorial articles, particularly your answer to Mr. Schumaker which made a different impression on me than your answer some years ago to Mr. Hyacinthe Loysen; and now I understand you perfectly I believe.

No doubt we have the same aim, but we differ in two points: first, your purpose is philosophy, mine is application. Secondly, you proceed in your reasoning by idealistic conceptions and I by materialistic observation and induction.

Your normative factors of existence are the "ideas" of Plato. Your God is their prototype, the central, the highest, whether in the universe or in oneself. The soul is a portion of Him, transitory in our brain but imperishable. Physicists would say it is energy. You add that those normative factors are realities, but that the man untrained in abstract thought cannot comprehend them. Well, I must say I am among those untrained and I have great difficulty in comprehending as realities in my brain those things which are not physical. Notwithstanding, your pantheistic conception of nomotheticism

and entheism pleases me ; that is, of a God everywhere, even in ourselves. But it is only a philosophical view and does not meet the demands of experience. Such a God can not be supplicated and invoked, nor your "immortal" soul which is but a portion of the universal spirit.

In fact after long meditation and in spite of the fact that I belong to a group systematically anti-religious, anthropology understood in its wide acceptation has led me to the conclusion that a faith is necessary for utilitarian purposes. The very great majority has need of it, viz., children until, let us say the age of ten years, a premature skepticism tending to make anarchists of them ; women, in whom sentiment is a requisite of their special function of reproduction ; the downtrodden, such as slaves ; and those broken-hearted by great natural misfortunes. I do not include the unsuccessful in the struggle for life, for every one must reap what he has sown, must receive the full effects of his acts. It is the penalty of responsibility.

But on what foundations can we base that faith ? The best certainly would be the ordinary conception of God as the Creator and governor of the universe, whom we can supplicate and invoke, and the conception of our ego surviving to receive just retribution for our thoughts and deeds on earth. Philosophers have built systems to support these conceptions, among which the most rational are nomotheism and entheism. Churches have done the same, either at some definite time or gradually : at some definite time through a prophet or God-man who said or believed that his was the divine mission to proclaim the revelation or *Logos* of God ; or through a simple man who preaches from his heart and who is the product of his surroundings, his personal education and hereditary predisposition, to whose ministrations the churches then add the rites and ceremonies so necessary to the common people. But science has never given its sanction to these conceptions. Neither can energy be said to be the God we dream of and need ; the ego or soul begins with the first sensation of the child and ends with the last breath of the individual, young or old.

Now these two conceptions are really indispensable. China, putting aside Lao-tze and Buddha, has not a supernatural faith. The religion of Confucius is only an ethical system built up on that which flourished in the time of the emperors Yu Ki, Yao and Shun. The national religion in China is filial piety, the worship of ancestors and benefactors of the race, the earliest progenitor in prehistoric

times being the son of the heavens. Some may think that such a religion is the cause of China's deadlock in civilization although so advanced some 4500 years ago. But in my opinion it is the Chinese language and system of writing which retarded China's progress, the introduction of Buddhism serving to confirm the results.

Shall I speak of other conceptions or abstractions which have been or might have been held up as a sort of idol, that is to say anthropomorphized and surrounded with rites and ceremonies so that the people would form the habit of considering them as a guardian or fetish to which they may appeal and which they can adore? First among such ideas stands Plato's conception of the Supreme Good, that is the perfection uniting the true, the good and the beautiful. Next the conception of virtue or of wisdom so much talked of, especially by the Stoics. Reason worshiped by the first French republic is in the same category. Such also would be the Utopian conception of universal altruism or fraternity, of solidarity, of equality of all classes and all men (a senseless idea since there is no equality in nature), of collectivism, etc.

The best concept, I must say, to take a synonym of God would be justice so much sought after by the Jews and finding its consummation in the eschatology of the Persians. But its non-existence around us is too evident. My definition of it is this: Justice is in our mind the consecration of human responsibility; it is receiving what is due to oneself and to others, the full effects of conduct.

All those conceptions are more or less included in God-nature or God-cosmic-order. They are attributes or secondary aspects of Him, your superreal factors of life. They all answer to the same disposition or need of a faith for man. This view of yours is quite ingenious and I accept it. Then we are not atheists, we understand God in a wider sense, higher than in the ordinary orthodox manner, that is all.

Another idea, conscience, approximates your soul or entheism in the same way. It corresponds to that of the Christ-ideal of which you speak, that will remain after the historical Christ as the best guide for virtuous conduct.

I will not stop here to discuss your consciousness in your interesting article in *The Monist* of January, 1908. ("Mysticism" also is interesting). Conscience, in common opinion, is the inner voice which more or less imperatively tells us what we must do or not do. In my opinion conscience is the physiological product, accumulated and

confirmed by heredity, of those demands of social life, which a long experience of man has recognized in the course of centuries and ages. They are the hereditary habits of Spencer, myself and others, which in animals are called instincts. Their origin does not trouble your consciousness of the ego and entheism. Although conscience can not be worshiped or invoked it can be heeded. Is it not after all the virtue or wisdom taught by a long experience?

Now leaving the speculative considerations, what is to be done at the present time? Must we proceed by a revolution or be opportunists and continue the evolution whose course hitherto has been as follows:

(1) Naturalism leading to polytheism; (2) Local and national gods, each proclaimed as the only and the best; (3) Monotheism, one of these gods such as Yahveh taking the head. The evolution of the religious need made a great advance at the beginning of the Roman empire, and another at the time of Luther. At the present time another and greater advance is in progress. Oriental archeology, the two last volumes of Loisy on the Synopsis, and such articles as those of *The Monist* and *The Open Court* show that the day is near. A few years ago in Switzerland I had a private talk with an illustrious Protestant professor of theology, and put the following question to him:

There are two systems in Christian Churches, one of them has its foundation exclusively on the Bible whose influence is melting away; the other is founded on decrees (decretals, true or false), whose supporters would die rather than make the least concession to modern thought. Is it not the duty of the most liberal in the first to take the lead and start the movement forward?

In *The Open Court* of November, 1907, you wrote in excellent terms that it would not be wise to make too rapid an advance and that the churches must be given time. You suggest that it would be better to cling to the most liberal of Christ ideals, and you accept the proposition of Mr. Bell to have instead of the Bible a book of compilations gathered from all sources, containing suitable teachings and sentences from Jesus, Paul, Confucius, Zarathushtra, Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, etc. I would add even prophets of primitive people and modern authors. A few days ago I was reading the six first chapters of the *Didache* or Teaching of the Apostles, which contains very good suggestions for daily conduct. The habit would be slowly formed of seeking ethical standards in this collection instead of in the Gospels which are not always clear to the reader.

Afterwards other modes of procedure would be found which would at last bring about the best universal religion combined with the best universal ethics in accordance with the happiness of mankind.

I spoke above of a revolutionary method which would be less slow. I hardly dare say what I was thinking. Well, it would tend to the practice of filial piety, the cultivation of the family and the worship of benefactors of mankind, as in China but with better position given to women. Before long the institution of the family will be entirely lost in our countries if we do not strengthen it and make it the palladium of society. Surely families are not eternal and do not realize immortality; but by his ancestors a father extends one hand to the past and by his descendants stretches one hand towards the future. An old man on the eve of his death thinks that his good deeds will be an example and capital for his posterity. Beside this consideration does it not also favor the physiological end of the genus *homo*?

But would it not be possible to combine the systems: (1) Christ as a center, as we would take Tell or Osiris, because his name is widely popular, and as a synonym of duty or wisdom, the product of man's experience in the course of ages; (2) the religion of filial piety and the worship of benefactors in ethics. It is the business of the laity to study the question.

Now both Mr. Bell and yourself are under an illusion. You believe that it will be possible at some remote time to build up a practical religion or church on the foundation of eternal truths; but truths are the property of scientists and philosophers, and not fully accessible to the great majority for whom the churches are intended. One of my conclusions in anthropology is that the always persistent animal nature of man is in contradiction with the requirements of social life. It is only through laws supported by a police that our ego recognizes that concessions must be made to others, in order to have the benefit of reciprocal concessions.

After all, what are those eternal truths? Are they natural laws, determined and formulated by physics, biology or sociology, and answering to true realities; or conceptions of the human mind, the normative types of thought which you call superrealities, or meta-realities as a theorem of geometry?

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FRANCE.

I would have many works indeed to call to the attention of the readers of *The Monist* were I to include all the branches of philosophical science. I prefer to confine myself to those whose subject bears a close relation to the philosophy of science and the science of religion.

First of all I will mention among the works on history and criticism, *Platon* by M. Cl. Piat, *Pierre Bayle* by M. Delvolve, and *Leibniz* by M. Baruzi.¹ M. Piat's study is very learned and sensible; that of M. Delvolve very curious and interesting, and not less so is that of M. Baruzi which undertakes to bring out vividly the great views of Leibnitz on the "religious organization of the earth."

The figures of the two philosophers Bayle and Leibnitz are found also in M. Joseph Fabre's *La pensée moderne*, which is the third volume of a series of five whose object is to give us the vast panorama of human thought from antiquity up to the present day. This volume takes us from Luther to Leibnitz.

Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza (and to these are joined Galileo, Bacon, Malebranche, Hobbes, Newton) are shown here in all their glory. M. Fabre has known how to make his analysis briefly, and to present the doctrines skillfully without a tiresome display of erudition. The curiosity of the reader is no less strongly attracted by less familiar figures arranged in their place in the "movements of ideas," where they are given their real significance. Accordingly in books one, five and seven we find discussed the Catholic crisis and the advent of Protestantism, the continued protestation with the dissenters of the seventeenth century, and finally the Puritan reformation with the initiators of the American Revolution. It is enough to speak of the enormous work accomplished by the author and to indicate its value and lofty range.

M. H. Delacroix gives us his painstaking and remarkable studies in his specialty, the history and psychology of mysticism, (*Etudes d'histoire et la psychologie du mysticisme*). The three great types investigated are St. Theresa, Mme. Guyon and Suso with some minor ones, taken in different environments and at different epochs, in order to restore more accurately the elements of which the mystical experience is composed. M. Delacroix does not limit himself to that passive form of mysticism, ecstacy (the treatment here is con-

¹ These volumes and those that follow are published by F. Alcan, Paris.

cerned only with Christian mystics); he rightly shows (and your distinguished compatriot Josiah Moses was wrong in this point) that mysticism in its larger forms reveals itself as active, expansive and creative.

M. Rogues de Fursac relates and describes as an eye-witness the religious revival of the district of Galles (1904 to 1905) under the title, "A Contemporaneous Mystical Movement" (*Un mouvement mystique contemporain*). He writes with sympathy and as an observant spectator. M. Revant d'Allonne in "The Psychology of a Religion" (*La psychologie d'une religion*) treats from the point of view of the specialist in psychiatry the complex phenomena of revelation and religious inspiration in the personality and work of Guillaume Monod (1800-1896) that "Resurrected Jesus" who has his church and his followers in our modern Paris.

The ethical problem never ceases to occupy the minds of thoughtful people, and this problem which so profoundly engages one's entire life becomes imperative in the present crisis when morality no longer finds a solid foundation upon which to lean outside of the various religions. How different are the points of view from which each person considers the question of morals! M. G. Belot in his "Studies of Positive Ethics" (*Etudes de morale positive*) proves himself to be a sociologist and a utilitarian. M. Fouillée in his *Morale des idées-forces* does not intend to leave technically philosophical ground and flatters himself that he can construct a doctrinal ethics which is convincing. M. Albert Bayet lays his foundation on the idea of good (this is the title of his book, *L'idée de bien*) and conceives as possible a rational ethical art in which science would play a subordinate part. Moreover, he rejects utilitarianism as well as all so-called scientific ethics. The idea of good in his eyes is a relative idea, changing as its object changes, and religious men themselves are compelled to arrive at the conclusion that there can not exist a "universal and holy ethics."

Is it not true on the whole, as I have more than once written here and elsewhere, that we ought not to confound the purely psychological aspect of moral phenomena with their practical aspect? Is it not also true that what we call moral obligation or moral imperative is the result of a psychological impulse as are faith and habit, while duties which are the object of ethics, grow from life itself, that is to say, they are the expression of judgments and feelings in terms of experience? Such in my opinion are the two

essential features of all moral doctrine which can be regarded as positive.

We now come to the bold attempt of M. H. Bergson to apply to biology his concept of "real duration" as distinguished from "abstract time," an expression which sums up the influence of the past on the present and the future. But this expression implies something else in the metaphysics of M. Bergson. It implies liberty, the power of creation, and this is the explanation of the title of the book, "Creative Evolution," (*L'évolution créatrice*). Its final purpose is to take up anew in the light of present-day knowledge the great problem of the origin of life.

M. Bergson's subject leads him to discuss the ideas of finality, chance, non-existence, order, and he does it in pages which are among the best that he has written. I greatly appreciate his shrewd and penetrating criticisms; for instance, that of the principles invoked by the mechanists on the one hand and the finalists on the other. But perhaps he is too complacent in the use of such vague expressions as tendencies, vital enthusiasm, etc., and I find myself in the position of a skeptic, a doubter, after permitting myself to be carried away upon the wings of his metaphors. In the mechanistic theory determinism takes the place of an intelligent God; in finalism a certain force of attraction or repulsion occupies that place. In the "creative evolutionism" of M. Bergson it is activity, and time; it is vital enthusiasm and duration. As contradictory as these leading ideas seem to be and as uneven as their critical efficacy can be, are they not in some respects nevertheless possible substitutes for each other and do they not symbolize a provisional synthesis of the same facts? This difficulty always remains that even if all is not given it nevertheless seems that all can be made with that which is given.

I will refrain from making any further remarks. It is impossible to give in a few lines a satisfactory sketch of a work of such importance.

At the last minute I have just received a work by M. l'abbé Lucien Roure, "Face to Face with the Religious Fact" (*En face du fait religieux*),² the title of which alone shows that the author has intended a direct and vigorous work. The religious problem, religious sentiment and its varieties, mysticism and its explanations, religion and life,—such are the subjects treated, and, I will add, treated with eloquence and warmth. In the chapter on varieties of

* Paris: Perrin, 1908.

the religious sentiment there are some instructive pages on "immanentalism," or the method of immanence recently discussed in France in a talented manner by Father Laberthonnière, but condemned by Rome. The chapters devoted to mysticism are particularly interesting in that they show accurately the point of view of the Catholic Church on this delicate question. I observe that here as in the *Etudes* of M. Delacroix the character of activity is to be found in Christian mystics, among whom the quietists do not hold a legitimate place, according to Abbé Roure. In this connection and with regard to the religious significance of facts without now investigating their psychological definition, the alternative is not imposed upon us to know whether mystical phenomena prove faith or whether it is faith which gives form to mystical phenomena.

This work raises still further questions, but I have reached the limit of this short note.

LUCIEN ARREAT.

PARIS, FRANCE.

DER VORCHRISTLICHE JESUS.*

EXTRACTS FROM A REVIEW BY PROF. DR. KARL BORINSKI.

(Translated from *Xenien*, I., pp. 45-71.)

A book by an American professor of mathematics, which would establish with geometric rigor and precision an entirely new theory of Jesus and the Origins of Christianity, is not thereby, in and of itself, either mathematically or theologically, a phenomenon of interest and importance. Theological mathematicians are in far worse repute than even mathematical theologians. To the latter indeed Kant would seem to have given a final quietus, but the former do yet greatly abound. Alas! it is commonly not the profound martyr-spirit of a Pascal but the cabalistic folly of a Newton, so repellent to the Voltaires and Du Bois Reymonds, that will not let them sleep. In our own time an Italian professor of mathematics has sought to "prove" in a ponderous tome, by a measureless array of figures and formulas, the nonsensical thesis that Dante's Delectable Mountain in the first canto of the Inferno is identical with his Mount of Purgatory. Of the recent American proofs for and against the forbidden fruit of Paradise, the less said, the better....

* William Benjamin Smith, *Der vorchristliche Jesus* nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums. Mit einem Vorwort von Paul Wilhelm Schmiedel. Alfred Toepelmann: Giessen, 1906:

What then is so remarkable in the work of this American mathematician, who emphatically declares to his German correspondent, "my vocation is mathematics, my avocation is theology"?

* * *

There is much, yea, much that is full of significance! Of this we may assure at the outset the reader of this admirable volume. In the first place, our mathematician stands fully abreast with the specialists of his "avocation," being interesting by virtue of his compulsive acumen, and pre-eminent through his wide-extended learning. He strides forth in his critical and theological panoply as sure as if he had never had aught to do except with Bible-texts, Apocryphas, Heretics, Gnostics, Apologists, Rabbinists, and Church-Fathers, had never given a thought to aught else but Semitic languages, the Orient, and cuneiform inscriptions. Only occasionally does an unfamiliar citation from Goethe, or some strong side-light cast on some biologic doctrine, betray the fact that here we have to deal with a theologian that forms a class by himself.

* * *

This it is, the uniqueness of the man much more than the uniqueness of his demonstration, that draws us to him. Leibnitz declares that it is precisely to self-taught scholars that the profession they have conquered owes the most, "for they force their way into the field by a new and hitherto untrodden path, and so catch sight of much that the others, who beat round in the accustomed circle, never became aware of." So, too, our subtle-witted Biblical critic, erupting from the world of equations into that of text-variants and parables, has perceived that whereof the theological profession as such—now in the sign of Wellhausen, Kautzsch, and Delitzsch—has not so much as dreamed. He has beheld not the traditional "theistic concept of the Yahvist and the Elohist," projected backward nearly three thousand years from the average modern conceptions of Synagogue, Talmud, and Rabbinism. No! Out of unintelligible allusions, divergent text-readings, obscure confessions, rejected witnesses,—a senseless chaotic pall-mall! the inner sense of this transylvanian mathematician, incessantly busied in constructing forms, has beheld ever more and more distinctly a connected text arise and take shape before him. *Voices*, too, have issued forth therefrom, not isolated nor accidental, but *choral strains* other indeed than celebrated the birth of the Christ-child of the Church, and yet at heart no other! *human choruses*, resounding through many gen-

erations and girdling the circummediterranean world with proclamations of the holy household faith of Israel ever more and more affrighted, Israel bowed and finally crushed to earth, but Israel comforted still by his God within, the Lord of his Psalms, and saying, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and "Behold! He that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep."

* * *

This it is, the milder present form of the stern transcendental eschatologic Messiah-idea, not the exalted Messiah-Judge, the Christos of the Hellenistic Jews, but his gentle personal complement, the Jeshuah, Salvation personified, *this* is according to our mathematical clairvoyant the "Nazarean," i. e., not the Man of Nazareth, a place (he assures us) that did not exist at that day, but as the word itself signifies, "the Defender, the Protector, the Guardian." "The term Nazarees, by which the Christians were first known (Acts xxiv. 5), by which they are still known in the Orient, and by which they are denoted in the Talmud, (*Ha-Nôsrim*, b. Taan, 27b), is common in the Old Testament, where it always means "keeper," "guard" (2 Kings xvii. 9; xviii. 8; Jer. xxxi. 6)." "The root N-S-R. appears 63 times in the Old Testament and never in any other sense." "The attempts of Neubauer, Grätz *et al.*, to find Nazareth in the Talmud, and to identify it with Galilee, have not succeeded." "Epiphanius attests unequivocally that the Nazarees (*Nasrapaios*, the one form of the name that renders exactly the Hebrew and Syrian Nasarya)" existed before Christ and knew not Christ." . . . "It is impossible that these pre-Christian Nazarees could have derived their name from Nazareth, with which they stood in no connection. We may be sure that they thought of God as Preserver (N-S-R.)" This word (Nasarya) our author has now found in the great magic papyrus edited by C. Wessely (itself dating from the first half of the fourth century but copied from a very ancient document). It is there used in the exorcism of demons, as we have long known was also the case with the name of Jesus (cf. Heitmüller's *Im namen Jesu*). The invocation of this name at baptism and in magical healings stand thus in line with each other. For Jesus signifies Saviour (cf. Zahn's *Das Evangelium des Matthäus*), just as N-S-R. means *Preserver*. Matthew i. 21 proves this "clear as the day": "And thou shalt call his name Jesus, for it is he that shall save his people from their sins."

To our wielder of equations nothing seems more natural than the combination Jesus Nazaræus, and no less natural that the appellative Jesus (Saviour) as the mightier, holier, *positive* title should supplant the other (Nazaræus), meaning merely "Protector." To us it seems no more wonderful that some—especially Gentiles or foreigners—should attempt to explain this latter epithet as derived from a birthplace than that in the end, through some interpretation or analogy, a birthplace should speedily develop into a resort for pilgrims. How quickly places may acquire sanctity and actually receive sanction as being holy, we may see in the example of Lourdes, in which case a few lustra were enough, whereas in the case in hand centuries were at disposal. "This attempt was a quite natural and indispensable part of the one all-embracing process which rounded itself out in the Gospels, namely, the process of historization, of *underpinning ideas with historical details.*"

* * *

Us, however, it behooves to remain conscious, as were those who first spoke and heard the name, of its original ideal significance. "If a conspicuous man were named *Oliver the Protector*, every one would understand this epithet as it is written. It would occur to no one to refer the title to an obscure and otherwise unknown village of Protecteth, or Protecta. Precisely so, if he were named Publius Defensor, no one would ever conjecture that the surname Defensor referred his ancestry back to the unmentioned village of Defenseth or Defensas. Jesus Nazaræus, Jesus the Guardian, is quite parallel with Zeus Xenios, Hermes Psychopompos, Yahveh Sabaoth, and countless others in both classical and Semitic languages."

* * *

A mousing Biblical critic might here start many a question that it would be hard to answer save *in sensu mystico*. As, why did the parents of Jesus (parents in the strict sense according to the Sinaitic Syriac Gospel, the oldest text yet discovered) bear exactly the names of *Joseph* (the patriarch that delivered his father and brethren in Egypt, that is in Gentiledom, outside of Zion) and of *Miriam*, sister of Moses, witness and mediator of the deliverance of the lawgiver of the Nile, *who called his mother as nurse of the Child?* Of precisely that woman who marched as guide along with Moses and Aaron before the Israelites? At the significance of these names and at other considerations (as the chastity of Joseph) I shall

here only glance. They are especially important for the needs of Gentle Christians, in the historical outfitting of the Idea. Miriam means beauty, Joseph the *additional* son, (Gen. xxx. 24) or according to Gen. xxx. 23 (though this appears philologically inadmissible), he who hath taken away the shame. And why at his birth do the parents of Jesus go to Bethlehem, literally place of food, of (heavenly) bread—to the “city of David,” where lay that field of Boas who there met the foreign gleaner Ruth, soon to become his wife and ancestral mother of David and Jesus, whence too the mighty men of David at peril of their lives brought him the water (of life) when the Philistines had beset the place (2 Sam. xxiii. 13-17)?

* * *

The orthodoxy of a spiritually elevated humanity will some day find its confirmation in such “facts” as these, which indeed have always afforded the Bible reader, illuminated by the “Holy Spirit,” his last refuge from internal doubt and contradiction, from external strife and attack. Even now the *positive* criticism of our author directs the attention of Orthodoxy to a most important fundamental consideration: “We recognize now clearly the open secret of the triumph of Athanasius and of the foredoomed failure of Arianism as well in its ancient as in its modern forms” (as Socianism or the “Germanism” of Herr Chamberlain).—The loftiest spirits of the ancient Church, as Augustine in his *Confessions* (VII, 19, on gross misconceptions of the Incarnation) have always found the solution of this enigma only in a strict dogmatic, never in an historical, interpretation. “Jehovah and Messiah” are exchangeable ideas that can never be parted asunder by pragmatic distinctions. How did it come to pass that precisely the most radical assailants of the Christ “after the flesh” in the first real battle for dogma, that precisely Marcellus and Photinus, were out-and-out Athanasians? Herewith too a strange light is shed upon the doctrine of Apollinaris, that the Incarnation of Christ is accomplished only *in the believer*, and the merely *practical* rejoinder of Athanasius and Gregory Nazianzen, that hereto a divine *model was needed!* In this light Nestorius, who first attacked the idea of the “Mother of God,” appears as a rigorously orthodox heresy-hater.

* * *

See how our author lays bare the very root of the matter: “No matter by what transcendent abilities conducted, no matter by what learning and logic and devoted zeal, the attempt to deduce Christian-

ity from a man, no matter how magnified, must prove forever abortive. For the Jesus Christ of primitive Christianity was not human but Divine, the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords, the Saviour, the Deliverer, the *Guardian-God*. *

* * *

From this orthodox point of view our uncompromising mathematician proceeds straightway to inquire into the primitive sense of the preaching of the Anastasis, "God hath raised up Jesus." His starting-point is the remarkable discussion (by the disciples) of the significance of this promised Resurrection: "What is it, to arise (from the dead)?" (Mark ix. 10).

Long ago Spinoza (in his twenty-third letter to Oldenburg) advanced a purely spiritual interpretation of this "Resurrection from the dead," aligning it with "Let the dead bury their dead." But our author is at once more definite and more radical. For him the original apostolic reference was to the *Installation as Son*, the determination to Sonship, as written in the second Psalm: "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." The passage in Acts (xiii. 23f), which teaches the upraising of Jesus with express reference to this Psalm, is so very important because it discovers the *original idea and the process of transformation* to a wholly different meaning. Paul's sermon on Mars' Hill was so exclusively a "Gospel of Jesus and Anastasis" (Acts xvii. 18) that the sensation-loving Athenians understood it outright as the introduction of two "new Gods." The meaning of this primitive preaching of the Upraising is given in the Psalm: It is the inauguration of the Son-of-Man as the *active Representative Godhead*. This Son-of-Man was an over-earthly being, vicegerent of the highest Godhead, who receives an "eternal dominion and indestructible kingdom" (Dan. vii. 14). In the doctrine of the Naassenes (highly enlightened pre-Christian Gnostics) this Son-of-Man (Barnasha) signifies human being, almost abstract *Humanity*. "This kingdom" (says our author) "actually embraced all peoples, tribes and tongues, and was so far forth an earthly kingdom; but it was handed over in Heaven by and before the "Ancient of Days" and so was a kingdom of Heaven, even as its king was a citizen of Heaven." The establishment of this kingdom of Heaven (Malkuth Schamajim) on earth was originally conceived as that precious fragment of a purely human apocalypse paints it, as a kingdom of the righteous and the loving (Matt. xxv. 31-46; cf. Dan. xii: 1-4).

It was entirely in this Old Testament sense of the advent of Judgment at the hands of Michael as a kind of Vice-Jehovah (Dan. xii), or of Messias-Christus as Son-of-Man, that we find the kingdom of the skies proclaimed by the Baptist. But mark well a new and weighty observation! In the Gospel narrative it is plain to see that "the Baptist *did not himself at first proclaim* the Jesus." In Matt. xi. 2-6 and Luke vii. 18-23 we read: "Art thou the Coming One or look we for another?" The imprisoned John sends this question to the Jesus who had just appeared on the scene with an independent proclamation; says our author: "Here we behold the *confluence of two streams of religious thought*—The Gospel of the coming One and the Gospel of the Jesus, henceforth to mingle their waters forever. The first seems to have been almost pure Judaism, in fact perhaps Palestinian Judaism, that took its rise from Daniel and went not far beyond the current apocalyptic Messianism. The second seems to have been born in the Dispersion and was at first only half-Jewish and half-Hellenic or -heathen. As such it must have scandalized the strict orthodoxy of Palestine, the temple, the Sanhedrin, and while attracting a few must all the more have made the majority stumble. Such seems to be the meaning of the words of the Jesus: "Blessed is he whosoever is not scandalized *in me*." Verily these words also were prepared prophetically as a "stone of stumbling and rock of offense."

* * *

Jesus comes "out of Galilee" for the (Jewish) baptism of John, "out of the Galilee of the heathen" of Isaiah! In the darkness, in the region and shadow of death it was that the great light long prophesied arose (Matt. iv. 12-16). The Baptist at first knows not this Jesus (John i. 31). His "going into the Judean land seems to shadow forth the gradual progress of the Jesus-cult from the Dispersion into the orthodox Jewry." John the Baptist rejoices thereat. "He must increase, I must decrease. He that comes from above is over all" (John i. 30-32). Thus interprets our author: "Here seems to be set forth the gradual exaltation of the Jesus-idea over the idea of the Coming One. Certainly an antagonism between the two ideas is here cautiously disclosed.... There is no choice left us but to recognize the two great concepts of the Coming One (the Christ-Messiah) and of the Jesus as primarily distinct but finally fused into one, the world-conquering concept of the Jesus-Christ."

How different they were has already been stated in these terms at the close of the first essay, on the pre-Christian Jesus: "Moreover since the Jesus is called *Kurios* (Lord), the regular if not quite universal Septuagint rendering of the divine name JHVH, it is evident that the Jesus was from the start nothing else than a divinity, in fact God himself, but regarded *under a definite aspect, as a peculiar Person*, namely, as the *Deliverer*, the *Defender*, the *Saviour*; Christus (strictly Chrestus) denotes the *same Deity under a somewhat different aspect*, namely, as *Messiah, King, and Judge*.

The Mightier, who in the preaching of the Baptist should come, was none other than God himself as prophesied in Malachi iii. 1; iv. 1, 5. It was the *Union of these two points of view*, of the gentler Jesus and the sterner Christ, that yielded *Jesus the Christ, the Lord God of the Oldest Christianity*. The proclamation of this Union was the slogan of the primitive preaching."

* * *

That the Parables, the especial flower of New Testament poesy, the "convincing proof of its inspiration" (Jülicher), have in the process of the suns taken on other colors and indeed other forms than the original, our author is at pains to show in his fourth essay. "The Sower sows the Logos" *not* (he maintains) in the ethic-symbolic sense of the word of Salvation, of *conversion* to the kingdom of God. Nay, it is *God the Creator* who in his own person as Sower sows (in allegory) the divine Logos as *Seed-of-Men* upon the field of the world and beholds what fruit it bears. This is the doctrine of "cosmic seed," or, as we would say, of the "inner forms" of things, which Anaxagoras grounded and the Stoics developed into their doctrine of the *spermatic Logos*, the ideal seed of the World. According to Plotinus (*En. IV, 3, 10, 380*) the germinal Logoi form and fashion organisms like "microcosms." The spermatic Logos, observes our author, well versed in modern as in ancient lore, plays with Plotinus almost the rôle of the continuous germ-plasma of Weismann. The Jew Philo operates with this conception of the spermatic Logos as with a matter needing no explanation (*de. virt. II, 533f*). Among other Jews Justin in his so-called second Apology and James in his Epistle (i. 21) are cited to show how universally current in the Dispersion was this stoical notion of the Logos implanted in man. For "aside from two or three lines plainly interpolated, this Epistle knows nothing of historical Christianity. James is speaking of the ethical doctrine of the Dispersion."

Smith calls this original strictly allegorical version of the Parable the *Naassenic* version. On p. 118 he sketches with the hand of a master in philology how we are to conceive this primitive form.

These Naassenes, treated at length by Hippolytus, formed a pre-Christian sect which, so far from *perverting* the Gospel of the Cross, have preserved intact certain aboriginal types of Christianity. From them have been derived all later forms of Gnosticism. The Naassenic hymn quoted by Hippolytus celebrating the help of Jesus descending from the bosom of the Father to battle with the ills of the world, our author esteems not merely archaic, as do Harnack and Preuschen, but as preceding the Christian Scriptures and even the Christian era.

* * *

Herewith, in his last essay, "*Sæculi Silentium:—the Epistle to Romans before A.D. 160*," the author enters upon a more strictly historic field of investigation. Thus far he has dealt with the ideas themselves that determined pre-Christian Christianity rather than with the historic phenomenon and its documents. To be sure, the axe that is here laid at the tabu of New Testament criticism (the Pauline Epistles), threatens also at the same time their peculiar tendency, that "Pauline Christianity," so called with visibly increasing reluctance. But this daring path-breaker has already indicated that herewith he will merely pave the way to an illumination of the dark-hidden core of Christianity, the Life and Crucifixion of Jesus. The ignorance and uncertainty concerning the beginnings of Christianity, so keenly felt even in apostolic times, find their explanation in the fact "that the doctrine of the Jesus was pre-Christian, a cult which, on the border of the centuries (from 100 B.C. to 100 A.D.), was wide-spread among the Jews, and especially the Hellenists, being more or less veiled in "Mysteries." Not even a far keener-sighted explorer than any evangelist could have spied out and unearthed the origin of such a deep- and wide-rooted growth."

* * *

Here too the Alexandrine Jew of Acts (xviii. 24-28) serves our author as capital witness, Apollos, "An eloquent man and mighty in the Scriptures." This fiery spirit "was wont to preach and teach accurately the doctrine of the Jesus ($\tauὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ$) although he knew only the baptism of John." This singular character, already instructed as a "catechumen" in historical Christianity, of whose supposed definitive fundamental fact, crying aloud to heaven, he yet

knew not one blessed word, finds confederates at the opening of the next chapter (xix: 1-7). They are the "twelve disciples"—a canonic congregation—which Paul met in Ephesus, who knew not that there was a "Holy Spirit," who also had been baptized only with John's baptism, but none the less were "believers." Yea, even in the self-styled "Theophoros" Ignatius (of Antioch) we meet with so-called heretics who denied that Christ had been a man of flesh and blood. But all these merely negative considerations, such as the silence of Josephus, the silence of the *Autor ad Theophilum*, the mutual annulment of Matthew and Luke in their accounts of the Nativity,—*all these* are mere child's play compared with "the very serious riddle at the very threshold of the New Testament." How explain the through-and-through contradiction between the primitive *preaching of the Kingdom*, as an immediately imminent lightninglike and everywhere visible cosmic catastrophe, and the *teaching of the Kingdom*, as a gradual moral and spiritual development, proceeding step by step, as imperceptible as the sprouting of the mustard seed or the fermentation of the leaven? Compare Matt. xxiv. 27 with Matt. xiii. 31, 33; Mark iv. 26-28! Not Baur, the head of the critical school (to whom the first discovery of this contradiction is ascribed, p. 99), but Lessing's Wolfenbütteler Fragmentist, H. S. Reimarus, was the first to "find in this thoroughgoing contradiction the proper problem and goal of criticism," and in fact almost in our author's own words. Baur's two-term formula of Paulinism vs. Petrinism has long since ceased to satisfy. Of "ingenious" interpretations of the "Self-consciousness of Jesus" in this radical contradiction between his preaching and his teaching, our author will have none. He lays hold of the *historical setting of the whole process itself*. He conceives the fact of that contradiction "as only one among many similar phenomena of a *transformation of the propaganda*."

And it is on this threshold that we look forward to the promised continuation of our author's researches in such a well-ransacked region, indeed, with intense expectation. In this remarkable investigator, with all his radicalism, there breathes no breath of destructive zeal, but rather through and through, a *constructive and requickening criticism*. Will he be able to reproduce for us the historical picture of the great national-spiritual tragedy of the Destruction of the second Temple?*

* It may perhaps interest the reader to learn that Prof. Smith has assembled and hopes ere long to publish a large body of evidential matter bearing on this and related questions. Professor Borinski's own interesting interpretations are here omitted as only indirectly related to the subject of the review.

Investigations like the foregoing furnish clear proof that there is no better antidote for the much decried "destructive" tendencies of Biblical criticism than its own self: than resolutely to follow out its most delicate and "dangerous" researches and reasonings to the very end. For thus, instead of a timorous policy of barricade, behold the ancient truth revealed clear and pure, no longer indeed blinding, because now perceived with the well-armed eyes of science, but all the more overwhelming. For Truth stands never in conflict with Truth, and the Holy Spirit loses naught in power or dignity, whether it find expression in the life of an individual or in the firmly compacted intuition of an age and a race. Neither is the validity of the Biblical text for the churches hereby affected, whatever attitude they may assume regarding it. Is there not indeed far greater cause of uneasiness in the perpetual strife of dogmas, each denying the other and denouncing it as heretical? Is it not this very strife that has brought us to our present unbearable condition? Nay more, it is the eternal wrangle of the churches that has set Faith hopeless and helpless at war with herself, and it is precisely from such researches as the foregoing, which dispel doubts and annul contradictions, that the *Faith* of the best of every creed may hope to win security and unity once more. And if any man chooses to dub the result "docetic," because forsooth teaching that the history of Jesus is a fact not of history but of *Faith*, by all means let him have his word. In the spirit of real religion it is a title of honor. For was not Docetism the oldest, the *actually historic*, view of the story of Jesus? And is not this form of faith in that story the only one that can lend it virtue? It is only in presence of this genuine Faith in the Eternal Son of God, revealed in Righteousness and Love, and not in the presence of legends, miracles, and relics, that invincible Science is awed and lays down her weapons.

THE THEORY OF A PRE-CHRISTIAN CULT OF JESUS.

Prof. W. Benjamin Smith's collection of essays in German¹ on the origin of Christianity—which is sufficiently paradoxical in the circumstances of its publication, since it is the work of a distinguished American writer on mathematics—employs no small learning in the defence of a theory that is a still greater paradox. No

¹ *Der vorchristliche Jesus, nebst weiteren Vorstudien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Urchristentums.* Mit einem Vorworte von P. W. Schmiedel. Giessen: A. Zöpelmann, 1906.

historical hypothesis put forward by any competent scholar was ever more revolutionary, or more important, if true. For, while it is certain to seem startling, beyond any other possible hypothesis, to religious orthodoxy and critical conservatism, it is equally at variance with the fundamental presuppositions of the whole advanced school of New Testament criticism. Yet the argument is so skilfully handled, and so much apparent new evidence is extracted from familiar data, that one of the most eminent and most radical of the critics of the prevailing school commends the book, in a friendly preface, to the serious consideration of the Biblical scholars of Germany, and, while certainly not professing conversion, declares that the reasoning is "really by no means so easy to refute."

What we know as primitive Christianity, Dr. Smith contends, was the product of a vast and slow syncretism. The more fundamental and distinctive elements in it were derived from Gnosticism—of which movement, therefore, it was the child, and not, as has been supposed, the parent. The Christian faith of the second century emerged, through certain processes of fusion and modification, out of the doctrines of quasi-Gnostic sects that flourished in Syria at least a generation before the Christian era. The name of its reputed founder, Jesus Nazoræus, was originally that of a divine being or Aeon revered by the sect of the Naassenes,—and probably by others. The semi-human figure who is the hero of the Synoptic Gospels was evolved (chiefly as the result of the partial transformation of this Gnostic theosophy through its merging with Jewish Messianism) out of the celestial object of this primitive Jesus-cult. The resurrection-belief originated in a sort of etymological myth, due to the ambiguity of such words as ἀνίστημι, ἀνάστατος, ἐγείρω; the doctrine of 'the raising-up of the Christ' at first related, not to the reappearance of a body once entombed, but to the divine legation and the final triumph of the heaven-descended Messiah. The ethical and religious content of the extant Gospels consists, not of the utterance of a great Teacher more or less diluted and corrupted by the inferior media through which they are transmitted, but of the ultimate deposit of the reflection and discussion of several generations of men profoundly stirred by one form of that movement of mysticism, otherworldliness and aspiration after inner regeneration, which was then sweeping over the entire Hellenistic world. The literary excellence and the moral profundity of many of the sayings and parables in the Gospels is the result, not of the

inspiration of a single Master, but of the long social attrition through which they were sharpened and polished, and of the gradual process of spiritual selection of which they are the fit survivors. All of this Dr. Smith believes to be capable of proof. And, though further evidence is promised in subsequent publications, the substance of the proof to be offered seems to have been already exhibited chiefly in *Der vorchristliche Jesus*.²

There is, or ought to be, no *choue jugée* in history; and the present theory, revolutionary though it is, deserves—since it undeniably has extensive erudition behind it—to receive an unprejudiced and careful examination. Fortunately the main argument is reducible to a few clear and definite contentions. I shall try to state these in consecutive order; to indicate the principal evidence offered for each; and to give an opinion concerning the genuineness and adequacy of that evidence.

I. It is undeniable, Dr. Smith maintains, that sects adhering to a characteristically Gnostic type of doctrines and 'mysteries' flourished widely in the Hellenistic world during the first century B. C. and at the period of the diffusion of Christianity; and, by the showing of the canonical writings themselves, such sects looked upon the Christian teaching as akin to their own.—The argument for this preliminary generalization rests chiefly upon the case of Simon Magus (Acts viii. 9-24, supplemented by Justin, *Apol.* I, 26 and 56; Irenæus, *c. Haeres.* I, 22; II, 126; IV, 6). If we take the passage in Acts as the reflection—distorted under the influences of very obvious motives—of a historic character and a real situation, and if we identify this first-century Simon with the originator of the Simonian heresies described by Justin and Irenæus, we get a representation of an immensely influential leader who owed nothing to Christian teaching and whose propaganda began earlier than that of Christianity; who was no mere sorcerer, but the preacher of a universal religion based upon a philosophical monotheism combined with Gnostic dualism and emanationism; who was deified by his followers; whose own traditional attitude towards Christianity was friendly enough; whose followers were, in the early second century, not generally distinguished from the Christians; and whom patristic tradition regarded as the father of all the Gnostic heresies. The assumptions upon which this representation is based seem to me

²For the reader of English only, a first-hand account of Dr. Smith's hypotheses seems to be available only in his article "New Testament Criticism" in the *Encyclopædia Americana*. A part of the argument is, however, published in *The Monist*, XV, pp. 25-45.

fairly probable ones. But the fact remains that the Simon-legend constitutes a historical conundrum of an almost insoluble complexity. There were, as Schmiedel has pointed out, at least four figures of Simon, one of them being apparently the Apostle Paul (*Enc. Bib.*, s. v.) ; it is impossible to affirm, with any considerable degree of confidence, just where one of these figures ends and another begins. The whole matter is involved in the controversies over the authenticity and date of the Pauline Epistles; the sources and date of the Book of Acts; the date and sources of the *Clementina*; the respective characteristics and the precise relations of Petrine and Pauline Christianity. Dr. Smith can hardly be said to have settled all these related issues; and for the present, therefore, any argument founded upon the passages relating to Simon Magus must be regarded as somewhat less than conclusive. For all that it may be considered a reasonable probability, to which facts of several sorts point, that tendencies or organized sects characterized by some or most of the distinguishing elements of Gnosticism, and especially by a fusion of Jewish, Greek and Persian ideas, were not rare about the beginning of the Christian era; and that Christianity was only one example of a common type of innovating religious movement at this period.

II. The great point of Dr. Smith's argument, however, lies in the assertion that the name *'Ιησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος* is to be found as that of a Logos or divine emanation among one or more quasi-Gnostic sects of unmistakably pre-Christian date.—In point of fact, no example is offered of the employment of the two words in conjunction anywhere outside of the New Testament. It will therefore be advisable to consider the evidence concerning each of the two terms separately.

A. *The name 'Ιησοῦς.* I. The proof of the existence of a Gnostic Jesus-cult in the first century B. C., Dr. Smith finds, first and foremost, in a passage of the *Refutatio* of Hippolytus. There we are told (V, 6) that the sect of the Naassenes adored as the primary manifestation of the ineffable Deity an archetypal, celestial Man, whom they also spoke of as "Son of Man"; and in a Naassene hymn cited by Hippolytus (V, 10) the name Jesus occurs as that of a pre-existent heavenly being sent by the Father to the lower world as the imparter of the saving Gnosis to suffering humanity. Now, we have good reason to believe, argues Dr. Smith, that these Naassenes were pre-Christian. For Hippolytus's arrangement of the heresies is plainly meant to follow a chronological order. And

it is the Naassenes that he mentions first of all; they, the Peratae, the Sethians and Justin, all come before Simon Magus, whom tradition represents as an older contemporary of the Apostles and the father of all the heresies. Hippolytus, according to our author (p. 123), "declares repeatedly that the Naassenes were the first of the heretical sects, from whom all the others afterwards known as Gnostics derived (*Ref. V, 6, 10, 11*)."¹ "We may quite definitely conclude, therefore, in agreement with Hippolytus, that Naassenism was antecedent to Christianity, that it flourished before the Cross was preached, and that the later forms of Gnosticism were its offspring" (p. 124).

If the reader will now turn to Hippolytus* and examine the fifth book of the *Refutatio* for himself, he will be likely to revert upon these last-quoted sentences with some astonishment. For he will discover two things. First, Hippolytus in none of the passages cited makes any such statement as that ascribed to him, about the descent of all other Gnostic doctrines from Naassenism. The nearest he comes to it is to say that the Naassenes "afterwards called themselves Gnostics" (which does not imply that they were the only or the first heretics who did so, and that "separating from them, many devised a heresy, in appearance manifold, but in reality one" (V, 6); this last seems to refer merely to the diverse subdivisions of the Ophite sect. Second, Hippolytus in plain terms describes the Naassenes as Christians. They are classified as a "heresy"; they taught that the archetypal Man "descended in one man, Jesus, who was born of Mary" (V, 6); they traced their doctrine "through Mariamne to James, the brother of the Lord"—which, of course, shows them not only Christian but also, at earliest, of the first or second generation *after* the Apostles. Dr. Smith's omission to mention any of these statements of Hippolytus, and his citing of that authority as a witness in favor of a view of the date of the Naassenes which the very same chapters of the *Refutatio* categorically contradict—this is a thing so amazing that it is difficult to comment upon it with propriety. Perhaps the author proposes to begin his argument by striking out from Hippolytus's text all the numerous passages unfavorable to the theory of a pre-Christian Jesus. But nothing is said even of such a desperate way of dealing

* Having seen advance proofs of Professor Lovejoy's criticism, Dr. Smith takes exception to the implication of unfairness on his part in the citation of Hippolytus, and in the January number of *The Monist* will take the opportunity to maintain his position especially with regard to this point as well as other particulars presented by Professor Lovejoy.—ED.

with the difficulty. The unsuspecting reader is simply given to understand that Hippolytus plainly and consistently describes the Naassenes as pre-Christian; in point of fact, he plainly and consistently describes them as a late first-century or second-century Christian school. In view of this, Dr. Smith's long essay on the Parable of the Sower must also be considered a failure. It is designed to show that the parable is a reworking of a Gnostic cosmogonic myth, relating the Creator's dissemination of the *λόγος σπερματικός* among the different classes—pneumatic, psychic, choic—of mankind. The idea is not without intrinsic plausibility; but the argument for it rests entirely upon the assumption of the pre-Christian date of the Naassene version of the parable, given by Hippolytus. And this assumption Hippolytus himself expressly forbids.

It is, indeed, true that there is some (though little good) patristic evidence for the non-Christian—not the pre-Christian—character of the Naassene sect. "Naassenes" is, of course, only Grecized Hebrew for "Ophites" or "Serpentists"; and of the Ophites Origen avers (*c. Cels.* VI, 28—the passage is not noted by our author) that "they spoke against Jesus....and would not so much as listen to the name of Jesus," (which, of course, proves too much for Dr. Smith's case). But this is flatly contradicted by Epiphanius (*Adv. Haeres.* 37), by Irenaeus (I, 34); and by Jerome (*Adv. Lucifer.*, 23), all better authorities than Origen on heresiology. It is not impossible that there was a pre-Christian Ophism, under a Hebrew name; but there is no real evidence of its existence. And there is not the least reason for believing (even if such a hypothetical pre-Christian stage of Naassenism be assumed) that in such a stage the sect knew anything of the name "Jesus." For the only Naassenes of whom Hippolytus has anything to say were definitely Christian.

2. The author also adduces in favor of his theory the fact of the occurrence, in an "old" passage of the Paris Magic Papyrus, of the words: "I adjure thee by the god of the Hebrews, Jesus" (ed. Wessely, l. 3120). If, as some authorities suggest, the passage be pre-Christian, it is undoubtedly significant. But so long as the date of it remains essentially conjectural, no argument of any weight can be rested upon it.

3. In the New Testament itself, however, Dr. Smith finds evidence pointing toward his conclusion. In Acts xviii. 25 we are told of Apollos of Alexandria that, coming to teach in Ephesus, "he

was wont to speak and teach accurately the doctrine of Jesus ($\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\rho\tau\omega\ \text{Ἰησοῦ}$)," though "knowing only the baptism of John." One who "knew only the baptism of John," argues Dr. Smith, can hardly have had any contact with the Christian propaganda. Whence, then, his knowledge of "Jesus"—unless there existed, independently of the Christian Church, and before it, a Gnostic Jesus cult, of which Apollos was one of the itinerant preachers? The argument has a certain *prima facie* effectiveness; but Dr. Smith again shows a surprising facility of forgetting the context of his chosen evidential passages. There are two considerations which prevent the story about Apollos from serving our theorist's purpose so well as it at first appears to do. The essential point of that story, as conceived by the author of Acts, is clear. The conception of the Holy Spirit, and the doctrines of the power of the Apostles to impart it, and of its wonder-working presence in the Church, may be said to be theological hobbies with that writer. Now "the baptism of John" (in contrast with the orthodox apostolic baptism) had come to be almost a technical term, signifying a "baptism of repentance" merely in which there was no reference to the Holy Spirit and no impartation of it (cf. Acts, i. 15; xi. 6; viii. 16, 17; Matt. iii. 11; Mark i. 8; Luke iii. 16; John i. 33). And (as is clear from the immediately following passage, Acts xix. 1-6) the fact that the disciples of Apollos had been baptized "into John's baptism," was taken as synonymous with the fact that they "had not so much as learned whether there is a Holy Ghost." Paul thereupon administers the joint ceremonies of baptism and laying on of hands, and "the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spake with tongues and prophesied." Now, it is not only possible, but even probable, that there existed early communities of Christians to whom the (probably not primitive) doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and the tale of the marvels of Pentecost, needed to be taught; and in the Apollos-story we very likely have the traces of some such episode. Certainly such an explanation of it seems far more natural than Dr. Smith's, while it is equally adequate to account for the peculiarities of the incident recorded. It is, indeed, true (for the second consideration) that we are told that Paul baptized these disciples of Apollos "into the name of the Lord Jesus." This might (though it need not absolutely) imply that they had not before been baptized in that name. Such an interpretation would undoubtedly make the whole character of the doctrine and affiliations of Apollos rather obscure. There seems to be an inexplicable inconsistency between what is asserted

by xviii. 25 and what is suggested by xix. 4, 5. But if the author of Acts really intended to indicate that the disciples of Apollos had not been baptized in the name of Jesus, his testimony would be even more unfavorable to Dr. Smith's hypothesis than it is upon the other interpretation. For if, as Dr. Smith believes, Apollos's whole teaching centered about the "name" and the powers of a divine emanation called Jesus, and if (as the text affirms) Apollos observed the rite of baptism, it would be inconceivable that he should not have baptized his followers "into the name" of that divinity.

B. The term *Ναζωραῖος*. For the pre-Christian use of this term Dr. Smith seems to me to make out a not much better case. His principal arguments are these:

1. As every one knows, the traditional explanation of this adjective as derived from the name of a Galilean town has long been unsatisfactory. We have very good reason for disbelieving that, in the first century, any such town existed.³ Dr. Smith reviews the various theories that have been devised for dealing with this difficulty and finds all of them—even Cheyne's equation of "Nazareth" with Galilee—open to reasonable objections. Yet the word, for some reason, played a great part in early Christian nomenclature. Epiphanius says (*Adv. Haeres.* 29, 1) that the followers of Jesus were all called Nazoræans before they were known as Christians. The name persisted as that of a Judeo-Christian sect who acknowledged the Messiahship of Jesus, but insisted upon the observance of all the requirements of the Law.

2. It is etymologically possible to derive the word from νάζειν, "to guard, preserve"; "Jesus Nazoræus" would then mean "Jesus the Preserver" or "Saviour." If this were the title of a divinity worshipped by Gnostic sects out of which Christianity developed, the early emphasis upon the epithet would be naturally accounted for; while neither the title itself, nor the emphasis on it, can be made intelligible upon the supposition of its reference to a wholly obscure, and probably non-existent, town.

3. Epiphanius speaks (*op. cit.*, 29, 6) of *Νασαραῖοι* who "were before Christ and knew not Christ." This seems pretty direct evidence that the word was in use with some special religious significance in the pre-Christian period.

This evidence, also, does not appear conclusive; but it has pertinency and interest, so far as it goes. It may be that Dr. Smith has here hit upon a hypothesis that may eventually yield fruit. Yet

³ See Dr. Smith's article in *The Monist*, XV, pp. 25-45.

even here he overstates the testimony of his sources, especially in his treatment of the evidence of Epiphanius, which he regards as so "conclusive" as to be "in fact the end of controversy."⁴ Epiphanius, in the first place, expressly distinguishes the terms "Nazoraioi" and "Nasaraioi," and plainly differentiates the sects to whom he ascribes those names. The "Nazoraioi" were a Jewish-Christian or Ebionitish sect, well known to us from the references to them by Jerome and other writers, as well as from the description of Epiphanius. They "adhered to the Law and practised circumcision," they "did not renounce the Law and the Prophets," but "confessed all things exactly as do the Jews," "differing from them only in believing on the Christ" (*Epiphanius, Adv. Haeres.* 29).⁵ The "Nasaraioi," on the other hand, according to the Bishop of Constantia, were a pre-Christian sect, Jewish by race, and classified by him among the "Jewish heresies"; while they observed the rite of circumcision, the Sabbath and the Jewish feasts, they condemned sacrifices, ate no flesh, and rejected the Pentateuch, professing to be in possession of a more authentic Mosaic revelation. If the Christian "Nazoraioi" and the pre-Christian "Nasaraioi" were, as Dr. Smith contends, one and the same sect, it is curious that the vegetarian regimen and the hostility to the orthodox Law, distinctive of the latter "heretics," were not found among the former also. Moreover, the "Nasaraioi" are the peculiar property of Epiphanius; apparently no other patristic writer gives even a hint of their existence. His own information about them he presents as having come to him rather vaguely at second-hand (*ὡς ὁ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐλθὼν περιέχει λόγος*). Now a fact so significant as the derivation of Christianity and of the original name of the Christian believers from so peculiar a Jewish movement, could not have been unknown to other apologists and heresiographers. But Dr. Smith supposes that all save Epiphanius suppressed their knowledge, because the fact ran counter to the theory which they wished to establish, about the origination of the Church in the work of a personal Messianic founder. The "Nasaraioi" were never to be mentioned, lest the whole fatal story of the true descent of Christianity—now first revealed by a mathematician of New Orleans—should be given away. The supposition is far from plausible. A conspiracy of silence so extensive and effectual, about a fact that (according to the hypothesis) must at

⁴ *The Monist*, XV, p. 34.

⁵ So Jerome: *ita Christum recipiunt ut observationes legis veteris non omittant.*

the outset have been notorious and undeniable, would be a truly miraculous violation of historical probability. There is no reason to think that the early Christian writers had the wit to conceal so completely the skeleton in their closet, even if they can be supposed to have been, for some centuries, unanimous in a deliberate design to do so. Nor could such mere evasion have been a natural or effective policy for them. For their opponents, pagan and Jewish, must have known the fact as well as they; and one can well imagine how constantly (under the supposed circumstances) the name "Nasaraioi" would have been thrown into the faces of the Christians, and how imperative it would have been for the apologists to discuss directly, and to explain away, the connection of their Church and doctrine with this (*ex hypothesi*) familiar school of heterodox pre-Christian Jews.⁶ Out of a single description of a sect of "Nasaraioi" by a late fourth-century writer of not the highest authority, who confessedly knew nothing about them at first-hand, Dr. Smith fabricates a whole chapter of church history that is in the highest degree picturesque and engaging, but quite impossible of belief. The solitary testimony of Epiphanius—in view of the countervailing probabilities—is quite insufficient to assure us that there ever were any such "Nasaraioi" as he describes. He was capable of a great amount of confusion of names and of misapprehension of facts. But assuming that the sect existed as described, the antecedent probabilities concur with Epiphanius's own account of the matter, which is that the pre-Christian "Nasaraioi" and the "Nazoraioi," or early Jewish Christians, were quite distinct bodies, with different tenets and customs, with conflicting attitudes toward the Pentateuchal Law, and, indeed, with little in common beyond a similarity of names. Finally—and this is perhaps the greatest gap in the argument—Dr. Smith entirely fails to bring his pre-Christian Nasaræans or Nazoræans into any sort of relation to a Jesus-cult. The two halves of his principal argument fail to connect. "Nazarene" may possibly enough have originally been an epithet having some religious rather than geographical import; though we do not know what that import was, and the whole question is merely a field for ingenious and

⁶Lest the reader suspect me of exaggeration in ascribing to Dr. Smith this humorous idea of a conspiracy of silence about the "Nasaraioi," let me quote his own words: "The dumbness of other heresiologists....now becomes more expressive than their speech. It was just because they had wit enough to perceive the danger of discussing these Nasaraioi, that they maintained a prudent but ominous silence, broken only by harmless allusions to their heretical doctrines. But the valor of Epiphanius got the better of his discretion." *The Monist*, XV, p. 41.

unverifiable conjecture. But at all events, the first-century Jewish community who (according to Dr. Smith) had the name of Nazoreans, are not said, even by Epiphanius, to have maintained a cult of a divine being called Jesus; and the sect which did (according to Dr. Smith) maintain such a cult was not called Nazorean. We are still a long way from the beginning of a proof of the existence of a Gnostic pre-Christian cult of *'Ιησοῦς ὁ Ναζωραῖος*.

III. The words *ἀνίστημι* and *ἀνάστασις*, with their Aramaic counterparts, were—so the next argument runs—quasi-technical terms in the vocabulary of Jewish Messianism; they referred to the coming and triumph of the hoped-for Redeemer of Israel or of mankind; and the first preachers of the “Anastasis of the Christ” could only have been understood by their contemporary hearers as heralding the speed^ν fulfilment of this hope.—This contention Dr. Smith bases chiefly upon two sorts of evidence.

1. An examination of both the classical and Hellenistic use of *ἀνίστημι*, he maintains, shows that, when not qualified by other expressions, the word did not ordinarily or naturally suggest the idea of resurrection from the dead; while it was very familiar in the sense of the “raising up” or “bringing forward,” through providential agency, of a prophet or leader or king or deliverer or “horn of salvation.” The latter use unquestionably occurs in the New Testament, e. g., Acts iii. 22, 26; Heb. vii. 11. But the other meaning is, of course, far more common; and I can see no reason whatever for supposing it to be a later or secondary meaning. The verb is used—and used without *ἐκ νεκρῶν* or other explanatory context—with the sense “to restore to life,” in what was very nearly the most famous passage in all Greek literature—the speech of Achilles to Priam in the last book of the Iliad (550-551):

“οὐ γάρ τι πρήκεις ἀκαχήμενος υἱος ἐήσος,
οὐδέ μιν ἀναστήσεις.”

“For naught shall it avail thee to mourn thy noble son.
Thou canst not raise him.”

The same sense occurs again in a familiar choral ode of the Agamemnon of Aeschylus (1361), and the Electra of Sophocles (139). Dr. Smith assuredly knows these facts; he would, I think, have dealt more fairly with his readers if he had explicitly mentioned them—at least the Homeric instance—especially since he takes the trouble to explain away the significance of Lucian’s use of *ἀνάστασις*, in the sense of “resurrection from the dead,” on the ground of the

late date of the writer. This substantive, it is evident, must always have been capable of suggesting the same range of meanings as the corresponding verb. As for the Hebrew terms, the author's discussion of them is no more convincing. It is true that the causative (Hiphil) of שָׁמַע, "rise," does not occur in the Old Testament with the meaning "raise from the dead"; but the active form of the stem is used to signify "to rise from the dead" in Isaiah xxvi. 14, and Job, xiv. 12. These pertinent passages our author likewise neglects to quote. Dr. Smith's sixteen pages of labored reasoning on linguistic grounds seem to me wholly without valuable result.

2. A simpler piece of evidence, however, is found by the author in 2 Timothy ii. 18, where we are told that certain teachers, Hymenaeus and Philetus, declared that "the resurrection had already taken place." It is a little difficult to see how—even if we knew no more about the meaning of this than the author suggests—the text can be supposed to favor the present theory of the original import of *Anastasis*. For, in the first place, the resurrection in question must be either that of Jesus or that of Christian believers generally. But the writer of the pastoral epistles surely cannot have deemed it a damnable heresy to maintain either that Jesus had already been "raised up" as the Messiah, or had already been "raised from the dead." The question at issue is, then, evidently that of the resurrection of the faithful; and *ἀνάστασις* can therefore be used here only in the precise sense which Dr. Smith is intent upon showing that it did not originally bear. Furthermore, we know, beyond reasonable doubt, just what Gnostic heresy is here referred to; it is the doctrine—fully described by Tertullian and ascribed by him to the Valentinians, by Irenaeus to "the followers of Simon and of Carpocrates"—that the true resurrection of the believer takes place when, by the attainment of the saving gnosis, and through baptism, he is delivered from spiritual death (Tertull., *De Res. Carnis* 19, *De Praesc. Haer.* 33, Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* II, 31 § 2). Other canonical passages cited by the author in support of his contention are even more surprisingly irrelevant. In favor of his theory about the genesis of the Dogma of the Resurrection he cannot be said to have offered any substantial evidence.

Though there remain certain supplementary points urged by Dr. Smith in favor of his principal hypothesis, the foregoing examination covers all the arguments which the author himself appears to regard as fundamental. The long concluding essay *Saeculi Silen-*

tium,⁷ dealing with the relatively distinct problem of the date and authorship of the Epistle to the Romans, it is not possible to consider here. But of the main and most revolutionary theory, that relating to the origin of Christianity, it may be said, by way of recapitulation, that not only does the author's own evidence, when critically examined, fail to yield any material ground for the theory; but also that, in part, the theory is flatly contradicted by evidence in his chosen sources, of which, for unexplained reasons, he neglects to apprise his readers.

It remains to add that, while the foregoing examination has dealt with the hypotheses of *Der vorchristliche Jesus* as if there were no general, logical presumption either against or for them, they really conflict with all the antecedent probabilities in such a matter, and could therefore be justified only by the most overwhelming mass of specific historical evidences. For the theory of the book requires us to suppose that a being originally worshiped as divine, came, in a century or so, to be thought of as a person so definitely human as the central figure of the Synoptic Gospels: one born in plebeian family in an ill-esteemed province, who hungered and thirsted, who lived with publicans and sinners, who (except in manifestly late and corrupt passages) is represented as speaking little of himself, who denied his own omniscience, who was betrayed and given over to a shameful death, whose serene faith was transiently overcome in one awful moment of physical anguish on the cross; whose story was associated with definite places and historic characters, and whose brothers and kin and personal followers were, in the early second century, remembered as real persons. The Transformation of the Prophet of Nazareth into the strange, oracular figure found in the Fourth Gospel, is conceivable; but the transformation of a being even more vague and superhuman than that of the Fourth Gospel into the hero of the Synoptic Tradition, is a process that passes belief. We are not without historic examples of the apotheosis of great leaders of mankind; but there is surely no historic parallel for such a rapid and definite humanizing of a metaphysical hypostasis.

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THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL LANGUAGES.

In *The Monist* for October, 1907, there appears an editorial essay on "Artificial Languages," which seems to me so full of mis-

⁷ Discussed by the same writer in *The Hibbert Journal*, I, pp. 308-334.

conceptions and wrong deductions, that I venture to reply to the same. For this purpose it will be best to take such statements as I consider erroneous, and reply to them seriatim.

Dr. Carus says: "With all the interest we cherish for the promotion of cosmopolitan ideals, we do not believe that the aim can be reached by the short cut of an artificial language."

To this I would answer that this aim is only secondary, and that the object of an international language is primarily of a more practical nature, namely to make communications between persons of different mother tongues easier, whether they be travelers, commercial correspondents, scientists, missionaries, or what not. Whether or not a feeling of international goodwill springs up thereby (which seems probable) is a secondary consideration.

He continues: "We trust to nature and hope that nature herself will in the long run work out an international language, not by a formal agreement nor after the fashion of acts of international legislature, but by natural growth. When the time will be ripe the fruit will be developed, and we see the time coming when one speech will be understood all over the world. Esperantists are more enthusiastic and cannot bide patiently that far-away time. They think that by artificial methods they can improve upon nature's tedious processes."

This is the most astounding utterance of a devotee of the "scientific method" that I know of. Carried to its logical conclusion it would kill all effort in any direction; inventions would be useless, as nature will "in the long run work out" whatever is necessary, "when the time will be ripe." What is the use of "improving upon nature's tedious processes by artificial methods"? We might just as well wait for nature to build our railroads and steamships; it is certainly easier and requires much less effort.

The fate of Volapük is then explained, and the reason of its failure, but that is no argument at all against an international language. As the first really practical attempt at the solution of this difficult problem it was remarkably successful, and that it was not more perfect is easily accounted for by the fact that its "inventor" was a country priest who had never traveled and was more or less ignorant of philology or foreign languages. How many of the most useful inventions have been so perfect from the start that they could not be and were not improved? To take one instance out of many and one whose evolution we can watch at the present time: How many unsuccessful attempts have been made for the navigation of

the air, and still the experiments continue? So that the failure of Volapük and the probable failure of Esperanto are no proof whatever against the feasibility of the project. And here I would at once say that I hold no brief for Esperanto and am no Esperantist. With almost everything Dr. Carus says against Esperanto I heartily agree; from the very start I consider the alphabet too large, because it contains difficult sounds and such as are too similar to each other; and the use of diacritical signs is highly objectionable. Even MM. Couturat and Leau, who in their *Histoire de la langue universelle* have carefully analysed about sixty projects for such a language, and who strongly endorse Esperanto and consider it by far the best so far produced, devote thirty-three pages out of the sixty on Esperanto in their book to criticisms and suggestions for improvements. Although these suggestions are almost all very pertinent, not a single one of them, so far as I know, has been adopted by the Congress of Esperantists. This is sufficient proof to show that Esperanto, such as it is, is unfit to become "the" international language, and if all these improvements were adopted, it would no longer be "Esperanto."

In passing I would say that personally I consider "Bolak" as by far the best attempt so far made, even if the vocabulary is somewhat difficult; its grammar is certainly the most logical and the easiest, and with some small changes could be made to answer the purpose perfectly. But this is of course a personal opinion and carries no weight.

The editor favors "English as a world-speech" and says that it is "far easier and much more useful to learn English than Esperanto." There is no doubt that English to-day is far more useful than Esperanto, as English is spoken by about 200 millions and Esperanto not even by one million. But that it is "far easier" can certainly be disputed with very good reason. There are many trustworthy cases on record of persons having learned Esperanto sufficiently well in a week or two to be able to correspond with the help of a dictionary. And there are cases of persons and even children below fifteen having learnt Esperanto in three to six months sufficiently well to speak freely and even to make public speeches. Can such a claim be made for English or any other living or dead language? And I agree that Esperanto is not "as it claims to be," and I personally think that an easier language can be "invented." But here again it must be borne in mind that it is not absolutely necessary for such an international language to be so extremely easy, although

ease of acquisition is of course a great desideratum. The object of such a language is to serve for everybody as the "second" language, and the only one outside of one's mother-tongue (philologists or others taking special interest in languages of course excepted.) It will therefore, once such a language has been agreed upon, not be necessary any more to learn two, three or more foreign languages, in order to be able to travel in comfort, to correspond with foreigners, to read the most important scientific works, etc. Nor is such a language in reality intended for the present grown-up generation, but for future ones. It will therefore be taught in schools, and even if its vocabulary for instance should not be so "international" and therefore so easy as Esperanto, it would still require much less time for its study and much more time could be devoted to other studies in schools than at present.

But this is a digression; even if English were as easy as Dr. Carus claims, which is by no means the case, it would never be officially adopted as the international language, because other nations would very justly object to the great advantage English-speaking nations would thereby enjoy. But the English orthography alone is sufficient to prevent English from ever being voluntarily accepted as the international language. And he is right in saying that a reform of English spelling would not help much or would make matters worse. The fact is that the English alphabet is woefully deficient for the sounds it must interpret, and although the editor seems to delight in the incongruities of English spelling, I doubt whether there are many who share this delight with him. He says: "We must here enter a second protest against the statement [of the Simplified Spelling Board] that the traditional English spelling is a puzzle to the stranger within our gates. The writer at any rate knows from his own experience that his only difficulty with the English was its pronunciation, while the spelling was one of the greatest helps to enter into the very spirit of the language. In fact it almost seems as if the spelling were made for foreigners and if English were spelled phonetically it would add immense difficulty to such students." Now it might at once be said that much of the difficulty he found with the pronunciation resulted from the spelling, and if it had been spelled phonetically, this difficulty would have been much less. But leaving this point aside, Dr. Carus cannot take his own experience as an objective truth. He commenced the study of English, as he himself says, "at a comparatively late period in my (his) life"; he had a University training, a perfect

knowledge of Latin and Greek and probably of Old German or Anglo-Saxon, and he has a special talent for acquiring languages, as evidenced by his very thorough knowledge of English, his proficiency in Chinese, etc. How many of those who learn English have these advantages? I venture to say, not one per cent; and I doubt whether even he would have learnt it so well and so easily, if he had not lived in a country where English is the national language. Dr. Carus says that the *gh* in "through" reminds him of its derivation from the German *durch*, in "though" from *doch*, etc.; what proportion of those learning English spelling, whether natives or foreigners, are reminded of these etymologies? And are all foreigners studying English, Germans? Is a Frenchman also reminded of *durch* and *doch*? They only see that this *gh* is not pronounced and seems quite arbitrary, and that *ough* is pronounced in about half a dozen different ways, according to the word in which it is used (tough, though, through, thorough, plough, cough, etc.). To the vast majority of those for whom an international language is intended and even to persons whose mother-tongue is English, English orthography is an immense stumbling-block; in no other language are there so many dictionaries in use, almost at every one's elbow, to clear up doubts in spelling, and it is common cause of complaint in business houses that it is difficult to find clerks who know how to spell correctly. Even university graduates are often bad spellers; at least I saw such a charge brought against an entire graduating class at Harvard. Dr. Carus puts the blame for the difficulty children in English-speaking countries have in learning to spell correctly on "the methods of teaching orthography" and the "spelling primers," which "appear to be devised for the purpose of stultifying the children and making the study as hard for them as possible." If after ages of instruction and with all the advances made in pedagogy within recent years this is the state of our "spelling primers," the fault seems to lie not so much in the primers as in the orthography itself, and the utter absence of any system that can be intelligently applied to the spelling of English words, except by learning the spelling of every word by heart, just as a Chinese has to learn every character in his language by heart. The saying of the late President McKinley* which Dr. Carus cites, that "that man must be a fool who could not spell a word in several ways," was certainly intended as a joke, or if meant in earnest, is on the

* By "our great martyr president" (*Monist*, XVII, 617) the editor had reference to Lincoln and not to President McKinley.

same level as that other saying of his that "a cheap coat makes a cheap man," thereby putting a man's worth, not in his character but in his clothes, and forgetting that in the eyes of a swell, McKinley's own coat undoubtedly appeared "cheap." The fact of the matter is that no business house will knowingly engage an office man who does not spell correctly, and that the difficulty of English spelling is therefore a great drawback and detrimental to its ever being adopted as an international language, even if there were no other objections. But international jealousy and rivalry would prevent its adoption, even if English were in all respects fitted for such a purpose. I do not say of course that English is not largely used in international dealings at the present time, but an "international" language in the real sense is not this accidental use, but its formal adoption by all the leading nations for such an object. A short time ago French was the language most in vogue for this purpose, and it is conceivable that in the future some other nation may take the lead in world politics or commerce. In that case should Russian or German or Japanese or Chinese be used as the international language? Certainly neither of them could be called "easy." But to show that it is not necessary for the spelling to denote the derivation of a word, take for instance the Italian and Spanish languages. Are these any more difficult and puzzling because "filosofo, fotografo," etc. are spelled with an *f* instead of a *ph*? Not in the least; on the contrary, according to my humble opinion these languages and specially Italian, are much easier than English, and as they are also much more euphonious and, not belonging to any world-power, would not give rise to so much opposition and jealousy as English, either of them, but specially Italian, would be much better adapted for an international language than English, if any of the existing languages would do, which I doubt. The spelling of Italian and Spanish is almost phonetic and with a few slight changes could be made entirely so; after learning a few simple rules any one can read Italian or Spanish at sight, without understanding a word of these languages, while it is absolutely impossible to read English without knowing every word and even the meaning of sentences, as some words are differently pronounced, according to whether they happen to be used as a noun or a verb.

Another reason why English (or any other living language) ought not to be taken for an international one is that they are continually changing and adding new words, slang phrases, etc. which every foreigner would have to be continually learning, while an

artificial language, not being used colloquially among people of the same nation, would remain stationary and would adopt only such new words as would from time to time be officially promulgated by whatever central authority would exist for this purpose. How many to-day can read and understand the English of three or four hundred years ago or of even a nearer period? The editor says: "If the majority of people make up their minds to spell a word in a certain way, we for our part are willing to submit, and if the spelling is not sensible we can yield to the popular demand without great compunctions of conscience." This may be admissible for one's own mother-tongue (though I deny it even there), but it certainly will not do for an international language. Should the whole world be continually on the watch, whether "a majority" spell a word differently or attach new meanings to words? The very idea seems preposterous and is a strong argument against the adoption of any "natural" language for the purpose we have in view.

He says further: "The irregularities of our grammar are by no means a fault of our languages but a very useful contrivance of nature." Why this should be so is a mystery to me; we see that as languages evolve to higher grades, these irregularities tend to disappear, (for instance, all newly made verbs in French end in *er*); modern languages certainly have fewer of them than ancient ones, and English, the latest development of all, has the least. If "irregularities have not been invented to bother schoolboys but to facilitate every-day speech," then the most irregular language ought to be the best, and Dr. Carus contradicts himself by extolling English as the ideal world-language, when he gives as a reason for its becoming so "the simplicity of its grammatical and syntactical construction"; it would not be simple, if there were many irregularities.

Another objection which he urges against any artificial language is that if "certain roots shall have definite meanings and certain endings shall indicate definite grammatical relations, the number of word formations would be so great that we would be embarrassed by the wealth of the several modes of expression." This is the first time that I see this argument used as an objection to an artificial language; so far the objection has generally been on the other side, that there would not be enough words to express all the different shades of meaning. But I do not see the pertinence of the conclusion; only such words would be coined as are needed. Certainly it is an immense help to the memory, if from a comparatively

small number of root words any number of related ideas can be expressed with the help of well defined suffixes.

Dr. Carus says: "From among the many different possibilities, custom chooses one and stereotypes it to suit exact conditions."

This is undoubtedly the case in living languages, but in an international language, destined to be everybody's "second" tongue and not in everyday use among relatives and friends, no such "custom" would arise.

He says: "This process cannot be done by grammarians in the study." About this opinions differ, but the fact that it has been done and done sufficiently well to enable persons of different nationalities to converse together at their ease, though by no means in a perfect manner so far, seems to militate against this *a priori* reasoning. A great many authorities can be cited on either side of the question, and if a philologist like Max Müller says, that an artificial language can be constructed "more perfect, more regular and easier to learn" than any natural language, which statement can be supplemented by that of many other eminent philologists, philosophers and scientists, it carries at least as much weight as that of any number of other philologists, philosophers and scientists in opposition. A dogmatic "It can not be done," will not be decisive in view of the many discoveries and inventions that have been made in spite of positive predictions that it could not be done. Let it be tried, and if the first attempts do not succeed, try again and again; then we shall see whether it can be done or not. But even if all philologists etc. were in the negative camp, it would be no proof whatever. History teaches us that the members of a profession are generally the most conservative and opposed to any innovation. See the opposition of the medical profession to Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, to Vesalius's discoveries in anatomy, to vaccination, etc.; the engineers' objections to Stephenson's plan for a railroad, etc. If Max Müller has "declared one after another of the world-languages to be the best possible attempt," it only shows, if true, that he considered several of the attempts already made sufficiently good and coming up to the dictum as just mentioned by him. If therefore something better still is finally evolved, it will certainly "fill the bill" and be sufficiently good for all practical purposes; it need not be "absolutely perfect," if such a thing in any field of human endeavor is possible. Why should not Prof. Max Müller give "his blessing to Schleyer's Volapük" and later to Mr. Liptay's *Gemeinsprache*, when both worked in a field he so en-

thusiastically endorsed? This does not mean that he considered every attempt the best possible one, but only that it was an improvement on its predecessors.

The examples mentioned on page 611 of a foreign child saying "you gain," when she meant "you win," etc. militate against Dr. Carus's theory of using a living language with its many difficulties and ambiguities as an international one. In such a language every distinct meaning must have a special word, no matter whether they have this in English or any other language. Because the word "spring" in English means one of the four seasons, a mechanical contrivance, a jump, etc., is no reason why in an international language each of these meanings should not have its own distinct word, and then such errors become impossible.

The fate of Volapük and the probable similar fate of Esperanto and probably of others in the near future, is no argument at all against such a language. Dr. Carus quotes from a pamphlet of Professor Brugmann: "Volapük died a natural death.... The movement split into two camps. An international world-speech academy consisting of seventeen members of twelve different countries sought to preserve uniformity and union. The inventor of Volapük, Rev. Schleyer, was expected to join them, but he reserved to himself the right of vetoing their statutes in all questions of universal language. A union could not be attained and so the whole Volapük movement fizzled out." What does this prove? That the inventor of Volapük was unreasonable, and nothing more. But as Volapük was very imperfect, which as a first serious attempt was only to be expected, it is good for the movement as a whole, that he was unreasonable and that no union was effected.

Dr. Carus says: "Other philologists who are found in the ranks of Esperantists are Professors Schuchardt of Graz, Baudoin de Courtenay of St. Petersburg, and Jesperson of Copenhagen, but how Platonic their interest must be appears from the fact that they simply sanctioned the idea without attempting an invention of their own, in spite of being themselves trained philologists." This also is a strange statement; if they are Esperantists, why should they invent another language? They probably consider Esperanto good enough (with some modifications), or they would not be Esperantists. But granted that they consider Esperanto too deficient to become the international language, has every philologist the time or the inclination or even the capacity for such a tremendous work? Must every mechanician who is in favor of aerial navigation, try to invent a

flying machine, in order to prove that his interest is more than Platonic? The very idea is absurd.

Dr. Carus makes fun of Esperanto by saying "that *patro* means 'father,' and *patrino* (literally translated 'fatheress') means 'mother'; *junolo* means 'youth,' and since the prefix *mal* denotes a contrast, *maljunolo* means 'old man.'" I see nothing funny in this; such formations are certainly a great help to the memory, and while in cases like "mother" there might be another word, yet it should be allowed in cases of a lapse of memory to coin such a word with the suffix for femininity. In Spanish *hermano* is "brother," and *hermana* (literally "brotheress" or "female brother") means "sister." The same is the case in this language and Italian with the words for "uncle" and "aunt," etc. Has anybody called this an "amusing feature" of these languages before? On the contrary, for foreigners trying to learn them, it is extremely pleasant. If Professor Leskien, from whom Dr. Carus also quotes, cannot find any other objections or must even mention these to strengthen his case, it must be very weak indeed. What I wrote about "spring" applies also to his remark on the word "church," for "place of worship" and an institution like the Catholic "Church"; there must be different words, as they denote different ideas. Such objections seem to me puerile.

Dr. Carus says: "At the moment when Esperanto was actually introduced as an obligatory study in our schools and used for international purposes, the differences and divergencies of opinion as to how best to meet them, would lead to so much trouble that the whole structure would collapse." This does not seem to me at all probable; the very fact that an international language (whether Esperanto or any other) has been adopted by the leading nations and introduced into the schools, would show that that language had passed the era of "differences and divergencies of opinion," and it would be taught and learned like any other subject. In fact there would and could be less occasion for differences, once that stage is reached, than in many other subjects; there are continually new ideas and consequently differences springing up in physics, psychology, pathology, etc., etc., but that does not prevent these sciences from being taught and learned and used in practical life.

Whether a majority of "Academies" are at present in favor of, or against such a project, or whether they are undecided, as seems to be the case, from the quotation of Professor Brugmann's letter, that they "refused any expression at all," is of minor importance. This idea will have to fight its way against the conservatism of

academies and specialists like every other great idea that ever originated in the brain of man. Eventually it will not be Academies nor specialists who will carry this idea through, but men of affairs and action.

The statement that "languages are living organisms as much as animals, and it is not more or less possible to create spiritual than it is to create physical organisms," is certainly open to grave objections. There is no analogy whatever between a language and an animal, except in a very symbolical sense; languages have been created by men, though up to the present they have not been created perfect, but nobody has so far succeeded or is likely ever to succeed in creating an animal, no matter of how inferior a kind.

That it is easy to construct such a language, grammar as well as vocabulary, is by no means asserted; that there are many difficulties to be overcome, not the least of which is the apathy of the majority of mankind, is freely conceded; but that this should deter us from at least trying to solve the task, or that it is *eo ipso* impossible, not only to invent a language fit for the purpose but also to have it universally adopted, is strongly denied.

C. T. STRAUSS.

COLOMBO, CEYLON.

EDITORIAL COMMENT.

While I do not believe that the adoption of an artificial language which should serve as a universal means of communication among people of different nationalities is feasible, I propose to have the problem discussed, and will not hinder the good work if such it be. I am not an enemy to the propaganda, but on the contrary believe that the discussion of the problem and attempts at constructing a universal language will prove beneficial. I have criticized the views of the advocates of Esperanto, but from my own standpoint I wish to give my critics also an ample opportunity to express their opinions and to censure my own propositions. I will say, however, that though I have given a careful perusal to Mr. Strauss's letter, I have not been convinced by his arguments.

I will dismiss at once a consideration of Esperanto because Mr. Strauss seems to agree with me that it does not fulfil the requirements, but I will repeat here that in my opinion the use of English would serve the purpose of an International language better than any artificial language heretofore proposed, first because it is the

easiest language to learn, and in this general statement I include all artificial languages as yet invented. It is further spoken by the greatest number of people on earth, and is likely to become in the natural process of competition the world language so much desired by Esperantists.

I grant that for the purpose of expressing one's thought with nicety and in an elegant form English is as difficult as any other language, but for the purpose of communicating in a rough way our urgent needs English is quite recommendable, and how well it adapts itself to circumstances can be seen by the formation of pigeon English, which is a kind of literal translation of Chinese into English. It is by no means elegant English speech but it fulfills the needs of communication between the English and the Chinese.

It seems strange that Mr. Strauss calls upon the authority of Max Müller although he bears in mind my references to him on the subject which suggest that Max Müller's support of any artificial language must not be taken seriously. There are men, and sometimes very prominent men, who can easily be induced to lend their name for any purpose that is not obviously objectionable, and Max Müller appears to have belonged to this class. The same Max Müller who endorses several artificial languages as the very best, claimed that languages could not be made but originated through natural growth.¹

Mr. Strauss says that to consider languages as living organisms is "certainly open to grave objections," and I will say in reply that this expression is more than a mere figure of speech. Languages have become such by being used, by being spoken and understood, and their vital physiological growth lies in the brains of men. A language that lives in books only, a language which has never been in practical use, is not a language but is an artificial design for a language. I claim that it is as easy to produce as many artificial designs for languages as it is difficult to create a real language that would be actually spoken and serve as a means of communication. Our speech is a living language only because there are living structures in the brains of people into which it has been impressed, and the difficulty consists in making the meaning of words agree to such an extent that a sound uttered by one is understood by others in the sense, or approximately in the sense, in which it was pronounced. Languages themselves are mere vibrations of air, but a living speech

¹ Max Müller used the Greek term *θέσει*, not *φύσει*.

is a complicated organism the vitality of which lies in the cerebral structures of living and thinking beings.

I do not deny the theoretical possibility of constructing a living organism, but I deny its feasibility and also its usefulness. In the same sense I do not deny the possibility of constructing an artificial language, but for all that I deny both the feasibility of it and its usefulness. I believe that the international language which will be spoken by all mankind on earth will come. I have the firm conviction that it is bound to come. I also believe that those idealists who try to create an artificial language for this purpose will act as pioneers in the line of these aspirations, but I do not believe that they are called upon to complete the work or that they will be successful in their endeavor. They are and will remain voices crying in the wilderness, and the fulfilment of their hopes will be as different as the Christ that was finally accepted by mankind was different from the Messiah ideal of the disciples of St. John.

While I do not believe that we can make plants or even living organisms by artificial means, I do not deny that we can improve the existing species. Mr. Strauss misinterprets my propositions when he thinks that I would oppose progress or ridicule the attempts at improving existing conditions, be it in spelling or pronunciation or grammar, but the successful reformer in all lines will be he who follows nature and builds upon those products which nature has given us. Burbank and Nilsson do not try to create new plants out of inorganic matter but they take the plants which nature furnishes us and improve them in such a way as to be more suitable for our needs and purposes. Accordingly I suggest that the method of reformers in the line of language should employ the same methods. Let them take the languages that exist and improve them.

English has, at least in my opinion, the best chance of becoming the world language, but it is by no means the only language that competes for this place of honor. I believe that to some extent Spanish has also been extremely successful. It has conquered the entire America south of the Rio Grande, and I would point out that it also possesses qualities which would enable it to become acceptable as a universal language.

Spanish has two great preferences over the English. One is its sonorous sound, the other its spelling, but I can not help thinking that the spelling problem is not quite so serious as Mr. Strauss makes it. It will be settled one way or another within reasonable time, and while I propose to move slowly in the line of spelling

reform, because the present method does not appeal to me, I am in sympathy with the aspiration for reformed spelling, and perhaps also for a reformed pronunciation.²

In theory it is quite possible to construct a living animal. I learn that in one of the laboratories of Johns Hopkins University, organs of frogs have been so transferred that practically new animals are composed. The heart of one frog is inserted into another, and if I can trust my informer (Professor Mall) kidneys have been inserted in cats and rabbits in out-of-the-way places where these kidneys continued their original function of filtering blood and producing urea. The possibilities of artificial combinations of this kind are unlimited, but in my opinion the experiments prove as little the feasibility of constructing an organism out of inorganic elements, as reformations of speech, grammar, spelling, etc., justify a belief in the creation of an artificial language.

Mr. Strauss will say that this is a dogmatic assertion and I grant that it is. I can only say that those who believe in the construction of artificial languages are welcome to try, and if they fail to try again. I am willing to watch the several trials, though the lifetime of one generation will not be sufficient to see all the failures resulting therefrom. Mr. Strauss misinterprets my position in several ways, and I will incidentally collect a few of his comments. He thinks that I would imply that the most irregular language ought to be the best because I say that irregularities of grammar are useful contrivances of nature, occurring in the most used words such as auxiliary verbs and other terms of common use. But I deny that my view of the origin of irregular forms leads to the inference which he draws therefrom. Irregularities originate according to our needs, and to increase them beyond their needs would certainly not be desirable. In the same way in rapid writing, such as shorthand, we use certain abbreviations. They are useful and serve their purpose, but if we would abbreviate every word we would soon find out that they would no longer be serviceable.

I believe that if an artificial language would really be accepted it would very soon introduce certain irregularities, abbreviations, typical phrases, etc., all of which would form exceptions or special applications or peculiar modes of expression analogous to the ir-

²The English speaking people might meet other nationalities half way by dropping some of their peculiarities of pronunciation. In my opinion there is no reason to drop the *g*, *k*, and *p*, and other consonants before liquids. At any rate English speaking people can pronounce these letters as well as foreigners in such terms as *psychic*, *gnostic*, *gnome*, *knight*, *knife*, etc.

regularities of the natural languages. They all would have to be learned in the same way as the grammar and irregular forms of natural languages, and an artificial language would therefore have not the slightest preference in this respect over a natural language.

The choice of terms must be decided by usage. When I referred to the difference of meaning in "you gain" and "you win," and how these two words which originally meant the same had been differentiated in English, I meant to call attention to the fact that such differentiation of meaning and an establishment of one definite meaning must precede that state of a language in which it becomes definite and intelligible. So long as words may mean whatever they imply by etymology the language is still like a charade. Its meaning must be guessed.

I expect to see the dethronement of Esperanto from its present place of prominence, nor do I doubt that other attempts will be made; —or rather I am cognizant of the fact that they are being made now.

Mr. Strauss seems to think that the construction of such a language would not be easy while I take the opposite view. It seems to me that such languages can be constructed with great facility upon very different foundations, either upon the Teutonic elements of a pan-German, or upon the several idioms of Romance speech. In either case it would be easy enough to supply a grammar or a vocabulary analogous to those in existence, but to make such a language acceptable to the people, to introduce it, to impress it into the living structures of human brains will prove to be a task beyond the power of mortal man.

At any rate I feel sure that it could not be introduced by either a majority vote, or by force or through the instrumentality of governments, and if it existed, if it were really accepted, it would still be doubtful whether it would be a fit vessel to receive the thought of scientific work as well as the poetry of the different nations. If it would serve as a medium for commercial purposes it might not be fit for any other use.

The main objection to the English which finds the readiest echo is the argument voiced by Mr. Strauss in these words: "The other nations would very surely object to the great advantage English speaking nations would thereby enjoy." However, it seems to me that if English becomes the world language it will not be through the consent of other nations but by sheer power of circumstances. People of different nationalities must make themselves understood,

and I believe that the English language has so far best fulfilled all the requirements.

One reason why, according to Mr. Strauss, neither English nor any other living language ought to be selected for international use is the fact that "they are continually changing and coining new words, strange phrases, etc., which every foreigner would have to be continually learning." I reply that if Esperanto or any artificial language would become a real true international language it would just as much continually change and add new words. If it did not it would not serve its purpose. The introduction of new ideas, new views, new aspirations, etc., require new terms, and if such modifications were excluded from an artificial language it would never hold its own against a truly living speech.

AUTHOR'S REJOINDER.

With regard to your reply I take exception only to the last paragraph, wherein you imply that I made the statement that an artificial language would not need new words from time to time. I certainly think that it does need additions to keep up with the progress of the world. But while in natural languages these new words are coined either by the inventors of new "things," or by popular usage, in an artificial language it would be done scientifically to fit into the structure of that language. And I expressly stated in my article not that in an artificial language the introduction of new words and other modifications would be excluded, but that it "would adopt only such new words as would from time to time be officially promulgated by whatever central authority would exist for this purpose."

AN EXPLANATION.*

To the Editor of The Monist:

Permit me to rectify an error, or rather give an explanation, with reference to my articles on "The Third Movement of the Earth" which appeared together in the July *Monist*.

On page 401, lines 4 and 5, it is said that observations have assigned to the movement of the third rotation a velocity of 48" a century, which causes the rotation to be accomplished in 2,700,000 years.

* Translated from a personal letter of M. Bezau.

Then on the last line on page 404 we read that the movement is $46''$ and the rotation is accomplished in 2,800,000 years.

Here is a contradiction which would puzzle your readers and I owe you an explanation.

The number $48''$ is the result of my personal calculations, and $46''$ is that given by the *Annuaire du Bureau des Longitudes* at Paris. The two computations differ by the insignificant amount of $2''$. When I speak of my personal work I use my own figures. Under other circumstances I purposely employ the figures which have been scientifically approved.

Moreover, I was formerly in agreement with the Bureau of Longitude who then indicated $48''$, but the Bureau has changed its computations and now gives a velocity of $46''$.

If I had thought that the two contradictory figures would be used side by side, I would have made them consistent.

PIERRE BEZIAU.

PARIS, FRANCE.

"THE THIRD MOVEMENT OF THE EARTH."

To the Editor of *The Monist*:

The article appearing in *The Monist* of July, 1908, under the above quoted head, by Pierre Beziau is interesting from a certain standpoint and ingenious; but the author is handicapped in not being familiar with the mathematics of astronomy, and, we may add, with descriptive astronomy. If the matter had been as simple as M. Beziau seems to think, the labors of La Place, Le Verrier, Adams, and a host of other mathematical astronomers would have been rendered useless. The law of gravitation (which is that every particle in the universe attracts every other particle with a force varying directly as the sum of the masses of the two particles and inversely as the square of their distances apart) is the proximate cause of a wonderful complexity in the motions of the heavenly bodies. It has required the combined energy, skill, and genius of mathematicians extending over three centuries or more of time to reduce the apparent irregularities of motions of the heavenly bodies to regularity. The most refractory of all has been our nearest neighbor, the moon. She has up to the present moment successfully defied them all. She has yet a small irregularity which is a bone of contention among astronomers. Some say this irregularity is accounted for by the slight retardation of the earth's rotation on her

axis during the ages, due to tidal friction. Others say, "No. A part of this irregularity can be so accounted for, but not all." But for the most part the motions of the heavenly bodies constitute a solved problem; or, perhaps we should say, a series of solved problems.

M. Beziau's third motion is the present slow change in the obliquity of the ecliptic (the path of the sun's apparent motion among the stars, the real path of the earth, regarding the sun as fixed in space). He gives this change as $46''$ per century, given as $45\frac{1}{2}''$ per century by some authorities. Now, if this change were constant, the time would come when the axis of the earth's rotation would become perpendicular to the plane of its orbit; and still later the axis would swing over until it would lie in the plane; thus passing through every possible angle to this plane. But La Place reduced this motion and referred it to the law of gravity; and his computations have been since verified by other mathematicians. It is found that this change in the obliquity of the ecliptic is due to the change in the path of the earth's motion, due to the secular effect of the attractions of the other planets—sometimes pulling her off at an angle on one side of a fixed plane, and then on the other side of that plane. This fixed plane is one established by astronomers for the purpose of convenient reference for the orbits of all of the planets. It coincides nearly with the plane of Jupiter's orbit. The extreme swing of the earth's path from this plane is but 3° . At present the earth's orbit is about $1\frac{1}{2}^\circ$ from the fixed plane. The obliquity will continue to diminish for ages; but the extreme change of the inclination cannot be more than 3° from its mean position.

Even if the third motion were a continuous rotation instead of an oscillation, as it is, it would fail to explain glaciation. The mean effect of a fixed amount of heat radiated to the earth from the sun is the greater the more uniform be the radiation to the surface; for this reason: The production of ice and snow is rapid during the intermission when the heat from the sun does not reach the earth. The greater the ice and snow, the greater will be the portion of the heat reflected back into space. This fact, generally ignored by writers on glaciation, is that where ice and snow are formed the cumulative effect of heat is at a maximum when the radiation to the surface is uniform. This condition would be most nearly approximated when the earth's axis is perpendicular to its orbit. So here M. Beziau's reasoning fails.

M. Beziau attributes the change in the obliquity of the ecliptic to a change in the position of the celestial equator, or the equinoctial,

and says, "this movement has been attributed to the ecliptic since its discovery without profound investigation, and on this hypothesis La Place and Le Verrier have rightly limited its extent. They have not properly considered the hypothesis in which the movement would belong to the equator. In that case they would be able to limit neither its extent nor duration."

It is a sufficient answer to this statement to say: If the obliquity were due to a change in the equator, a certain change in the declination of the stars would result, while the latitude of the stars would vary in a different manner. But if the obliquity be caused by the change in the earth's path (the ecliptic) the case would be reversed. Now it is the fact that the latitudes of the fixed stars so change as to be explained only by a change in the plane of the ecliptic itself. A slight knowledge of trigonometry and a moderate familiarity with the facts of practical astronomy would enlighten M. Beziau upon this phase of his theory.

M. Beziau's so-called law that "The planets turn about themselves on an ideal axis perpendicular to the plane of their orbit in an opposite direction from their movement around the sun and in a time equal to that of their revolution," is a law only so far as appearances go. To one located at the sun they would appear to so revolve, and this is for the same reason that one looking out of a car window forward and to the right sees the landscape rotate to the left, while if he looks forward and out the window at his left the landscape appears to rotate to the right.

M. Beziau's statement is very far from the facts when he says the rotation of the earth and moon about their common center of gravity is the cause of the "principal irregularities," "of the precession, the retrogression of the nodes of the moon, the nutation, the oscillation of the lunar orbit, libration, etc." The fact is that none of these motions can be so explained. The only effect of the rotation of the earth and moon about their common center of gravity is to make a slight sinuosity in the paths of their centers. In fact, the change can be called sinuosity only when compared to the curve of average position; the actual line of motion in each case being always concave toward the sun, the center of curvature being always in a direction toward the sun; the radius of curvature of the path of the moon's center being longer at new moon and shorter at full moon, and the radius of curvature of the path of the earth's center shorter at new moon and longer at full moon.

Libration is very easily explained, and is not a motion at all,

but an apparent motion merely. The motion of the moon on its axis is uniform, while the angular motion in its orbit is variable; so when the angular motion is greatest, the motion of the moon on its axis appears to be slightly retrograde, and *vice versa*. Libration is an apparent oscillatory swing of the face of the moon, giving us an opportunity of seeing about four sevenths of its surface in the course of the lunar month. Besides the libration of the moon in longitude explained above, there is a libration in latitude due to the inclination of her pole to her orbit, first nodding one pole toward the earth and then the other, behaving as the earth does to the sun and from a similar cause. Again, a daily libration is due to the rotation of the earth on its axis. If we see the full moon at six o'clock p. m., we see a slightly different surface twelve hours later, due to our changed relative position, 8000 miles at right angles to the line of sight.

Precession and nutation are firmly established on a mathematical basis and by observation as well. The former is caused by the attraction of the sun and moon on the protuberant mass at the equatorial regions because of the oblateness of the earth's form. This is not a direct effect, but a differential effect—the difference between the attraction for the side toward the attractive force and that for the side from it. There is no foundation for the statement that attractive forces attract the centers of mass only. Attraction affects every particle separately, the same as though they were in no way connected. Precession causes the pole of the earth to swing around the pole of the ecliptic once in 25,800 years.

Nutation has a similar cause in the moon, causing the pole of the earth's axis to describe a small circle in the heavens once in a lunar cycle of 18.6 years.

Likewise the gradual change of the angle of inclination of the moon's orbit to the ecliptic is due to planetary attraction, and is an oscillatory change, not a rotation.

To go deeply into the mathematics of these questions would require volumes. There are a large number of apparent irregularities which M. Beziau does not mention, the change in the longitude of perihelion, the rotation of the line of apsides, changes in eccentricity of the orbits of the planets, and other smaller secular changes.

It will be sufficient to say, in answer to his broad claims, that practically all these apparent inequalities have been computed mathematically and have been verified by observation; and what will be necessary for M. Beziau to do is to overturn the mathematics of La

Place and all the great mathematicians since his time, if he would convince the scientific world. His "third motion" is as inefficient as were the cycles and epicycles of the old Ptolemaic system of astronomy.

And still further, M. Beziau's third motion is impossible from a mechanical standpoint. It is a well-known fact of mechanics that a rotating body can have but one axis of rotation when rotating freely due to its own momentum. If the body be impressed with forces simultaneously or alternately tending to give it motion of rotation about more than one axis a single resultant axis of rotation is produced about which single axis it will continue to rotate until some other impressed force causes a new single resultant axis of rotation. The gyroscope in its various forms is a practical illustration of this fact of mechanics. A force brought to bear tangentially to a meridian line of the rotating body will cause the axis of the body to describe the surface of a double cone, the center of oscillation being the common apex, and this is just what happens to cause nutation and precession by action of the moon and sun. Much more is to be found in the article by M. Beziau which may be criticised from the standpoint of mathematics and physics, but it would be useless to go farther; enough has been said to show how utterly untenable is his theory.

CHARLES H. CHASE.

LANSING, MICH., Aug. 1, 1908.

ON HYPERSPACE.

To the Editor of The Monist:

Although the statement of your position with regard to the question of hyperspace, as given on page 471 of your current volume, is in the main highly satisfactory, it seems to leave something to be desired. When we are confronted by an apparent breach of the law of continuity, it would seem more logical to explain it as the result of a relative rather than an absolute limitation. If I walk three paces and bring up against a stone wall I say, "Here is an obstacle that I can not at present surmount;" I do not say, "This is the end of the universe; there are no more paces beyond." That we are three-dimensional beings living in a three-dimensional world is beyond doubt; but it would appear logical to regard this dimensional limitation not as inherent in the nature of things, but as due to

some kind of constraint. In *Knowledge* (London, July, p. 157) H. Stanley Redgrove submits what he regards as a mathematical proof of the infinite dimensionality of space. Without discussing the validity of his reasoning here I submit that his conclusion is in stricter accordance with the laws of continuity than the ordinary assumption. My object in writing this is to make a suggestion regarding the kind of constraint to which our present limitations may be due—a suggestion which at the same time seems to offer a solution of a difficulty that must have presented itself to all students of this question. If matter may exist in a space of higher dimensions than itself, why might not two-dimensional or one-dimensional matter exist in our three-dimensional space? Now although, for argument's sake, two-dimensional matter has often been assumed, I have never seen any suggestion of its possible nature. Let us suppose an ether of three dimensions and matter consisting of modifications of portions of this ether—vortices, strains, or what you will. If these be due to three-dimensional motions, we shall have three-dimensional matter, but if we suppose the ether constrained in such a way that its motion shall be uniplanar (parallel to one plane) then, although the ether itself remains tri-dimensional, the material world due to it will be two-dimensional; in other words, the matter in this world, the natural forces, and so on will have, to all intents and purposes, only two dimensions. The molecules, to be sure, might really have three dimensions—they might be vortex-filaments, for instance; but so far as any mutual interaction is concerned—any sense-perception, for example, exercised by organisms made up of them, their world would be limited to two dimensions. Now, if this be so—and I can see no escape from it—we may in like manner have a four- or five- or infinite-dimensional ether constrained to perform all its motions parallel to a three-flat. Its motion might perhaps be called by analogy "uni-tri-flat." Then we should have the exact counterpart of our present universe; and such I prefer to think that it is. It would seem also perfectly legitimate to speculate about what might happen if the constraint should "slip a cog" and drop down to a four-flat constraint, or if it should be removed altogether.

All this is quite agreeable to your statement that "as soon as we make an *a priori* construction of the scope of our motility, we find out the incompatibility of the whole [four-dimensional] scheme"; only it views the incompatibility as due to some form of constraint and not to the inherent necessity of a tri-dimensional world.

It is evident also, of course, that the idea of such a constraint

is quite independent of the particular form that has been given to it in the above suggestion.

ARTHUR E. BOSTWICK, PH. D. (YALE).

NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY, July 27, 1908.

A COMMENT ON PSEUDO-GEOMETRY.

The article of Mr. Chas. H. Chase on "Pseudo-Geometry" in the last issue of *The Monist* (pp. 465-467) has most certainly been welcomed by all mathematicians, desirous of keeping our infallible science free from absurdities and chimeras. In fact it is surprising how the fallacies of Lobatchevsky and Bolyai could find so many followers. I maintain that Euclid's Ax. XI does not permit the existence of what its promoters call "non-Euclidean geometry" etc. Permit me to prove my position.

Two straight lines in a plane either intersect in one point or they are parallel. This fact is so simple that Euclid did not even deem it necessary to mention it as an axiom; however, it is necessary to bear in mind, that he had no conception of an unlimited space, plane or line, and that he reckoned with *positive* magnitudes exclusively. Intersecting straight lines converge towards their point of intersection and diverge from it, which fact, if the point of intersection lies within the illustration (drawing), can be observed by ocular inspection. It was the practical geodetist Euclid, who gave in his Axiom XI the means to ascertain the direction of convergency, if the point of intersection is at a distance. Now as much as the sum of the two inner angles on the side of convergency is less than two right angles, so much does it exceed 180° on the side of divergency, for the sum of all four of these angles equals 4 right angles. For the case that the sum of the inner angles on either side of the transversal amounts to exactly 2 right angles, this indicates neither convergency nor divergency in either direction: the two lines are *parallel*.

Euclid deduces from Axiom XI the theorem that *parallels intersect any transversal at equal angles*, which he makes use of to prove, that the sum of the three angles of a plane triangle equals 2 right angles. Perhaps it might have been of advantage to give the above wording to the axiom upon which to base the theory of parallels and make the present official wording a scholium.

May these explanations help to expel from exact science a plane that in fact is part of a sphere with an infinite radius, a triangle in

which the sum of the angles is less than 2 right angles, and a space of more than three dimensions.

FRANCIS RUST, C. E.

PITTSBURGH, PA.

MR. GERALD CATOR'S SCHOLASTIC GOD-IDEA.

Mr. Gerald Cator's article "Id Quo Majus Cogitari Nequit" is indeed what he calls it, "a scholastic essay." The character of his whole thought is scholastic and its deductions follow the method of scholastic logic. Modern thought has become alienated from this method of argumentation, and we feel sure that naturalists will simply turn their backs upon it. Nevertheless the article contains a good deal of thought which because of a general opposition to scholasticism is at present neglected. We are keenly conscious of the shortcomings of this almost mediæval mode of thought, and it seems strange that there are thinkers to-day who cling to it with such tenacity. But modern thinkers, especially naturalists, are apt to overlook the objective significance of pure logic and of all the interrelations implied in purely formal thought. It is for this reason that we deem it worth while to understand scholasticism and to preserve what is true in it.

Mr. Cator is certainly right when he insists, "that if to any degree we know anything, we can not be perfectly ignorant of anything else....Blank ignorance as to the nature of things is in the strictest sense impossible....Once true, always true, etc."—truths so often ignored by both the agnostics and the pragmatists.

Our thought indeed tells us something about the nature of reality, and modern naturalists use the same scholastic arguments much more than they themselves know. There is more apriorism even in a man like Haeckel than he himself is aware, although the modern naturalist is in the habit of denouncing apriorism and commonly thinks himself free from it.

The editor has treated Mr. Cator's subject in a recently published book entitled *God: An Inquiry into the Nature of Man's Highest Ideal and a Solution of the Problem from the Standpoint of Science*, and there is an agreement in the titles themselves, though Mr. Cator expresses it in abstract and more ponderous style for which the Latin language is more appropriate, saying "*Id Quo Majus Cogitare Nequit*." Considering the result, the agreement as well as the differences are obvious. While we believe in a center that

can not be shifted or changed, we insist that the center is not of an individual nature, it is not a particular place, it is not a personality after the fashion of man. The very expression "center" is purely allegorical, for it is a center which is omnipresent; it is an ideal center. It is a center only in the sense that the normative factors of the world constitute a unity, a systematic and consistent whole, but it is not local nor does it partake of any of the characteristics of particularity.

Accordingly we see in Mr. Cator's scholastic treatment of the subject an anthropomorphic statement of a truth of which he has caught a glimpse, and the significance of which he has understood as an astrologer may grasp the grandeur of astronomical truths.

EDITOR.

A COMMENT ON "EVOLUTION AND THE SOUL."

I read with great pleasure Dr. Carus's thoughtful and original paper in the April *Monist* on "Evolution and the Soul" and with his permission would make a brief comment.

I am glad Dr. Carus believes the universe is intelligible, and that he does not think the origin of life is an unfathomable mystery.

Dr. Carus affirms that "it may be considered as an established fact that life is a function, not an entity or substance." Who has established this? Are there not great physicists on the other side, and does not Dr. Carus hypothecate his own contention when he says that life is a "phenomenon *sui generis*?" And how does he know it is the "tendency of certain elements to organize into life-plasm?" Is it not well to remember that evolution is not a potentiality, but a path? Now a path cannot make itself, nor determine who shall walk upon it. Dr. Carus is so enthusiastically a monist that he hesitates to say there are two things, soul and body. Yet mind or soul may have been in some primeval atom, and while mysteriously united with matter mind may not have been an efflorescence from it. When we attribute an effect to the vibration of the ether, to chemical or physical action, have we exhausted the whole truth of things?

Dr. Carus states that "all existence bears in itself the power of spontaneous motion." Is not this disputed by the great physicists, for example, Lord Kelvin and Sir Oliver Lodge?

And does he not leap over the gulf (which he himself admits) between the physical and chemical world and organized life by the

phrase, "that every atom possesses subjectivity, a potentiality of feeling, out of which the soul of man is woven?" Is not this Tyndall's theory, though I believe he abandoned it in his later years?

Dr. Carus says "that mind is nothing but the sum total of, and the interactions among all these feelings." Is not this pure guessing? How does he cross the gulf between feeling and volition, sentiency and creations like the Parthenon, the Sistine Madonna, Hamlet, and *The Descent of Man*?

And I ask, how do we know that "character is a matter of form," that "life is simply a question of *form*?" Dr. Carus affirms that the material form produces the feeling. But may it not be that the feeling produces the form? Can blind forces create an intelligent soul? May not life, which is dependent on matter for its phenomenal appearance, be independent of it? Do things come to their fruition, not by the higher but by the lower element?

JAMES G. TOWNSEND.

JAMESTOWN, N. Y.

EDITORIAL REPLY.

The Rev. James G. Townsend is a preacher highly respected among the fraternity of Unitarian ministers, and we give publicity to his criticism to show our readers the problems implied and what men of a different position have to say on these subjects; but we hope we shall not be obliged for that reason to reply to all the questions that he raises, because they would actually demand the writing of whole volumes in order to be thoroughly answered. We can only say that the monistic world-conception is simple and disposes of many problems which in a dualistic philosophy become extremely involved and improbable. We can see the mind of a child grow in perfect parallelism with his body according to the amount of experience that he imbibes. We have every reason to assume that the origin of the soul takes place simultaneously with the origin of the body, and so we come to the conclusion that life, the activity of a living organism, is not a substance but a function. But even assuming that life were not a function but an entity, the difference of the life tendencies would originate according to their different forms and so even on this assumption character would remain a matter of form.

That certain elements have a tendency to organize into life plasm is a matter of observation, not of theory. It can be verified as well as the other fact that under special conditions some elements

have the tendency to crystallize. The same is true of feeling. That feeling originates is a matter of experience and the question is merely how to interpret its origin. The dualistic explanation advocated in former centuries must be regarded a failure on account of the extraordinary complications which it involves, while a monistic conception has so far proved satisfactory before the tribunal of science. The only objections which have been raised against monism have been made from the standpoint of religion on account of its insufficiency on moral and emotional grounds. And here I believe that a deeper knowledge of the facts will enable us to take an attitude that will overcome these objections.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

DIE PERSONENNAMEN IN DEN KEILSCHRIFTURKUNDEN AUS DER ZEIT DER KÖNIGE
VON UR UND ISIN. Von Dr. P. Engelbert Huber, O.F.M. *Assyriologische
Bibliothek*, herausgegeben von Friedrich Delitzsch und Paul Haupt,
XXI. Leipsic: Hinrichs, 1907. Pp. viii, 208. Price 36 m.

This volume contains the following chapters: (1) Preface; (2) List of abbreviations used in the book; (3) Introduction; (4) Enumeration of the several texts and publications from which the "personal names" have been extracted. This paragraph embodies also a discussion of the "mode of dating" the tablets, of the "nomenclature of the months," etc.; (5) The formation of the "personal names"; (6) Classification of names; (7) Names of women; (8) The "sacred names" used in the formation of the *nomina propria*, such as "names of gods," "sacred districts," "sacred cities," "sacred *Kultstätten*," "sacred symbols," "sacred *Kultgegenstände*," "deified kings," "foreign deities"; (9) List of "personal names" occurring in the documents of this period, so far published. This list is followed by an enumeration of the "names of gods," "names of deified kings," "names of temples," "names of cities," "names of rivers," and all other "predicative elements" which form part of the "personal names."

Seeing that the most important part of the book is the "List of personal names," I shall confine myself to that chapter. Right here, however, I must mention the fact, in order not to be misunderstood, that Huber, having been a pupil of Professor Hommel, would naturally follow quite closely in the footsteps of his teacher and master. Not only in the introductory chapters, but all through the book, in the several notes and explanations, we can detect the teachings of Professor Hommel, which are, though very often quite ingenious, mostly against the reviewer's own conception of the religion of Babylonia. It would, therefore, be entirely out of place here to argue against them with the pupil, instead of the master. Apart from this very marked influence every student of the religion and history of the Sumerians and Semitic Babylonians will know, I am sure, that most cordial thanks are due to Dr. Huber for his labors and pains in having put before the scholars and the public in general a compendium of names which reveal to us the very heart throbbings, the religious aspirations, feelings and teachings of a people living about 700 years before the time of Abraham, i. e., at about 2700-2300 B. C. In fact, the contents of this book are so important that no student of religion and history, but especially no student of the Sumerian and early Semitic Babylonian language, will be able to do without it. In short, the names contained in this book are a veritable mine of information.

On account of the importance of these names it is the more to be regretted that Huber was not quite equal to his task, that he was not able to do justice both to himself and the names here treated. It almost seems to me that the author undertook a subject which was and is somewhat beyond his capacities both as a Sumerian or Semitic linguist and as a student of religions—and this notwithstanding the fact that Huber himself is a theologian.

When using this book—in order to be reasonably certain of either the proposed readings or translations—the student will have to refer constantly to the original, so little reliable are the readings and translations. Single signs and whole groups of signs have been either misread, or misunderstood, or left out, or wrongly divided, or wrongly connected. In some instances only the first half of the name is given, while the other half is left out. In other instances the first half of the name is omitted, while the other half is registered. Sometimes the official title of a person has been made to be a part of his name, while at other times what was considered to be a title and hence was omitted in the transcription, forms an integral part of the name. The alphabetical arrangement is most careless, thus preventing the student, in many cases at least, to find the exact place where a name may or may not have been registered. Considering all these shortcomings, it is with a great deal of regret that we have to say that Huber had under discussion one of the finest subjects from a religio-historic standpoint, but he missed his opportunity!

To give and correct here all the mistakes, misreadings, and mistranslations would lead me too far. I shall confine myself, therefore, to a few most flagrant examples, which would justify the above-given criticism.

P. 41a, *ni-ku* in *A-a-ni-ku*, though followed by *lugh*, is a title. P. 42a.b, *Ab-ush (!)-shu-shag-ga*, *Ab-ta (!)-shu-shag-ga* and *Ab-ba-ush (!)-shu-shag-ga* are one and the same name. P. 44a, the *nu*, in *A-ga-nu*, belongs to the title *nu (!)-banda-gud*, which follows the name. *A-gish (?)-gibil-gim* is, of course, identical with the name read on p. 41b, *A-ba (!)-bil-gim*. P. 45a, *a-mur*, can never mean, according to Assyrian grammar, "sieht!" *A-mur-En-zu* means "behold, oh Sin!" This also against the corrections on p. 208, where the translation "ich schaute" is proposed. *A-chu-um-ilu* means "A is god." *A-chu-ba-am* has to be transcribed *A-chu-iqisha-am* (or *qâ'isham*), i. e., "A. has given," or "is the giver" (i. e., of life or of a son etc.). P. 46a, *Al-la-bil* has to be read *pa-al shangu-ne*. P. 47a, *Ama-ra-ki-ag-ra* is no *nom. pr.*, but signifies "to his beloved mother," notice the verb *ba-an-na-gi-in* which follows it. *Shim* in *Ama-shim* is the sign *SHIM+PI*. P. 47b, the first three names, beginning with *apin*, are no *nom. pr.*, but official titles. On p. 48b we are told that *Azag-ga-ni* is the father of *Nam-gin-tur-na-mu-tar*. But on pp. 138b, 139a the latter name is divided into two, i. e., *Nam-gin* is said to be the son (*tur*) of *Na-mu-tar* and of *Azag-ga-ni*! Does Huber call this *uniformity*, or will he deny in the face of this example that he had not the faintest idea of what he was registering? The passage from which these names are taken reads "so and so much for *Azag-ga-ni*, so and so much for *nam-gin-tur Na-mu-tar-dumu-ni*," i. e., "for the 'child's service' of *Na-mu-tar*, his child"; in other words, *Na-mu-tar* was a daughter (! *gin=amatu*, *nam-gin=amtûtu*, *nam-gin-tur=amtûtu sha märtu*, or something like it) of *Azag-ga-ni*; both, father and daughter, have hired themselves out and receive their wages! P. 49a, *Azag-lal* does not belong to the *nom. pr.* *Shesh-kal-la*, see p. 152a. The *A* in such names as *A-ga-ga*, *A-gish-gar-ra*,

A-gu-gu, A-gul, A-da-da, A-lul-lul, etc., etc., is not a part of the name but signifies "hire, wages," i. e., *A=bilat*, see *B. E.*, XVII, part 1, p. 38, note 13. P. 49b, the names *E-a-gal* (read *galu*-*bi*) and *E-a-gal-gu* belong together. Neither "*E. ist der Mann des Wortes*" nor "*E. ist der Mann von Gu*" is a correct translation. The sign read *bi* or *gu* is the same as that of *REC* 555. i. e., it is *duq*. Br. 5891; Meissner 4216; cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Z. A.*, XVIII, 120, 2. *Galu duq* again is an abbreviation of *galu duq-qa-pur=pacharu*, "potter," cf. II R 58, 57b, *dingir duq-qa-pur=ili E-A shá pa-cha-ri*. Both names, therefore, have to be translated "Ea is (was) the potter," i. e., "Ea has formed, created those persons." P. 51a, the "15" does not belong to *E-si*, cf. loc. cit., col. III, 14. *Edina* has to be read *RIQ* or *SHIM* and is an official title. P. 51b read *En-ud-sud-[shu]*. For *En-(d)Ba-u* read *A-SHAG asag (d) Ba-u*. *En-(d) Nannar* and *En-(d) Innanna-Unuk* are no proper names but signify "priest (*pashishu*) of *N*, and *I*." *En-lil-ki* is likewise not a proper name, but *dumu En-lil-ki* means "a Nippurian." P. 52a *Erin-da, Ib-da* (p. 52b), *U'-da* (p. 55b) are one and the same name; the first reading is the only correct one. P. 52b, *gal-til* does not belong to *Igi-bar*. P. 54a read *I-be-Sin*. P. 54b *Ish-da-gan* is only the second half of the name, cf. p. 154a, above. P. 55a *ni-ku* does not belong to *I-til (I-til-a=In-til-la!)*. *U-edim* has been misread; read (*sham*) *Shim-e* and cf. *En-u (=sham)-shim-ma*, p. 51a. The same misreadings we find again in *U-edim-Ba-u, Lugal-u-edin, Nin-u-edin*. P. 55b after *Utu-ma-Nina-ki* the *TAG* has been left out, for this name and its pronunciation see Br., Meissner, and Thureau-Dangin. P. 57a, for *Uru-gal-gir-uru* read *Ush galu gir-nita*, i. e., "Ush, the *shakanakku*!" (*Uru*)-*dun-gi-sib-kalam-ma* has been registered already on p. 56b. P. 58a, read *Gir* (or *Ur-ra-ur-sag* for *Uru-ra*). *Gin-ush-shal-mach* (p. 59a) and *pa-al* (p. 59b) after *Ur-E* are titles. P. 60a and p. 70a read *Ur-en-gal* (instead of *kul*)-*du-du*. P. 60b read *Ur-Ba-gá* (instead of *bi*!). P. 61a read *Ur-lil* (for *gal*)-*li*, cf. p. 64a. P. 69b read *Ur-zu-[ab]* and the name immediately following *Ur-du(l)-shar-gub-ba*, cf. p. 63a. P. 70a read *Ur-En-zu* (! for *u*). P. 75a read for *Ur-(d) ba-dug=Ur-(d) Dul-shar-gub*. P. 76a read *Ur-Engur* (for *(d) gar*). P. 77a read [...] -an (d) *Ba-u* for *Ur-(d) dingir-ba-ú*. P. 79b sub *Urkal-kal* cf. *Mi-da* with *Uri-da* (p. 56a)! P. 82b read *Ur-(d) En-lil-lá* for *Ur-(d) Sa-lal*. P. 83a *Uz-nam* is interesting. The tablet from which this name is taken is an "inventory," the line in which this name (?) occurs reads *us nam-banda NIN-AN-ra*, i. e., "the goats (=uz) of the prefecture belonging to *NIN-AN*," for which see also *B. E.*, XVII, p. 4, note 8.

But sapienti sat!

HUGO RADAU.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., Aug. 26, 1908.

Two publications lie before us which are an exposition of the bitter controversies that have ranged in Philadelphia concerning the dignity and ability of Prof. H. V. Hilprecht. We have abstained from making any reference to this very important affair, and do not now propose to enter into the details of the discussion. The publications before us contain a thorough exposition of the subject, and one of them, published by Professor Hilprecht himself, contains all the documents, evidences, and statements that have been offered pro and con. We learn that Professor Hilprecht is again in Europe, and fur-

ther books of his are in preparation. He has most assuredly done enough valuable work to be regarded as a scholar of first rank, and his labors are not yet completed. It appears that the much mooted temple library of Nippur is after all a reality in spite of the denial of Professor Hilprecht's enemies, for Dr. Radau is busily engaged in copying and editing its text. It remains to be seen how much our knowledge of the Orient, its history, culture and religion will be increased after their prospective publications appear. The first book in question is entitled *The So-Called Peters-Hilprecht Controversy* and contains two parts, first the Proceedings of the Committee appointed by the Board of Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, secondly, Supplemental Documents, Evidence and Statement. It is published in Philadelphia by A. J. Holman & Company. The other publication is a mere pamphlet entitled *A Non-Partisan View of Professor Hilprecht's Work*, and contains two essays, the second being Professor Hilprecht's Views regarding the Nippur Tablets from the Standpoint of an Assyriologist.

The controversy has done very little good and so far as we can see only harm. If it contains a lesson, it is that we should try to overlook the attacks or insinuations made by one worker concerning the ability or even honesty of a colleague. It may then be hoped that similar occurrences will not be easily repeated.

THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE SCIENCE OF ANTHROPOLOGY. By *Juul Dieserud, A. M.* Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1908. Pp. 200.

The author is a catalogue reviser on the staff of the Library of Congress, and the present book is the outcome of experience with the worries and perplexities which haunt the professional classifier. Mr. Dieserud is preeminently qualified for the task he has undertaken from his experience as classifier and later as librarian of the anthropological books at the Field Columbian Museum Library. In his introduction the author takes occasion to bring out a few salient landmarks in the evolution of the science of anthropology. Part I contains forty pages devoted to a study of the question, what anthropology is, and in this are discussed all the various phases of the science of man and the several lesser sciences into which it has been divided by different authorities. The next thirty pages are occupied with a careful scheme of classification which will prove invaluable to librarians. The largest part of the book contains a very comprehensive bibliography from the time of Magnus Hundt whose work was published in 1501, to 1905. In connection with each book, whenever possible, some idea is given of the treatment, either by quotation of the author's definition of his subject, or by list of contents or both. The appendix contains lists of "Anthropological and Ethnological Societies and their Publications," "Leading Ethnological Museums and Museums Containing Ethnological Collections," "Proceedings, etc., Examined of Anthropological and Scientific Societies," and "Periodicals Examined." An index to the authors enumerated in the Bibliography, completes the work.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. Edited by *Samuel Macauley Jackson, D. D., LLD.*, in 12 volumes. Vol. I. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. Price per volume \$5.00 (21s.)

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